
Conversation and Responsibility
Michael McKenna(Author)
Oxford University Press Inc
Published on 18. October 2018
Book
Paperback/Softback
260 pages
978-0-19-085778-3 (ISBN)
Description
In this book Michael McKenna advances a new theory of moral responsibility, one that builds upon the work of P. F. Strawson. As McKenna demonstrates, moral responsibility can be explained on analogy with a conversation. The relation between a morally responsible agent and those who hold her morally responsible is similar to the relation between a speaker and her audience. A responsible agent's actions are bearers of meaning--agent meaning--just as a speaker's utterances are bearers of speaker meaning. Agent meaning is a function of the moral quality of the will with which the agent acts. Those who hold an agent morally responsible for what she does do so by responding to her as if in a conversation. By responding with certain morally reactive attitudes, such as resentment or indignation, they thereby communicate their regard for the meaning taken to be revealed in that agent's actions. It is then open for the agent held responsible to respond to those holding her responsible by offering an apology, a justification, an excuse, or some other response, thereby extending the evolving conversational exchange.
The conversational theory of moral responsibility that McKenna develops here accepts two features of Strawson's theory: that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal--so that being responsible must be understood by reference to the nature of holding responsible--and that the moral emotions are central to holding responsible. While upholding these two aspects of Strawson's theory, McKenna's theory rejects a further Strawsonian thesis, which is that holding morally responsible is more fundamental or basic than being morally responsible. On the conversational theory, the conditions for holding responsible are dependent on the nature of the agent who is responsible. So holding responsible cannot be more basic than being responsible. Nevertheless, the nature of the agent who is morally responsible is to be understood in terms of sensitivity to those who would make moral demands of her, thereby holding her responsible. Being responsible is therefore also dependent on holding responsible. Thus, neither being nor holding morally responsible is more basic than the other. They are mutually dependent.
The conversational theory of moral responsibility that McKenna develops here accepts two features of Strawson's theory: that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal--so that being responsible must be understood by reference to the nature of holding responsible--and that the moral emotions are central to holding responsible. While upholding these two aspects of Strawson's theory, McKenna's theory rejects a further Strawsonian thesis, which is that holding morally responsible is more fundamental or basic than being morally responsible. On the conversational theory, the conditions for holding responsible are dependent on the nature of the agent who is responsible. So holding responsible cannot be more basic than being responsible. Nevertheless, the nature of the agent who is morally responsible is to be understood in terms of sensitivity to those who would make moral demands of her, thereby holding her responsible. Being responsible is therefore also dependent on holding responsible. Thus, neither being nor holding morally responsible is more basic than the other. They are mutually dependent.
Reviews / Votes
Conversation and Responsibility is simply a terrific book that repays multiple readings. Michael McKenna offers a rich and subtle exploration of a whole host of issues, takes a highly original and interesting approach of his own, and does it all in a most impressively judicious and open-minded way." Philosophical Studies McKenna has managed to turn the spotlight on an absolutely fundamental question * Just what is responsibility, anyhow?that has received far less direct attention than it should, and his treatment of that question is informed by a command of the contemporary literature that is at once deep and synoptic. The book is a tour de force, and everyone should read it." George Sher, Rice University* Michael McKenna's Conversation and Responsibility is a very important book, one that must now take pride of place in any philosophical conversation about moral responsibility for years to come." Criminal Law and Philosophy Michael McKenna's Conversation and Responsibility is an ambitious and impressive statement of a new theory of moral responsibility. ... Conversation and Responsibility... is meticulously erected and defended. The fundamental analogy employed is both illuminating and stimulating of further reflection and debate. Conversation and Responsibility belongs on the top shelf of any set of readings devoted to the contemporary discussion of moral responsibility." Philosophical Review
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
New York
United States
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 156 mm
Thickness: 15 mm
Weight
448 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-085778-3 (9780190857783)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

Michael McKenna
Conversation & Responsibility
Book
04/2012
1st Edition
Oxford University Press Inc
€185.30
Shipment within 15-20 days
Person
Michael McKenna is Professor of Philosophy and Keith Lehrer Chair, University of Arizona.
Author
Professor of Philosophy and Keith Lehrer ChairProfessor of Philosophy and Keith Lehrer Chair, University of Arizona
Content
- Preface
- Introduction: Moral Responsibility, Conversation and Meaning
- Chapter 1: Responsibility: A Conceptual Map
- 1. Kinds of Responsibility
- 2. Morally Responsible Agency
- 3. Moral Responsibility for Conduct
- 4. Holding Morally Responsible
- 5. Moral Responsibility, Entailment, and the Concept of Moral Responsibility
- Chapter 2: Reorienting Strawson's Theory of Moral Responsibility
- 1. Variations on Strawson's Theory
- 2. Embracing and Developing Wallace's Principle (N)
- 3. A Normative Interpretation versus an Extreme Metaphysical Interpretation
- 4. Two Distinctions
- 5. Resisting a Strawsonian Theme: The Explanatory Role of Holding Responsible
- 6. A Modest Metaphysical Interpretation
- Chapter 3: Moral Responsibility and Quality of Will
- 1. A Strawsonian Quality of Will Thesis
- 2. The Morally Reactive Attitudes and their Attendant Practices
- 3. Pleas: Reasons to Modify the Reactive Attitudes
- 3.1 Excuses and Justifications
- 3.2 Exemptions
- Chapter 4: Conversation and Responsibility
- 1. The Intimate Link between Being and Holding Responsible
- 2. Introducing a Conversational Theory of Moral Responsibility
- 3. Agent Meaning and Morally Responsible Agency
- 4. Agent Meaning and Action Meaning
- 5. What Kind of Meaning is Agent Meaning?
- 6. The Place of Meaning in Other Theories of Responsibility
- Chapter 5: Genuine Responsibility: Defending a Conversational Theory
- 1. A Robinson-Crusoe-type Objection
- 2. Why Affect?
- 3. Moral Responsibility without Desert?
- 4. Moral Responsibility with Desert?
- 4.1 Basic Desert
- 4.2 Ultimate Responsibility and What is Deserved
- 4.3 Axiological, Deontological, or Both?
- Chapter 6: Conversation and Deserved Blame
- 1. In Search of Desert Thesis
- 2. What's the Harm in Blaming?
- 3. Articulating a Desert Thesis for Blame
- 4. A Challenge for the Moral Responsibility Skeptic
- Chapter 7: Blame's Warrant
- 1. The Challenge of Proper Warrant
- 2. Justifying Blame in the Absence of Desert
- 3. Justifying Blame by Way of Non-Basic Desert
- 4. Why not Basic Desert?
- 5. Accounting for Blame's Warrant
- Chapter 8: Conversation and the Scope of Moral Responsibility
- 1. Blaming in the Absence of the Blamed
- 2. A Restrictive View of Moral Responsibility's Scope
- 3. Blameworthiness for Bad Acts?
- 4. Blameworthiness for the Nonvoluntary?
- 5. Conversation and a Unified Account of Moral Responsibility's Scope
- Chapter 9: Conclusion