Principled Ethics
Generalism as a Regulative Ideal
Published on 20. April 2006
Book
Hardback
254 pages
978-0-19-929065-9 (ISBN)
Description
Moral philosophy has long been dominated by the aim of understanding morality and the virtues in terms of principles. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists, who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. In Principled Ethics, Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever meet the particularist challenge head-on, and defend a distinctive view they call "generalism as a regulative ideal."
Reviews / Votes
Principled Ethics is an excellent work of philosophy...No philosopher working on particularism should ignore McKeever and Ridge's arguments...All in all, Principled Ethics is a highly stimulating read * Daniel Star, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews * an impressive counterblast to the particularists, and a genuine contribution to the debate * Jonathan Dancy, TLS * Despite the attractions of particularism, most philosophers feel that it misses something. McKeever and Ridge turn these vague worries into razor-sharp objections. Then they develop a moderate alternative view of how principles work in morality. For anyone tempted to become a particularist, this book is a powerful deterrent. * Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Dartmouth College *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 242 mm
Width: 162 mm
Thickness: 19 mm
Weight
539 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-929065-9 (9780199290659)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Book
04/2006
Oxford University Press
€60.00
Shipment within 15-20 days
Persons
Content
1. The many moral particularisms ; 2. Holism about reasons ; 3. Default reasons ; 4. Moral vision ; 5. Constitutive generalism ; 6. From moral knowledge to default principles ; 7. Beyond default principles or trimming the hedges ; 8. Generalism as a regulative ideal ; 9. Principled guidance ; Appendix