
Wittgenstein on Language and Thought
Description
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This book defends and outlines the key issues surrounding the philosophy of content as demonstrated in Wittgenstein''s Philosophical Investigations. The text shows how Wittgenstein''s critical arguments concerning mind and meaning are destructive of much recent work in the philosophy of thought and language, including the representationalist orthodoxy. These issues are related to the work of Davidson, Rorty and McDowell among others.
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Content
- Intro
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Rival Approaches in the Philosophy of Content
- 1 The Pre-philosophical Charactistic of Content
- 2 Strategic Changges for the Philosophical Elucideation of Content
- 3 The Representationalist Orthodoxy
- 4 The Wittgensteinian Alternative
- Further Reading
- 2 Wittgenstein's Destructive Criticisms of Explanations of Content
- 1 The Connection Between Content and Normativity
- 2 Wittgenstein on Linguistic Content
- 3 Wittgenstein on Mental Content
- 4 The Generality of Wittgenstein's Critical Arguments
- 5 Wittgensteinian Arguments Against Representationalism
- Further Reading
- 3 Sceptical, Constructivist and Minimalist Interpretation of Wittgenstein
- 1 Scepticism
- 2 Constructivism
- 3 Minimalism
- Further Reading
- 4 Wittgenstein and the Theory of Content
- 1 Wittgenstein and Theories
- 2 Wittgenstein's Account of the Pre-philosophical Characteristics of Content
- 3 Wittenstein's Theory of Content and Externalism
- Further Reading
- 5 Wittgenstein and Davidson of Content
- 1 Davidson's Theory of Interpretation
- 2 Davidson and Wittgenstein on the Distinction between Scheme and Content
- 3 Davidson and Wittgenstein on the Rejection of Internal Mental Objects
- 4 Davidson, Wittgenstein and McDowell on the Connection of Thought and the World
- Further Reading
- 6 Content and Causality
- 1 Wittgenstein on Physicalism
- 2 Davidson's Casual Theory of Mind
- 3 A Non-causal Theory of Mind?
- 4 An Objection to Anomalous Monism
- 5 Concluding Remarks
- Further Reading
- Bibliography
- Index
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