
Critical Systems: Formal Methods and Automated Verification
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Content
- Intro
- Preface
- Organization
- Abstracts of the Invited Talks
- Lessons Learned in a Journey Toward Correct-by-Construction Model-Based Development
- Model-based Testing Strategies and Their (In)dependence on Syntactic Model Representations
- Random Testing of Formal Properties for Industrial Critical Systems
- Contents
- Invited Talk
- Model-Based Testing Strategies and Their (In)dependence on Syntactic Model Representations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Problem Description
- 3 A Model-Independent Method for Input Equivalence Class Partition Testing
- 4 Model-Based Transformation-Invariant Calculation of Input Equivalence Classes
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- Automated Verification Techniques
- Abstract Interpretation of MATLAB Code with Interval Sets
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Contribution
- 2 Related Work
- 3 Abstract Interpretation of MATLAB
- 3.1 Syntax and Concrete Semantics
- 3.2 Abstract Semantics
- 3.3 Abstract Interpretation
- 4 Evaluation
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- Workflow Nets Verification: SMT or CLP?
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Workflow Nets
- 2.2 Modal Specifications
- 2.3 Modal Specifications Verification Method
- 3 Experimental Protocol
- 4 Results and Feedback from Experiments
- 4.1 Observation from State-Machine Workflow Nets Verification
- 4.2 Observation from Marked-Graph Workflow Nets Verification
- 4.3 Observation from Free-Choice Workflow Nets Verification
- 4.4 Observation from Ordinary Workflow Nets Verification
- 4.5 Lessons Learned from Experience
- 5 Related Work and Conclusion
- References
- One Step Towards Automatic Inference of Formal Specifications Using Automated VeriFast
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Architecture
- 3 An Inner Look at Automated VeriFast
- 3.1 Auto-generating Predicates
- 3.2 Auto-fixing
- 4 Automated VeriFast by Examples
- 4.1 Stack Example
- 4.2 Bank Example
- 5 Related Work
- 6 Conclusions and Future Work
- References
- Analyzing Unsatisfiability in Bounded Model Checking Using Max-SMT and Dual Slicing
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background and Motivating Example
- 2.1 Bounded Model Checking for Embedded Control Software
- 2.2 Example Model with a Counter
- 2.3 Motivation
- 3 Initial Condition Analysis Using Maximum Satisfiability
- 3.1 Max-SMT
- 3.2 Analyzing Initial Conditions with a Partial Max-SMT Solver
- 3.3 Example of Analyzing Initial Conditions
- 3.4 Limitations
- 4 Causal Path Analysis Using Dual Slicing
- 4.1 Dual Slicing
- 4.2 Causal Path Analysis
- 4.3 How to Compare Execution Logs
- 4.4 Example of Analyzing the Causal Path
- 5 Case Study
- 5.1 Outline of the Model and Problem Setting
- 5.2 Results
- 6 Related Work
- 7 Conclusion and Future Work
- References
- Towards the Automated Verification of Weibull Distributions for System Failure Rates
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Multi-state Failure Mode in Satellite Subsystems
- 3 Preliminaries
- 3.1 Continuous-Time Markov Chains
- 3.2 The PRISM Model Checker
- 3.3 Continuous Stochastic Logic
- 4 Approximation of Weibull Failure Models
- 4.1 Weibull Distributions
- 4.2 Increasing Failure Rates (IFR)
- 4.3 Decreasing Failure Rates (DFR)
- 5 Encoding the Weibull Models with CTMCs in PRISM
- 5.1 Encoding the Weibull Distribution with IFR
- 5.2 Encoding the Weibull Distribution with DFR
- 6 Conclusion and Future Work
- References
- Fault-Aware Modeling and Specification for Efficient Formal Safety Analysis
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Model-Based Safety Analysis
- 2.1 Fault Terminology
- 2.2 State-Based Fault Modeling
- 3 Fault-Aware Modeling and Specification
- 3.1 Fault-Aware Kripke Structures
- 3.2 Fault-Aware Linear Temporal Logic
- 3.3 Fault Injection
- 4 Deductive Cause Consequence Analysis
- 4.1 Conceptual Improvement: Safe Fault Sets
- 4.2 Efficiency Improvement: Fault Removal
- 5 Tool Support and Evaluation
- 5.1 The S# Modeling and Analysis Framework for Safety-Critical Systems
- 5.2 Evaluated Case Studies
- 5.3 Evaluation Results
- 6 Conclusion and Future Work
- References
- Model-Based System Analysis
- Block Library Driven Translation Validation for Dataflow Models in Safety Critical Systems
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Formal Specification of Blocks in Dataflow Languages
- 2.1 Example of Block Specification: IntegerDelay
- 2.2 Specifying a Block Family
- 2.3 Verification and Validation of Block Specifications
- 2.4 Handling Loop Constructs
- 3 Verification of the Correctness of Generated Code
- 3.1 Semantic Annotation of the Generated Code
- 3.2 Verification Using the Frama-C Toolset
- 4 Translation Validation of IntegerDelay
- 5 Related Work
- 6 Conclusion and Future Work
- References
- A Model-Based Framework for the Specification and Analysis of Hierarchical Scheduling Systems
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 3 Formal Model-Based Compositional Framework for Hierarchical Scheduling Systems
- 3.1 Automata-Based Models for a Scheduling Unit
- 3.2 Formal Analysis of Hierarchical Scheduling Systems
- References
- Utilising K Semantics for Collusion Detection in Android Applications
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Related Work
- 2 A Collusion Definition on the Android Level
- 3 The K Framework
- 4 Concrete Android Semantics
- 5 Abstract Android Semantics
- 6 Model Checking for Collusion
- 7 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
- References
- Unified Simulation, Visualization, and Formal Analysis of Safety-Critical Systems with
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Case Study: Height Control System
- 3 Modeling Safety-Critical Systems with
- 3.1 Model of Computation
- 3.2 The Modeling Language
- 3.3 Fault Modeling
- 4 Analyzing Safety-Critical Systems with
- 4.1 Execution Semantics of Models
- 4.2 Model Checking Models
- 4.3 Simulating Models
- 4.4 Evaluation of Model Checking Efficiency
- 4.5 Safety Analysis of the Height Control Case Study
- 5 Conclusion and Future Work
- References
- Applications and Case Studies
- Formal Verification of a Rover Anti-collision System
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The S3 Toolset
- 3 Specification and Design of the ARP Use Case
- 3.1 The Context of Use Case
- 3.2 System-Level Safety and Functional Requirements
- 3.3 System Design Choice
- 3.4 High-Level Software Requirements and Software Design
- 4 Property Verification
- 4.1 The Workflow of Property Verification
- 4.2 K-Inductive Proof of Safety Property
- 4.3 BMC and Test Case Generation
- 4.4 Safety Property and Map Data Validation
- 4.5 Property Verification Results
- 5 Equivalence Proof Between Design and Generated Code
- 6 Lessons Learned
- 6.1 Proof of Generated Code
- 6.2 Proof-Driven Design Guidance
- 7 Conclusion and Perspective
- References
- Verification of AUTOSAR Software Architectures with Timed Automata
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 2.1 Introduction to AUTOSAR
- 2.2 Timed Automata
- 3 Transformation of AUTOSAR Models
- 3.1 Transformation
- 4 AUTOSAR Timing Extensions
- 4.1 Timing Events
- 5 Implementation and Evaluation
- 6 Conclusion
- References
- Verification by Way of Refinement: A Case Study in the Use of Coq and TLA in the Design of a Safety Critical System
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Application: Arbitrary Waveform Generator (AWG)
- 3 Expressing the AWG in TLA+
- 3.1 Limitations of the TLA+ Framework
- 4 Expressing the AWG in TLACoq
- 5 Implementing TLACoq
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Application of Coloured Petri Nets in Modelling and Simulating a Railway Signalling System
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Introduction to the Railway Signalling Principle and Desired Properties
- 2.1 Railway Signalling Principle
- 2.2 Desired Properties
- 3 The Coloured Petri Net Model
- 3.1 Global Declarations and Route's State
- 3.2 Setting Routes
- 3.3 Clearing Signals
- 3.4 Approach Locked and Back Locked
- 3.5 Releasing Route
- 4 Lessons Learnt and Perspective
- 5 Conclusion and Suggested Work
- References
- Formal Techniques for a Data-Driven Certification of Advanced Railway Signalling Systems
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Innovation in Signalling Systems
- 2.1 ``Communication Based'' Distancing Systems
- 2.2 Highly Innovative Distancing Concepts
- 2.3 Distributed Interlocking Systems
- 2.4 Safety Paradigm Shift
- 3 Integrity and Consistency of Vital Information
- 4 Demonstrating Safety
- 4.1 Data-Driven Safety Design Techniques
- 4.2 Software Faults
- 5 Quantitative Dependability Assessment
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Author Index
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