Truth and Skepticism
Published on 16. August 2010
Book
Hardback
264 pages
978-1-4422-0513-0 (ISBN)
Description
Robert Almeder provides a comprehensive discussion and definitive refutation of our common conception of truth as a necessary condition for knowledge of the world, and to defend in detail an epistemic conception of truth without falling into the usual epistemological relativism or classical idealism in which all properties of the world turn out to be linguistic in nature and origin. There is no other book available that clearly and thoroughly defends the case for an epistemic conception of truth and also claims success in avoiding idealism or epistemological relativism.
Reviews / Votes
Few philosophers have thought as long and as hard about the issues of the truth and our knowledge of it as Robert Almeder. And as so often in philosophy, they way to insight proceeds most smoothly along the path of criticism. By critiquing virtually all of the influential present-day opponents of his views, Almder manages to provide a firm footing for his own persuasive and eminently instructive position. -- University of Pittsburgh, Micholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Those who take the epistemic account of truth to be a non-starter should read this compact book carefully. Almeder goes on the offense here, and develops a pragmatist epistemology farther than anyone has before. A must-read. -- Linda Martin Alcoff, Hunter College, CUNY The most sustained defense of an epistemic theory of truth available, coupled with a detailed response to various species of skepticism. Highly recommended as a gateway to contemporary debates on the nature of truth. -- Paul Humphreys, University of VirginiaMore details
Language
English
Place of publication
United States
Publishing group
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 235 mm
Width: 157 mm
Thickness: 20 mm
Weight
587 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-4422-0513-0 (9781442205130)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Robert Almeder
Truth and Skepticism
E-Book
08/2010
1st Edition
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
€124.99
Available for download
Robert Almeder
Truth and Skepticism
E-Book
08/2010
1st Edition
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
€124.99
Available for download
Person
Robert Almeder was professor of philosophy at Georgia State University until his retirement in 2005. He is the former editor of The American Philosophical Quarterly and has served on the editorial boards of numerous scholarly journals.
Content
Preface
Part 1: Rejecting Correspondence and All Non-Epistemic Theories of Truth
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Minimal Requirements for an Adequate Theory of Truth
Chapter 3: Justification for Non-Vacuity and Reliability Principles
Chapter 4: The Core of Correspondence and Other Non-Epistemic Theories of Truth
Chapter 5: The Main Argument Against Correspondence and Other Non-Epistemic Theories of Truth
Chapter 6: How the Main Argument Differs From Other Similar Arguments
Chapter 7: Forestalling Three Predictable Objections to the Main Argument
Chapter 8: Does the Main Argument Confuse
Chapter 9: Does the Main Argument Require Abandoning Truth as a Goal?
Chapter 10: An Objection from Common Sense
Chapter 11: The Objection from the Paradox of Analysis
Chapter 12: A Proposed Reduction of the Main Argument
Part 2: In Defense of the Epistemic Theory of Truth
Chapter 1: Preliminary Objections to the Epistemic Theory of Truth
Chapter 2: Other Objections to the Epistemic Theory of Truth
Chapter 3: Conclusion
Part 3: Defeating Skepticism
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: The Moral of the Above Taxonomy
Chapter 3: Self-Defeating Skepticisms and the Strength of Global Weak Skepticism
Chapter 4: The Canonical Argument for Global Weak Skepticism and the Contextualist Response
Chapter 5: Other Critiques of Contextualism
Chapter 6: The Asymmetry Objection to the Argument from Ignorance
Chapter 7: Global Weak Skepticism as an Inference to the Best Explanation
Chapter 8: Is the Global Skepticism here Refuted Implied by the Main Argument?
Part 4:Conclusions
Chapter 1: The Main Problem and Future Prospects
Chapter 2: Blind realism and the Non-Vacuity Objection
Chapter 3: Does Blind Realism Presuppose Non-Epistemic Truth?
Chapter 4: The Fitch Objection
Bibliography
Index
Part 1: Rejecting Correspondence and All Non-Epistemic Theories of Truth
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Minimal Requirements for an Adequate Theory of Truth
Chapter 3: Justification for Non-Vacuity and Reliability Principles
Chapter 4: The Core of Correspondence and Other Non-Epistemic Theories of Truth
Chapter 5: The Main Argument Against Correspondence and Other Non-Epistemic Theories of Truth
Chapter 6: How the Main Argument Differs From Other Similar Arguments
Chapter 7: Forestalling Three Predictable Objections to the Main Argument
Chapter 8: Does the Main Argument Confuse
Chapter 9: Does the Main Argument Require Abandoning Truth as a Goal?
Chapter 10: An Objection from Common Sense
Chapter 11: The Objection from the Paradox of Analysis
Chapter 12: A Proposed Reduction of the Main Argument
Part 2: In Defense of the Epistemic Theory of Truth
Chapter 1: Preliminary Objections to the Epistemic Theory of Truth
Chapter 2: Other Objections to the Epistemic Theory of Truth
Chapter 3: Conclusion
Part 3: Defeating Skepticism
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: The Moral of the Above Taxonomy
Chapter 3: Self-Defeating Skepticisms and the Strength of Global Weak Skepticism
Chapter 4: The Canonical Argument for Global Weak Skepticism and the Contextualist Response
Chapter 5: Other Critiques of Contextualism
Chapter 6: The Asymmetry Objection to the Argument from Ignorance
Chapter 7: Global Weak Skepticism as an Inference to the Best Explanation
Chapter 8: Is the Global Skepticism here Refuted Implied by the Main Argument?
Part 4:Conclusions
Chapter 1: The Main Problem and Future Prospects
Chapter 2: Blind realism and the Non-Vacuity Objection
Chapter 3: Does Blind Realism Presuppose Non-Epistemic Truth?
Chapter 4: The Fitch Objection
Bibliography
Index