Realistic Decision Theory
Rules for Nonideal Agents in Nonideal Circumstances
1st Edition
Published on 16. September 2004
278 pages
978-0-19-803823-8 (ISBN)
Description
Within traditional decision theory, common decision principles -- e.g. the principle to maximize utility -- generally invoke idealization; they govern ideal agents in ideal circumstances. In Realistic Decision Theory, Paul Weirch adds practicality to decision theory by formulating principles applying to nonideal agents in nonideal circumstances, such as real people coping with complex decisions. Bridging the gap between normative demands and psychological resources, Realistic Decision Theory is essential reading for theorists seeking precise normative decision principles that acknowledge the limits and difficulties of human decision-making.
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08/2004
Oxford University Press Inc
€124.90
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Content
- Intro
- Contents
- 1. Realistic Standards for Decisions
- 1:1. Decision Theory and Its Schools
- 1:2. Making Decision Theory More Practical
- 1:3. Steps toward Realism
- 1:4. Procedures for Theory Generalization
- 2. Optimizing and Its Offspring
- 2:1. Optimizing
- 2:2. Optimal Decisions
- 2:3. Pursuit of Optimization Given Uncertainty
- 2:4. Expected Utility Analysis
- 3. Idealizations
- 3:1. A Theory of Idealizations
- 3:2. Idealizations for My Decision Theory
- 3:A. Appendix: Debates about Idealizations
- 4. Realism about Agents: Resources
- 4:1. Revised Idealizations and Goals
- 4:2. Probability and Utility
- 4:3. Indeterminate Probabilities and Utilities
- 4:4. Quantizations' Reply to Indeterminacy
- 4:5. Objections to Reliance on Quantizations
- 5. Realism about Agents: Cognitive Limitations
- 5:1. Unknown Mental States and Abilities
- 5:2. Acquisition of Missing Input
- 5:3. Nonexistent Probabilities and Utilities
- 5:4. Ignorance of A Priori Matters
- 5:5. Substantive and Procedural Standards
- 6. Realism about Agents: Mistakes
- 6:1. Accommodating Mistakes
- 6:2. Evaluation's Scope
- 6:3. Correction of Mistakes
- 6:4. Comprehensive Evaluation of Decisions
- 7. Acceptability's Consequences
- 7:1. No Mutually Justifying or Self-Justifying Mistakes
- 7:2. Dilemmas
- 7:3. Irrationality Rewarded
- 7:4. Mistakes in Execution of Plans
- 7:5. Mistakes about Options
- 7:A. Appendix: Attention to Options
- 8. Realism about Situations
- 8:1. Reinstated Idealizations
- 8:2. No Maximum Utility
- 8:3. Shifting Grounds for Utility Comparisons
- 9. Applications to Game Theory
- 9:1. Games of Strategy
- 9:2. Self-Support and Games of Strategy
- 9:A. Appendix: Games of Strategy and Bounded Rationality
- 10. Ideal to Real
- Appendix A: Optimization and Utility Maximization
- A.1. Sets of Options
- A.2. Utility of Worlds
- A.3. The Principle of Pros and Cons
- A.4. Outcomes
- A.5. Intrinsic Utility Analysis
- A.6. Conditional Probability and Utility
- A.7. Informed Utility's Primacy
- Appendix B: Consistency of Calculations of Utilities
- B.1. Verication of Consistency
- B.2. Consistency of Higher-Order and Ersatz Utility Analyses
- Notes
- Glossary
- A
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- C
- D
- E
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- Q
- R
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- U
- References
- Index
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
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- K
- L
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