Higher-Order Metaphysics
Published on 21. March 2024
Book
Hardback
556 pages
978-0-19-289488-5 (ISBN)
Description
This volume explores the use of higher-order logics in metaphysics. Higher-order logics are natural extensions of the common systems of predicate logic, with a history going back to the very beginnings of formal logic. Such logics are well suited to formalize metaphysical views and arguments. Over the last decade, there has been a resurgence of interest in higher-order metaphysics.
Seventeen original essays are grouped under five headings. Three introductory chapters present higher-order languages and motivate their use in metaphysics. Three chapters on pure higher-order metaphysics discuss different options of higher-order languages and logics which may be used in metaphysics. Three chapters on applied higher-order metaphysics consider the application of higher-order logic to various central topics of metaphysics. Three historical chapters trace the development of higher-order logic as it relates to metaphysics over the last 150 years. The volume concludes with a discussion, containing two chapters criticizing the use of higher-order logic in metaphysics, as well as responses to these criticisms by two authors.
Seventeen original essays are grouped under five headings. Three introductory chapters present higher-order languages and motivate their use in metaphysics. Three chapters on pure higher-order metaphysics discuss different options of higher-order languages and logics which may be used in metaphysics. Three chapters on applied higher-order metaphysics consider the application of higher-order logic to various central topics of metaphysics. Three historical chapters trace the development of higher-order logic as it relates to metaphysics over the last 150 years. The volume concludes with a discussion, containing two chapters criticizing the use of higher-order logic in metaphysics, as well as responses to these criticisms by two authors.
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Dimensions
Height: 231 mm
Width: 150 mm
Thickness: 41 mm
Weight
998 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-289488-5 (9780192894885)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Peter Fritz | Nicholas K. Jones
Higher-Order Metaphysics
E-Book
04/2024
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€113.99
Available for download
Peter Fritz | Nicholas K. Jones
Higher-Order Metaphysics
E-Book
03/2024
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€101.99
Available for download
Persons
Peter Fritz is Professor of Philosophy at the Dianoia Institute of Philosophy at the Australian Catholic University, and at the Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas at the University of Oslo. He studied philosophy and logic at the Universities of Konstanz, Amsterdam, and Oxford, and works on logic, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language.
Nicholas K. Jones is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, as well as Official Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at St John's College, Oxford. He studied philosophy at the University of Leeds before receiving his PhD from Birkbeck, University of London. His research lies at the intersection of metaphysics with the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of language.
Nicholas K. Jones is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, as well as Official Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at St John's College, Oxford. He studied philosophy at the University of Leeds before receiving his PhD from Birkbeck, University of London. His research lies at the intersection of metaphysics with the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of language.
Content
Part One: Introduction
1: Peter Fritz and Nicholas K. Jones: Higher-Order Metaphysics: An Introduction
2: Andrew Bacon: A Case for Higher-Order Metaphysics
3: Jeremy Goodman: Higher-order logic as metaphysics
Part Two: Pure
4: Andrew Bacon and Cian Dorr: Classicism
5: Oystein Linnebo: Reality as tall and ne, not at and coarse
6: Laura Crosilla: Constructive Type Theory, An Appetizer
Part Three: Applied
7: Tim Button and Robert Trueman: A fictionalist theory of universals
8: Maegan Fairchild: Symmetry and Hybrid Contingentism
9: Harvey Lederman: Higher-order metaphysics and propositional attitudes
Part Four: History
10: Kevin C. Klement: Higher-Order Metaphysics in Frege and Russell
11: Fraser MacBride: Against Second-Order Logic: Quine and Beyond
12: Adriane Rini: Ordinary Language meets Higher-Order Quantication
Part Five: Discussion
13: Christopher Menzel: Pure Logic and Higher-order Metaphysics
14: Timothy Williamson: Menzel on Pure Logic and Higher-Order Metaphysics
15: Bryan Pickel: Against Second-Order Primitivism
16: Timothy Williamson: Pickel against Second-Order Primitivism
17: Agustin Rayo: Why I am not an Absolutist (or a First-Orderist)
1: Peter Fritz and Nicholas K. Jones: Higher-Order Metaphysics: An Introduction
2: Andrew Bacon: A Case for Higher-Order Metaphysics
3: Jeremy Goodman: Higher-order logic as metaphysics
Part Two: Pure
4: Andrew Bacon and Cian Dorr: Classicism
5: Oystein Linnebo: Reality as tall and ne, not at and coarse
6: Laura Crosilla: Constructive Type Theory, An Appetizer
Part Three: Applied
7: Tim Button and Robert Trueman: A fictionalist theory of universals
8: Maegan Fairchild: Symmetry and Hybrid Contingentism
9: Harvey Lederman: Higher-order metaphysics and propositional attitudes
Part Four: History
10: Kevin C. Klement: Higher-Order Metaphysics in Frege and Russell
11: Fraser MacBride: Against Second-Order Logic: Quine and Beyond
12: Adriane Rini: Ordinary Language meets Higher-Order Quantication
Part Five: Discussion
13: Christopher Menzel: Pure Logic and Higher-order Metaphysics
14: Timothy Williamson: Menzel on Pure Logic and Higher-Order Metaphysics
15: Bryan Pickel: Against Second-Order Primitivism
16: Timothy Williamson: Pickel against Second-Order Primitivism
17: Agustin Rayo: Why I am not an Absolutist (or a First-Orderist)