Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities
Published on 10. February 2021
978-1-108-60803-9 (ISBN)
Description
An agent often does not have precise probabilities or utilities to guide resolution of a decision problem. I advance a principle of rationality for making decisions in such cases. To begin, I represent the doxastic and conative state of an agent with a set of pairs of a probability assignment and a utility assignment. Then I support a decision principle that allows any act that maximizes expected utility according to some pair of assignments in the set. Assuming that computation of an option's expected utility uses comprehensive possible outcomes that include the option's risk, no consideration supports a stricter requirement.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
Worked examples or Exercises
File size
0,87 MB
ISBN-13
978-1-108-60803-9 (9781108608039)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Book
02/2021
Cambridge University Press
€24.00
Shipment within 15-20 days
Person
Content
1. Introduction; 2. Imprecision; 3. Rational imprecision; 4. Probabilism; 5. The expected-utility principle; 6. Norms for imprecise attitudes; 7. The permissive principle of choice; 8. Sequences of choices; 9. Choices in games of strategy; 10. Conclusion.
