Social Design

In Lieu of an Introduction: How I Remember Leonid Hurwicz.- Institution Design: Technical Change and the Decentralization Penalty.- Fundamental Theory of Institutions: a Lecture in Honor of Leo Hurwicz.- The Hurwicz Program, Past and Suggestions for the Future.- Social Networks from a Designer's Viewpoint.- Design Under Uncertainties: Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design.- Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments.- Design of Tradable Permit Programs Under Imprecise Measurement.- Second Thoughts of Social Dilemma in Mechanism Design.- Markets: Allocation Mechanisms, Incentives, and Endemic Institutional Externalities.- The Role of (quasi) Analyticity in Establishing Completeness of Financial Markets Equilibria.- Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibrium.- Rules: Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules.- Equal Area Rule to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims.- Implementation: Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information.- Unrestricted Domain Extensions of Dominant Strategy Implementable Allocation Functions.- Self-Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium.- New Directions in Design: Domains Admitting ex post Incentive Compatible and Respectful Mechanisms: a Characterization for the Two Alternatives Case.- Mechanisms in a Digitalized World.- Incentive Compatibility on the Blockchain.- Contextual Mechanism Design.