Local Provision of Public Services

ContentsContributors Preface 1. The Tiebout Model after TWenty-Five Years: An Overview I. Introduction II. An Overview III. Conclusion References 2. The Theory of Local Public Goods TWenty-Five Years after Tiebout: A Perspective I. Introduction II. The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics with Local Public Goods III. Sufficient Conditions for the Efficiency of Local Public Goods Equilibrium IV. Inefficient Local Public Goods Equilibrium V. Land Capitalization VI. Rental Capitalization VII. Redistribution VIII. The Decentralization of Pareto Efficient Allocations IX. Conclusion References 3. Beyond Tiebout: Modeling the Political Economy of Local Government I. Introduction II. The Limits of Tiebout Models: How Far Can One Push the Competitive Analogy? III. Exit and Voting in Local Government Models IV. Toward a Political Economy of Local Government References 4. A Review: Is the Property Tax a Benefit Tax? I. Introduction II. The Tiebout Orthodoxy III. Challenges to the Orthodoxy References 5. The Incidence of the Property Tax: The Benefit View versus the New View I. Introduction II. Zoning, Capitalization and the Allocative Effects of the Property Tax III. Interjurisdictional Competition and the New View of the Property Tax IV. General Evaluation and Conclusions References 6. Income Redistribution in a Federal System I. Introduction II. The Model III. Optimal Federal Redistribution IV. Deductibility of Local Taxes V. Regional Cost of Living or Amenity Differentials VI. Tax Avoidance or Elastic Labor Supply VII. Conclusion References 7. Are Property Taxes Capitalized into House Values? I. Introduction II. Studies Based on Aggregate Data III. Studies Based on Cross-Sectional Micro-Data IV. Studies Based on Micro-Data Representing Tax Changes V. Conclusions and Suggested Further Research References 8. Voting and Spending: Some Empirical Relationships in the Political Economy of Local Public Finance I. Introduction II. Perception and Intergovernmental Aid III. Budget Cuts and Learning IV. The Size of Majorities V. Voter Turnout in Budget Elections VI. SMSA vs. Other Districts VII. Conclusion References