Liberal Legitimacy
The justification of political power in the work of John Rawls
1st Edition
Published on 6. August 2020
223 pages
978-3-7489-0963-7 (ISBN)
Description
Die Rechtfertigung politischer Macht ist Voraussetzung ihrer Legitimität. Das Buch systematisiert die Erscheinungsformen dieser liberalen Intuition und entwickelt unter Rekurs auf John Rawls die Idee, Legitimität durch öffentliche Rechtfertigung zu generieren. Auf der einen Seite verteidigt es den politischen Liberalismus als eine für pluralistische Gesellschaften geeignete Legitimitätstheorie, die die demokratischen Institutionen innewohnenden normativen Potentiale verwirklichen hilft. Auf der anderen Seite lotet es seine Grenzen aus und argumentiert, dass öffentliche Rechtfertigung nicht alle Bürger gleichermaßen adressiert: Die Verteidiger liberaler Legitimität müssen sich über die beschränkte Reichweite ihrer Begründungsressourcen im Klaren sein.
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Content
- Cover
- Introduction
- Thinking about legitimacy
- The liberal perspective on legitimacy
- The challenge of pluralism and public justification
- Legitimacy as public justification in Rawls's work
- The structure of the book
- Part I - Liberal legitimacy in context
- 1. The concept of legitimacy
- 1.1 The elements of political power
- 1.1.1 The political system
- 1.1.2 The means of the political system
- 1.2 Concepts and conceptions of legitimacy
- 1.3 Empirical conceptions of legitimacy
- 1.3.1 Weber's belief-based conception of legitimacy
- 1.3.2 Beetham's hybrid conception of legitimacy
- 1.4 Normative (especially liberal) conceptions of legitimacy
- 1.4.1 Legitimacy and the resolution of political disagreements
- 1.4.2 Legitimacy, the justification of coercion, and obligation
- 1.4.3 The standards of legitimacy
- 1.5 Conclusion of the chapter
- 2. Liberal legitimacy and public justification
- 2.1 Two ideas of consent
- 2.2 Voluntarist accounts and their shortcomings
- 2.3 Hypothetical agreement and contractualism
- 2.3.1 The point of contractualist theories
- 2.3.2 The normative role of reasons in contractualist theories
- 2.3.3 The example of Kant's contractualism
- 2.4 Legitimacy as public justification
- 2.4.1 From philosophical to public justification
- 2.4.2 The challenge of legitimacy as public justification
- 2.5 Conclusion of the chapter
- Part II: Liberal legitimacy in a Rawlsian framework
- 3. Justice and legitimacy before the political turn
- 3.1 The nature of justification and reflective equilibrium
- 3.2 The contractualist argument for justice as fairness
- 3.2.1 The contractualist device of the original position
- 3.2.2 Two core ideas
- 3.2.2.1 Society as a system of fair cooperation
- 3.2.2.2 The two moral powers as the basis of freedom and equality
- 3.2.3 The original position as a device of representation
- 3.2.4 The argument from the original position
- 3.3 Democratic politics and legitimacy in Theory
- 3.3.1 The application of the principles of justice
- 3.3.2 Justice, legitimacy, and obligation
- 3.4 The stability of a well-ordered society as a justificatory condition
- 3.4.1 Stability for the right reasons
- 3.4.2 The normative role of stability in Theory
- 3.4.3 The idea of a well-ordered society
- 3.4.4 The argument for convergence on justice as fairness
- 3.5 Conclusion of the chapter
- 4. The challenge of reasonable disagreement
- 4.1 Reasonable disagreement and the burdens of judgment
- 4.2 Reasonable disagreement and the fundamentals of Theory
- 4.3 The problems with reasonable disagreement and pluralism
- 4.4 Conclusion of the chapter
- 5. Liberal legitimacy in Political Liberalism
- 5.1 The political conception of justice
- 5.1.1 The three features of a political conception
- 5.1.2 The content of public political culture and the process of justification
- 5.1.3 Reasonable conceptions of justice and generic liberalism
- 5.1.4 Excursus: the philosophical status of PL's argument
- 5.1.4.1 The role of PL's argument for a liberal conception of justice
- 5.1.4.2 The normative foundation of PL's argument for a liberal conception of justice
- 5.2 (Un)Reasonable citizens and the limits of public justification
- 5.2.1 The epistemic components of reasonableness
- 5.2.2 The ethical components of reasonableness
- 5.2.2.1 The idea of reasonable citizens
- 5.2.2.2 Impermissible conceptions of the good and comprehensive doctrines
- 5.2.3 Unreasonable citizens and public justification
- 5.2.4 The rights of unreasonable citizens
- 5.2.5 Vagueness and the limits of reasonable disagreement
- 5.3 The role of overlapping consensus
- 5.3.1 The idea of overlapping consensus
- 5.3.2 The road to an overlapping consensus
- 5.3.3 Reasonable comprehensive doctrines and overlapping consensus
- 5.3.4 Legitimacy and overlapping consensus
- 5.4 Public reason and the legitimate exercise of political power
- 5.4.1 The constitutional framework and legitimacy
- 5.4.2 Public reason as a precondition for the legitimate exercise of political power
- 5.4.2.1 The idea of public reason
- 5.4.2.2 Range of application
- 5.4.3 Neuralgic points of public reason and political liberalism
- 5.4.3.1 Public reason as a normative notion (not primarily epistemic)
- 5.4.3.2 Public reason and dependence on comprehensive doctrines
- 5.4.3.3 The historical contingency of public reason
- 5.4.3.4 The indeterminacy of public reason
- 5.4.3.5 Public reason, neutrality, and public justification
- 5.4.3.6 Political liberalism and unrealistic views of the political
- 5.5 Conclusion of the chapter
- 6. Beyond legitimacy as public justification
- 6.1 The duties of citizens who reject political liberalism
- 6.2 The normative authority of partially illegitimate legislation
- 6.3 The political and philosophical status of political liberalism
- 6.4 Conclusion of the chapter
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
