The Value of Living Well
Published on 30. May 2013
Book
Hardback
384 pages
978-0-19-993111-8 (ISBN)
Description
Since the middle of the twentieth century, virtue ethics has enriched the range of philosophical approaches to normative ethics, often drawing on the work of the ancient Greeks, who offered accounts of the virtues that have become part of contemporary philosophical ethics. But these virtue ethical theories were situated within a more general picture of human practical rationality, one which maintained that to understand virtue we must appeal to what would make our lives go well. This feature of ethical theorizing has not become part of philosophical ethics, although the virtue theories dependent upon it have.
This book is an attempt to bring eudaimonism into dialogue with contemporary philosophical work in ethical theory. It does not attempt to replicate the many contributions to normative ethics, in particular to thinking about the virtues. Instead, it attempts to contribute to metatethics - to thinking about what we are doing when we think about normative ethics. In particular, it attempts to contribute to contemporary philosophical debate on the nature of what is good for us, on what we have most reason to do, on what facts about both those ideas consist in, on the nature of values and value facts, and the nature of the reasons for respect for others we might have. Its aim is to mark off space in these debates where a way of thinking about ourselves and our agential, practical, natures as the ancients did can enrich our thinking about those deep and important questions. In this way the book makes a case for what we might call Virtue Eudaimonism.
This book is an attempt to bring eudaimonism into dialogue with contemporary philosophical work in ethical theory. It does not attempt to replicate the many contributions to normative ethics, in particular to thinking about the virtues. Instead, it attempts to contribute to metatethics - to thinking about what we are doing when we think about normative ethics. In particular, it attempts to contribute to contemporary philosophical debate on the nature of what is good for us, on what we have most reason to do, on what facts about both those ideas consist in, on the nature of values and value facts, and the nature of the reasons for respect for others we might have. Its aim is to mark off space in these debates where a way of thinking about ourselves and our agential, practical, natures as the ancients did can enrich our thinking about those deep and important questions. In this way the book makes a case for what we might call Virtue Eudaimonism.
Reviews / Votes
This is an exceptionally fine book... I recommend it highly to those interested in Aristotelian ethics, and I consider it essential reading to those who follow and participate in recent discussions in meta-ethics. * Gregory Mellema, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
New York
United States
Target group
College/higher education
Dimensions
Height: 240 mm
Width: 161 mm
Thickness: 25 mm
Weight
722 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-993111-8 (9780199931118)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Person
Mark LeBar was educated at the University of Arizona and has been teaching philosophy at Ohio University in Athens, Ohio since 1999.
Content
Introduction ; Part One ; I. Aristotle on Ends ; I.1 Human life and agency ; I.2 Ends ; I.2.1 Ends as constraints ; I.2.2 Ends, reasons, and <"for the sake of which>" ; I.3 The Aristotelian framework ; I.4 Unhelpful friends ; I.5 Scanlon ; II. Challenges to the Structure ; II.1 No Ultimate End ; II.2 Long-chains views ; II.3 The looping model ; II.4 The real challenge to the Aristotelian framework ; II.5 Pseudo pluralism ; II.6 Political pluralism ; II.7 Telic pluralism ; II.8 What the failure of telic pluralism teaches us ; II.9 Relative monism ; III. Living Well ; III.1 Ancient argument about our Ultimate End ; III.2 Begin with agency ; III.2.1 Subordinating patiency ; III.3 First nature ; III.4 Second nature ; III.5 The VE proposal ; IV. Succeeding as Rational and Social Animals ; IV.1 The contribution of rationality ; IV.1.1 End-setting ; IV.1.2 Judgment in action ; IV.1.3 Training the passions ; IV.2 Sociality ; IV.2.1 Sociality and shared ends ; IV.2.2 Caring for others ; IV.2.3 The agent-relativity of welfare and care ; IV.2.4 Living well in community ; IV.3 Individual difference ; IV.4 Autonomy ; IV.5 Objections ; IV.5.1 Misconceptions ; IV.5.2 Virtue's commitments ; Part Two ; V. Constructivism ; V.1 Motivation for the approach ; V.2 Taxonomy: Constructivism and realism ; V.3 Recognitionalism: Evidence for and against ; V.3.1 Rational recognition ; V.3.2 Reversal of values and conditional value ; V.3.2.1 RV and CV in Plato ; V.3.2.2 RV and CV in the Stoics and Aristotle ; V.3.2.3 Constructivism in Aristotle: the Doctrine of the Mean ; V.3.3 VR reconsidered ; V.3.4 The constructed value of unconditional goods ; V.4 Practical rationality, agency and activity ; V.4.1 Background: realism ; V.4.2 Action guidance ; V.4.3 The failure of recognitionalism ; V.4.4 Naturalism ; V.5 Particularism and recognitionalism ; VI. General and Particular ; VI.1 The basic argument ; VI.2 The problem in Kant ; VI.2.1 The problem in Korsgaard ; VI.2.2 The problem in Herman ; VI.2.3 The problem in O'Neill ; VI.3 The problem for generalist Constructivism ; VI.4 Recognitionalist Particularism ; VII. Fitting Judgment ; VII.1 First-person, third-person ; VII.1.1 Case in point ; VII.2 Constructivism particularism - an overview ; VII.3 Conditions of judgment ; VII.4 Fittingness ; VII.4.1 The fitting in Aristotle ; VII.4.2 The fitting in Samuel Clarke ; VII.4.3 The fitting in later theorists ; VII.5 Fittingness as a normative standard for judgment ; VII.5.1 The fittingness relation ; VII.5.2 What is fitted to conditions ; VII.5.3 Fittingness, the good life, and comparability ; VII.5.4 Examples ; VIII. Critical Assessment ; VIII.1 Evaluation, supervenience, and justification ; VIII.1.1 The nature of supervenience in detail ; VIII.1.2 Supervenience - explanation ; VIII.1.3 Supervenience - application ; VIII.2 Publicity ; VIII.3 The relation between standpoints ; VIII.4 Objectivity and subjectivity ; Part Three ; IX. Response-Dependent Value ; IX.1 Reasons, ends, and value ; IX.2 Early response-dependence accounts ; IX.2.1 McDowell ; IX.2.2 Wiggins ; IX.3 Value: Concept vs. Property ; IX.4 Response-dependent value ; IX.4.1 Responses ; IX.4.2 Subjects ; IX.4.3 Conditions ; X. Objections to Response-Dependent Value ; X.1 Subjects of the value relation ; X.2 Response-dependent value: backdrop for the problem ; X.3 Response-dependent value: the problem motivated ; X.4 Floating reference: a cautionary note ; X.5 Relativism ; XI. Other issues ; XI.1 The circularity ; XI.2 Cuneo on practical wisdom ; XI. 3 Hussain and Shah's dilemma ; XI.4 Euthyphro dilemmas ; XI.4.1 Shafer-Landau's dilemma ; XI.4.2 Timmons' dilemma ; XI.5 Timmons on moral symmetry ; XI.6 Moral psychology ; XII. Respect for Others ; XII.1 Expressions of the target idea ; XII.2 The problem in a cartoon ; XII.3 First step at solution ; XII.3.1 Constructing reasons for respect ; XII.3.2 Respect and rights ; XII.3.3 VE's analysis of claims ; XII.3.4 VE's analysis of other rights ; XII.3.5 Respect and living well ; XII.3.6 THe extent of respect ; XII.3.7 Two Kantian notes ; XII.4 Revisiting the concern ; XII.4.1 Wrong Attitudes ; XII.4.2 The two-level structure ; XII.4.3 Fit with ordinary practice