Reference Book
1st Edition
Published on 29. March 2012
273 pages
978-0-19-162918-1 (ISBN)
Description
How do language and thought connect to things in the world? John Hawthorne and David Manley offer an original and ambitious treatment of the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought, leading to a new unified account of definite and indefinite descriptions, names, and demonstratives.
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John Hawthorne | David Manley
The Reference Book
Book
03/2012
Oxford University Press
€119.70
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Content
- Cover
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Part I: Against acquaintance
- 1 Introduction: reference and singular thought
- 1.1 Preliminaries
- 1.2 Themes from Russell
- 1.3 Reference after Russell
- 1.4 Singular thought after Russell
- 1.5 Acquaintance after Russell
- 1.6 Should auld acquaintance be forgot?
- 1.7 Gameplan
- 2 A defense of liberalism
- 2.1 The spy argument
- 2.2 Acquaintance and attitude reports
- 2.3 Turning the tables
- 2.4 HARMONY, SUFFICIENCY, and impoverished cases
- 2.5 'Believing of '
- 2.6 The Neptune argument
- 2.7 The irrelevance of CONSTRAINT
- 2.8 Sources of confusion
- 2.9 Conditional reference fixers
- 3 Epistemic acquaintance
- 3.1 Knowing-which and discrimination
- 3.2 Evans on acquaintance
- 3.3 Objections
- 3.4 Knowledge of existence
- 3.5 Understanding and knowledge
- Part II: Beyond acquaintance
- 4 From the specific to the singular
- 4.1 Indefinites: preliminary observations
- 4.2 Specificity: the bifurcated view
- 4.3 Interlude: presupposition
- 4.4 Specificity: the simple view
- 4.5 Interlude: covert domain restriction
- 4.6 Specificity as domain restriction
- 4.7 Singular restrictors
- 4.8 Acquaintance again
- 4.9 Coy and candid restrictions
- 4.10 Variant views
- 4.11 Specifics in attitude ascriptions
- 4.12 The representation requirement
- 5 What 'the'?
- 5.1 Three approaches to uniqueness
- 5.2 Existentialism
- 5.3 Exceptions to specificity?
- 5.4 Russellianism
- 5.5 Neo-Fregeanism
- 5.6 Three arguments for a neo-Fregean 'the'
- 5.7 Five arguments against a neo-Fregean 'the'
- 5.8 The upshot
- 6 Et tu, 'Brute'?
- 6.1 Demonstratives
- 6.2 Non-rigid uses
- 6.3 Salience
- 6.4 Modal themes
- 6.5 The view so far
- 6.6 Names
- 6.7 The predicate view: details
- 6.8 Two ineffective arguments
- 6.9 Calling and describing
- 6.10 Against the predicate view
- 6.11 Bare and bound?
- 6.12 Varieties of validity
- 6.13 Names: a tentative verdict
- Afterword
- Bibliography
- Index
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Y
- Z
