EU State Aid Control: Law and Economics

Name: EU State Aid Control: Law and Economics | Law and Economics
Brand: Kluwer Law International
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Law and Economics

Philipp Werner Vincent Verouden(Editor)

Kluwer Law International (Publisher)

Published on 16. December 2016

890 pages

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978-90-411-5148-3 (ISBN)

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In recent years, the European Commission has conducted an almost complete overhaul of State aid control in the European Union (EU). The State Aid Modernization (SAM) initiative has engendered new secondary legislation, as well as new guidelines covering practically all areas of State aid control, including both horizontal and sector-specific rules. Notable in these developments is an increasingly refined economic approach, both in the design of the rules and in the assessment of individual cases. This book, first of a kind in its in-depth analysis of the current legal and economic principles of EU State aid control, thoroughly explores the main rationales of State aid, the main concerns and the various trade-offs that underlie the rules and the decisions ultimately taken by the Commission and the Courts.

The first part of the book covers the various elements of the notion of State aid, including the hotly disputed conditions of economic advantage and selectivity. Its second part covers the compatibility of aid measures under horizontal rules across industry sectors, including an assessment of the efficiency of the General Block Exemption Regulation and of the new rules on ex post evaluation. The third part deals with the application of State aid rules in specific sectors such as infrastructure, broadband, energy and banking.

Distinguished experts - including lawyers, economists, academics, and officials of the European Commission and of Member State authorities - share their legal and economic experience, insight, and critique of EU State aid control as it stands.

As a critical assessment of the current status of EU State aid control from both legal and economic perspectives, and as an authoritative guide through its complexities and pitfalls, this book will be of immeasurable value, now and in the coming years, to all stakeholders required to understand, interpret and apply the rules under the new regime of State aid control.

Philipp Werner is a Partner in Jones Day's Brussels office. He has extensive experience in the area of State aid and advises public and private companies on privatization, restructuring, and investment aid. Vincent Verouden is a Director in E.CA Economics' Brussels office and a former Deputy Chief Economist at the European Commission. In this previous capacity, he was deeply involved in the various reform proposals in the context of the SAM programme.

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Content

Cover
Half Title Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
About the Editors
About the Authors
Table of Contents
Editorial
1. PURPOSE
2. OVERVIEW
2.1 First part: notion of aid
2.2. Horizontal rules: compatibility
2.3 Sectorial rules
3. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Chapter 1 Introduction - The Law and Economics of EU State Aid Control
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE BASIC RATIONALE OF STATE AID CONTROL IN THE EU
3. WHEN IS A MEASURE STATE AID?
3.1 The concept of "advantage"
3.2 Selectivity
3.3 State measure and State resources
3.4 Distortion of competition and effect on trade
4. COMPATIBILITY OF AID
4.1 Assessment framework
4.2 State intervention: objective and rationale
4.2.1 Market failures
4.2.2 Equity considerations
4.3 Incentive effect
4.4 The negative effects of State aid
4.4.1 Theories of harm in EU State aid control - a typology
4.4.2 Allocative inefficiencies (loss of welfare)
4.4.3 Distributional concerns (shifts in welfare)
4.4.4 The nexus between the incentive effect and the effects on competition and trade
5. ECONOMIC INSIGHTS FOR THE DESIGN OF STATE AID RULES
5.1 Empirical insights on the effectiveness of regional State aid
5.2 State aid and efficiency incentives: Compensation for SGEI
5.3 State aid and price signals: aid to compensate firms for increased ETS costs
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
PART I THE NOTION OF STATE AID
Chapter 2 Advantage
1. THE NOTION OF ADVANTAGE
1.1 General principles
1.1.1 Direct and indirect advantage
1.1.2 Compensation for structural disadvantages and regulatory burdens
1.1.3 Compensation for services of general economic interest
2. THE MARKET ECONOMY OPERATOR (MEO) TEST
2.1 General principles
2.2 Application of the MEO test
2.2.1 Cases where compliance with market conditions can be directly inferred from transaction-specific market data
2.2.2 Establishing whether a transaction is in line with market conditions on the basis of other assessment methods
2.2.3 Specific considerations to establish whether the terms for loans and guarantees are in line with market prices
3. CONCLUSION
Chapter 3 State Measure
1. INTRODUCTION
2. ONE OR TWO ELEMENTS?
3. IMPUTABILITY TO THE STATE
3.1 Directly granted by public authority or designated private or public body belonging to the public sector
3.2 Granted through intermediary public or private bodies, or through Stateowned enterprises - the Stardust Marine indicia
3.3 Post-Stardust Marine case law on imputability
3.4 Burden of proof & standard of proof: Commerz v Port Authority of Rotterdam
3.5 Imputability for implementation of EU directives
4. STATE RESOURCES
4.1 Public sector resources
4.2 Resources from State-owned enterprises (public undertakings)
4.3 Resources must enter under control of the State
4.4 Private resources do not constitute aid .
4.5 . or do they?
4.6 No need for resources to be permanently at the State's disposal
5. FORM OF STATE RESOURCES
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chapter 4 Selectivity
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE SELECTIVITY TEST
3. STEP 1: THE REFERENCE FRAMEWORK
3.1 The geographical reference framework - relevant for the purpose of regional selectivity
3.2 The material reference framework - relevant for the purpose of material selectivity
4. STEP 2: NON-DISCRIMINATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF THE MEASURE
4.1 The objective of the measure
4.2 Discrimination between operators who are in a comparable legal and factual situation having regard to the objective (prima facie selectivity)
5. STEP 3: JUSTIFICATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE NATURE AND LOGIC OF THE SYSTEM
5.1 The need to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic objectives (ground for justifications)
5.2 Can Step 3 be applied to non-fiscal measures?
5.3 The principle of proportionality must be observed, and appropriate monitoring and control procedures must be in place
6. CASES WHERE THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES RETAIN A MARGIN OF DISCRETION: TAX RULINGS AND OTHER EXAMPLES
7. SOME FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE COURT'S CASE LAW
7.1 Step 1: What is the role of the reference framework in cases of material selectivity - if any?
7.1.1 The significance of Gibraltar and later cases
7.1.2 Reference framework as a key component of the selectivity test
7.1.3 What are the criteria for determining the reference framework and thereby identifying activities benefitting from asymmetrical taxation?
7.1.4 Who is competent to define the reference framework?
7.1.5 Some final remarks on the role of the reference framework
7.2 The relationship between Steps 1 and 2
7.3 The relationship between Steps 2 and 3
7.3.1 The tests under Steps 2 and 3 are very similar
7.3.2 Can Steps 2 and 3 be merged into one single step (a new "Step 2")?
7.3.3 The burden of proof under Steps 2 and 3 is not the same - but why not?
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chapter 5 Distortion of Competition and Effect on Trade
1. INTRODUCTION
2. DISTORTION OF COMPETITION
2.1 Legal treatment
2.2 Economic considerations
3. EFFECT ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES
3.1 Legal treatment
3.2 The Commission's change in emphasis
4. MARKET DEFINITION VS. THE DUTY TO MOTIVATE
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
PART II COMPATIBILITY OF STATE AID
Chapter 6 Compatibility of Aid - General Introduction
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Evolution of state aid policy: from SAAP to SAM
1.1.1 Policy evolution and legal control
1.1.2 Good versus bad State aid
1.2 The SAAP
1.2.1 The balancing approach
1.2.2 The SAAP approach tested in the courts
1.2.3 Standard versus in-depth assessments
1.2.4 Did the SAAP deliver?
1.3 The SAM
1.3.1 The SAM - policy objectives
1.3.2 Streamlining existing guidelines
1.3.3 The Hinkley Point decision
1.3.4 The incentive effect - a new direction?
1.3.5 Judicial control of the application of the 'incentive effect' requirement
2. THE USABILITY OF THE NEW GBER
2.1 A model of GBER usability
2.2 Clarity of GBER provisions
2.2.1 Overview
2.2.2 A complicating factor: increased involvement of national courts
2.2.3 Preliminary conclusions: more or less transparency
3. CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 7 General Block Exemption Regulation
1. INTRODUCTION
2. BLOCK EXEMPTED AID AND GBER 2008
2.1 Why block exempt aid?
2.2 GBER 2008
2.3 Success
2.4 Modernisation
3. THE GENERAL BLOCK EXEMPTION REGULATION 2014-2020
3.1 Common provisions
3.2 Monitoring
3.3 Specific provisions
3.3.1 Introduction of new types of exemption
3.3.2 Move away from simple grants
3.3.3 Widening the scope of existing exemptions
3.3.4 Higher aid intensity levels in existing exemptions
3.3.5 Simplifying rules
4. WILL THE GBER 2014 ACHIEVE ITS STATED AIMS?
4.1 Serves a purpose of common interest
4.1.1 Addressing market failures
4.1.2 Other common interest objectives
4.1.3 Overview of common interest objectives in the GBER 2014
4.2 Aid must have a clear incentive effect
4.2.1 Economic rationale of the incentive effect
4.2.2 The "formal" vs. the "substantive" incentive effect in GBER
4.3 Aid is appropriate and proportionate
4.4 Aid is transparent
4.5 Aid is subject to a control system
4.6 Aid is subject to regular evaluation
4.7 Aid must not adversely affect trading conditions / distortion of competition
5. CONCLUSION
ANNEX I: AID CATEGORIES IN THE GBER 2014 (new categories indicated with *)
ANNEX II: MAXIMUM AID INTENSITIES AND NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS OF THE GBER 2014
Chapter 8 Ex Post Evaluation of Aid
1. INTRODUCTION
2. WHY WERE MEMBER STATES RELUCTANT TO EMBRACE THE NEW TOOLS?
2.1 Traditional and modern models of State aid control
2.2 Respective roles of the Commission and Member States
2.3 The (legal) implications of a 'bad' evaluation plan
3. OVERVIEW OF THE EX POST EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS
3.1 Scope of evaluation requirements
3.2 Main elements of an evaluation
3.3 Identification of the policy effects
4. WHAT MAKES A GOOD EVALUATION
4.1 Research on State aid evaluation lags behind
4.2 Research design
4.3 Best practice examples
4.4 First trends
5. CASE STUDY: TEKES (FINLAND)
5.1 Practical example from TEKES - how ex-post evaluation can be beneficial for the Member State
5.2 What can we learn from TEKES?
6. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Chapter 9 Research, Development and Innovation Aid
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF STATE AID TO R&D&I
2.1 R&D&I as a public good
2.2 R&D&I and financing constraints
2.3 R&D&I and coordination failures
3. THE ECONOMIC LIMITS OF R&D&I AID
3.1 The effectiveness of R&D&I aid
3.2 The potential distortions caused by R&D&I aid
4. THE NEW GENERAL BLOCK EXEMPTION REGULATION (GBER)
5. THE 2014 FRAMEWORK FOR STATE AID FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION
5.1 Existence of aid
5.1.1 Research and knowledge dissemination organisations and research infrastructures as recipients of State aid.
5.1.2 Indirect State aid to companies through publicly funded ROs or RIs
5.1.3 Public procurement of research and development services
5.2 Compatibility assessment
5.2.1 Incentive effect
5.2.2 Proportionality of the aid
5.2.3 The assessment of the undue negative effects of State aid
5.3 Evaluation
6. IMPORTANT PROJECTS OF COMMON EUROPEAN INTEREST (IPCEIs)
Chapter 10 Regional Aid
1. INTRODUCTION
2. REGIONAL AID AND COHESION POLICIES, PURPOSE AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Compatibility of regional aid in assisted areas under the Treaty
2.2 The European Commission's regional aid policy
2.2.1 Early developments and first principles of coordination
2.2.2 The first comprehensive reform in 1998: the RAG 2000-2006
2.2.3 The 2005 State aid Action Plan and the RAG 2007-2013
2.2.4 The 2012 State Aid Modernisation and the adoption of the RAG 2014-2020
3. ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR REGIONAL AID AND COMPETITION CONCERNS
3.1 Agglomeration effects - a brief introduction
3.2 Objectives of regional State aid
3.2.1 Rationales for state intervention: Equity vs efficiency
3.2.2 Local market failures
3.2.3 Categories of regional aid measures and their effectiveness
3.3 Distortions of competition and trade
3.3.1 Wasteful spending and subsidy races
3.3.2 Overcapacities and negative impact on productivity
3.3.3 Large firms vs small firms
3.4 Overview of regional aid cases, specifically of large investment projects
4. COMPATIBILITY OF AID UNDER THE RAG 2014-2020 AND THE GBER
4.1 Scope of application
4.2 Definition of regional aid maps
4.3 Notifiable regional aid
4.4 Compatibility assessment
4.4.1 Contribution to a common objective
4.4.2 Need for State intervention
4.4.3 Appropriateness of regional aid
4.4.4 Incentive effect
4.4.5 Proportionality of the aid amount (aid limited to the minimum)
4.4.6 Avoidance of undue negative effects on competition and trade
4.4.7 Transparency
4.5 Ex post evaluation
reporting and monitoring
5. OPEN QUESTIONS AND OUTLOOK
Chapter 11 Risk Finance Aid
1. INTRODUCTION
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Risk finance in Europe
2.2 EU policies and legislation in the field of risk finance aid
3. ECONOMIC CASE FOR RISK FINANCE AID
3.1 The funding challenge for young innovative firms
3.2 The market failures that reduce funding for young innovative firms
3.3 The costs and risks of government action
3.4 How do the new guidelines align with the economic case for government support?
4. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
5. GBER - SECTION 3
6. THE GUIDELINES
6.1 Scope of the Guidelines
6.2 Overall approach to assessment under the Guidelines
6.3 Practical application of the Guidelines
7. CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 12 Rescue and Restructuring Aid
1. BACKGROUND
1.1 Why R&R aid is generally a "bad thing"
1.2 Is R&R aid ever justifiable?
2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 General principles
2.2 The review of the R&R guidelines as a key element of SAM
2.3 No block-exemption for R&R aid
2.4 Scope of application
2.4.1 Sectoral scope
2.4.2 Material scope: Meaning of 'undertaking in difficulty'
3. RESCUE AID
3.1 "Traditional" rescue aid
3.2 A new tool for SMEs: "temporary restructuring support"
4. RESTRUCTURING AID
4.1 Return to viability (restructuring plan)
4.2 Own contribution and burden sharing
4.3 Measures to compensate the distortions of competition
4.3.1 General background
4.3.2 Structural measures
4.3.3 Behavioural measures
4.4 Process issues
4.4.1 The "negotiations" on commitments
4.4.2 Questions of implementation
4.4.3 Legal consequences of a breach of a commitment
5. "ONE TIME, LAST TIME"
6. NEW "FILTERS"
7. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Chapter 13 Services of General Economic Interest
1. INTRODUCTION
2. ECONOMICS OF SGEI
3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
4. EXISTENCE OF AID
4.1 Aid granted to an undertaking/for an economic activity
4.2 Granting of an advantage - Altmark and the SGEI Communication
4.2.1 Entrustment with a public service obligation
4.2.2 Objective and transparent parameters
4.2.3 No overcompensation
4.2.4 Efficiency test
4.3 De minimis Regulation
5. COMPATIBILITY OF AID
5.1 The respective scopes of the SGEI Decision and the SGEI Framework
5.2 Criteria of compatibility under the SGEI Decision
5.3 Additional criteria under SGEI Framework
6. OUTLOOK AND OPEN QUESTIONS
PART III STATE AID IN SPECIFIC SECTORS
Chapter 14 Infrastructure Aid
1. INTRODUCTION
2. WHAT IS "INFRASTRUCTURE" AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?
2.1 Definition and empirical evidence on the effects of infrastructure investment
2.2 The economic rationale for public financing of infrastructure
2.3 Economic Importance of public financing of infrastructure: a patchy situation across the EU
3. INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING AND STATE AID CONTROL: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
3.1 The Odd Couple
3.2 Infrastructure: economic developments and application of State aid rules
3.2.1 Infrastructure as part of the public remit
3.2.2 Liberalisation de jure and de facto
3.2.3 Recent developments
4. STATE AID TO INFRASTRUCTURE - ARE THERE SPECIFIC THEORIES OF HARM?
4.1 Theories of harm at the infrastructure level
4.2 Theories of harm at the user level (operators or downstream users)
5. STATE AID ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC FINANCING OF INFRASTRUCTURE: PECULIARITIES AND IDIOSYNCRASIES
5.1 Notion of undertaking
5.1.1 The beneficiary is not an undertaking when the activity exercised is ius imperii
5.1.2 A beneficiary's legal status or qualification under national law is irrelevant
5.1.3 Only for the part of infrastructure that is actually commercially used
5.2 Existence of State aid in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU
5.2.1 The concept of advantage
5.2.2 Competition distortions and effects on trade
5.3 Compatibility of State aid
5.3.1 Individual decisions
5.3.2 The GBER
5.4 Services of General Economic Interest
6. CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 15 State Aid in the Broadband Sector
1. INTRODUCTION
2. BROADBAND
2.1 What is "broadband"
2.1.1 Vertical and horizontal aspects of (public) investment in fixed line networks
2.1.2 Different access networks - main characteristics
2.1.3 Fixed access
2.1.4 Mobile access
2.2 Competition and investment
2.3 The economic rationale for granting aid in the broadband sector
3. CURRENT APPLICABLE GUIDELINES/LEGISLATION
3.1 General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) in broadband
3.1.1 Conditions for compatibility
3.1.2 GBER covers investment and operating aid
3.1.3 Procedure and impact
3.2 The 2013 Broadband Guidelines
3.2.1 "Black, grey and white": the need for State intervention
3.2.2 Balancing test
3.2.3 Compatibility Criteria
3.2.4 Access
3.2.5 Reporting
3.2.6 Ex-post monitoring
4. EXISTENCE OF AID: KEY CONCEPTS IN THE COMMISSION'S DECISIONAL PRACTICE
4.1 Economic advantage
4.1.1 MEIP
4.1.2 SGEI
4.2 Use of State resources
4.3 Selectivity
4.4 Distortion of competition, affecting trade between EU Member States
5. COMPATIBILITY CRITERIA (ARTICLE 107(3) TFEU)
6. OPEN QUESTIONS AND OUTLOOK
Chapter 16 State Aid in the Postal Services Sector
1. INTRODUCTION
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Evolution of the regulatory framework and provision of public services
2.2 Role of postal services in the EU
3. ECONOMICS OF THE POSTAL SECTOR
3.1 Postal services
3.2 Competition and main actors
3.2.1 Access competition
3.2.2 End to end competition
3.2.3 Incumbents still retain a very high share of revenues in the letter mail sector
3.3 Main developments in the sector
3.3.1 Market liberalisation and privatisations
3.3.2 Electronic substitution
3.4 Challenges in undertaking actions to reduce costs and increase efficiency
4. ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR STATE AID AND DISTORTIONS OF COMPETITION
4.1 Economic rationale of State aid
4.1.1 The universal service
4.1.2 Legacy costs and the policy objective of market liberalisation
4.2 Main distortions of competition
5. STATE AID ASSESSMENT
5.1 Existence of aid: compensation for the USO
5.2 Compatibility assessment under EU Law: the Postal Directive and the frameworks
5.2.1 Economic assessment of 'overcompensation' in SGEI compensation
5.2.2 Compensation for the costs of discharging the USO
5.2.3 Compensation for the costs of discharging other SGEIs
5.2.4 Compensation of legacy costs
5.2.5 Other forms of aid: State aid guarantees
5.2.6 Other forms of aid: restructuring aid
6. CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
Chapter 17 Transport Aid
1. INTRODUCTION
2. AVIATION
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Evolution of the State aid rules in the sector
2.3 What are the aims of State aid control in the aviation sector?
2.3.1 Benefits of aid
2.3.2 Negative effects of aid
2.4 The 2014 Aviation Guidelines
2.4.1 The existence of aid
2.4.2 Compatibility of aid
2.5 Some issues for debate
3. PORTS AND MARITIME TRANSPORT
3.1 Ports
3.1.1 Basic rationale for State aid control
3.1.2 Overview of existing legislation
3.1.3 Existence of aid
3.1.4 Compatibility assessment
3.2 Maritime transport
3.2.1 Rationale for State aid control
3.2.2 Overview of rules on compatibility
4. RAILWAYS: INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING, ARTICLE 93 TFEU AND THE RAILWAY GUIDELINES
4.1 Funding of railway infrastructure
4.1.1 Background of railway infrastructure funding
4.1.2 State aid assessment of railway infrastructure funding
4.2 Railway transport: Article 93 TFEU and the Railway Guidelines
5. PUBLIC SERVICE OBLIGATIONS AND REGULATION 1370 FOR PASSENGER SERVICES BY BUS AND RAIL
5.1 Overcompensation check for competitively awarded contracts
5.2 Application of the Annex for directly awarded contracts
5.3 Reasonable profit according to the Annex
5.4 Conclusion and outlook
Chapter 18 Energy and Environmental Aid
1. INTRODUCTION
2. ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR STATE AID IN THE ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DOMAIN
2.1 Rationale for State intervention
2.2 Some economics of power generation
2.3 On the rationale of specific aid measures applied to the sector
2.3.1 State aid to support renewable electricity generation
2.3.2 State aid in the form of exemptions from environmental taxes, ETS-induced increases in the electricity price, and various electricity surcharges
2.3.3 State aid to foster supply security and generation adequacy
3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY AID
3.1 Existence of aid
3.1.1 Transfer of State resources
3.1.2 Selectivity
3.1.3 Economic advantage
3.2 Compatibility
3.2.1 Direct application of the Treaty
3.2.2 Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI)
3.3 Key secondary legislation
3.3.1 Legal instruments/secondary legislation
3.3.2 Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020
4. APPLICATION OF THE STATE AID RULES IN RECENT ENERGY CASES
4.1 German EEG surcharge
4.2 Hinkley Point C Nuclear Power Station
5. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Chapter 19 Aid to Broadcasting, Culture and Sport
1. PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING AND STATE AID
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Applicable law
1.2.2 Economics of broadcasting sector
1.3 Analysis of economic rationale for State aid and State aid control
1.4 Existence of aid
1.4.1 The applicability of the Altmark criteria
1.4.2 State resources and imputability
1.4.3 Funding schemes of public service broadcasters: existing aid or new aid
1.5 Compatibility under Article 106(2) TFEU
1.5.1 Definition of the public service remit and new media services
1.5.2 Proportionality
1.6 Does public broadcasting affect professional sport through inflating its costs?
1.7 Outlook and open questions
2. CULTURE AND STATE AID
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Relevant law
2.2.2 Economics of the sector
2.3 Rationale for State aid for culture, and the rationale of State aid control
2.4 State aid in the sense of Art. 107 (1) TFEU
2.5 Compatibility of aid for culture under the GBER
2.5.1 Aid for cultural purposes and activities, Art. 53 GBER (non audio-visual)
2.5.2 Aid to audiovisual works, Art. 54 GBER
2.6 Compatibility of aid for culture under Art. 107 (3) (d) TFEU
2.6.1 Compatibility of cultural activities, other than audiovisual works
2.6.2 Aid to promote audiovisual works - Cinema Communication
3. SPORT AND STATE AID
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Relevant law
3.2.2 Economics of the sector
3.3 Support for Sport - State aid in the sense of Art. 107 (1) TFEU?
3.3.1 Sport as economic activity
3.3.2 Impact of professional sport (economic activity) on inter-Member State trade
3.4 Compatibility of State aid for sport
3.4.1 Under the GBER
3.4.2 Outside the scope of the GBER
Chapter 20 Aid in the Banking Sector
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE EU BANKING SYSTEM AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM CRISIS
2.1 The economics of banking
2.2 Transaction oriented banking and European institutional specificities
2.3 Systemic importance of large banking groups
2.4 An overview of State aid provided to EU banking groups
2.5 Sovereign debt crisis
3. STATE AID ENFORCEMENT IN EU BANKING
3.1 State aid enforcement in banking prior to the financial system crisis of 2008
3.2 State aid enforcement in banking following the financial system crisis of 2008
4. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATION IN SOME LEADING CASES
4.1 The First Banking Communication (October 2008)
4.2 Recapitalisation Communication (December 2008)
4.3 Impaired Assets Communication (February 2009)
4.3.1 Eligibility of assets
4.3.2 Disclosure and transparency
4.3.3 Valuation
4.3.4 Burden sharing
4.3.5 Aligning banks' incentives to participate in asset relief with public policy objectives
4.3.6 Restructuring and return to viability
4.4 Restructuring Communication (July 2009)
4.4.1 Restoring viability
4.4.2 Burden sharing
4.4.3 Preventing distortions of competition
4.5 Prolongation Communication (2010)
4.6 Exit Communication
4.7 Banking Communication II
4.7.1 Recapitalisation and Impaired Assets Relief Measures
4.7.2 Guarantees and liquidity support
4.7.3 Liquidation aid
5. JUDICIAL REVIEW
6. A COMMENTARY ON SPECIFIC ISSUES
6.1 Behavioural measures
6.2 Burden-sharing requirements
6.3 Cap on executive pay
6.4 Ban on acquisitions
6.5 Divestments
6.6 Impact of State aid on market structure
7. STATE AID CONTROL AND BANKING UNION
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chapter 21 State Aid and Privatisation
1. INTRODUCTION
2. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK: COMMISSION NOTICE AND GUIDANCE PAPER ON PRIVATISATIONS
2.1 Market Economy Vendor Principle - general principles
2.2 Possible preparatory measures in advance of privatisation
2.2.1 General principles regarding preparatory measures
2.2.2 Special cases of preparatory measures
2.3 State aid requirements with regard to the privatisation process
2.3.1 Openness
2.3.2 Transparency and non-discrimination
2.3.3 Absence of undue conditions
2.3.4 Sufficient time and information for a proper evaluation
2.3.5 Sale to the highest bidder
3. PROCEDURAL CONSEQUENCES ANCILLARY TO THE GUIDANCE PAPER
3.1 State aid-compliant bidding processes
3.2 Possibility of an independent expert evaluation
3.3 Less formal sales processes
4. STATE AID RISKS FOR THE BUYER
4.1 Recovery order due to unlawful State aid granted to the company prior to the privatisation
4.1.1 Economic continuity
4.1.2 Means of protection for the buyer
4.2 The privatisation itself leads to incompatible State aid in favour of the buyer
5. MEANS OF ESTABLISHING SUFFICIENT LEGAL CERTAINTY
Index
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