
The Handbook of Market Design
Description
Alles über E-Books | Antworten auf Fragen rund um E-Books, Kopierschutz und Dateiformate finden Sie in unserem Info- & Hilfebereich.
More details
Other editions
Additional editions

Persons
Content
- Introduction
- Part I: General Principles
- 1: Alvin E. Roth: What Have We Learned From Market Design?
- 2: Gary E. Bolton: Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior
- 3: Paul Klemperer: Using and Abusing Auction Theory
- Part II: Cases
- Section II.A: Matching Markets
- 4: Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Ünver: Market Design for Kidney Exchange
- 5: Atila Abdulkadiroglu: School Choice
- 6: Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin: Improving Efficiency in School Choice
- 7: Sarbartha Bandyopadhyay, Fedor Iskhakov, Terence Johnson, Soohyung Lee, David McArthur, John Rust, Joel Watson, and John Watson: Can the Job Market for Economists be Improved?
- 8: Joshua S. Gans and Scott Stern: Designing Markets for Ideas
- 9: Ashok Rai and Tomas Sjöström: Redesigning Microcredit
- Section II.B: Auctions
- 10: Paul Klemperer: The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods
- 11: Robert Day and Paul Milgrom: Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions
- 12: Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin, and Robert Wilson: Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati Diamonds
- Section II.C: E-Commerce
- 13: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth: Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior
- 14: Andrew Byde and Nir Vulkan: Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents
- 15: Benjamin Edelman: The Design of Online Advertising Markets
- 16: Tuomas Sandholm: Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of Sourcing
- 17: Nir Vulkan and Chris Priest: Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwith
- Section II.D: Law Design
- 18: Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman: A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems
- 19: Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, and Eric Talley: Legislation with Endogenous Preferences
- Part III: Experiments
- 20: Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Y. Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking: Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction
- 21: Martin Dufwenberg and Uri Gneezy: Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment
- 22: Elena Katok: Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions
- 23: Uri Gneezy, Ernan Haruvy, and Hadas Yaffe: The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill
- Part IV: Competing Designs
- 24: Michael Peters: Competing Mechanisms
- 25: Nir Vulkan and Zvika Neeman: Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets
System requirements
File format: PDF
Copy-Protection: Adobe-DRM (Digital Rights Management)
System requirements:
- Computer (Windows; MacOS X; Linux): Install the free reader Adobe Digital Editions prior to download (see eBook Help).
- Tablet/smartphone (Android; iOS): Install the free app Adobe Digital Editions or the app PocketBook before downloading (see eBook Help).
- E-reader: Bookeen, Kobo, Pocketbook, Sony, Tolino and many more (only limited: Kindle).
The file format PDF always displays a book page identically on any hardware. This makes PDF suitable for complex layouts such as those used in textbooks and reference books (images, tables, columns, footnotes). Unfortunately, on the small screens of e-readers or smartphones, PDFs are rather annoying, requiring too much scrolling.
This eBook uses Adobe-DRM, a „hard” copy protection. If the necessary requirements are not met, unfortunately you will not be able to open the eBook. You will therefore need to prepare your reading hardware before downloading.
Please note: We strongly recommend that you authorise using your personal Adobe ID after installation of any reading software.
For more information, see our eBook Help page.