
Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2024
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The four-volume proceedings set LNCS 14601-14604 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 27th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public Key Cryptography, PKC 2024, held in Sydney, NSW, Australia, April 15-17, 2024.
The 54 papers included in these proceedings were carefully reviewed and selected from 176 submissions. They focus on all aspects of signatures; attacks; commitments; multiparty computation; zero knowledge proofs; theoretical foundations; isogenies and applications; lattices and applications; Diffie Hellman and applications; encryption; homomorphic encryption; and implementation.
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Content
- Intro
- Preface
- Organization
- Contents - Part I
- Signatures
- On Proving Equivalence Class Signatures Secure from Non-interactive Assumptions
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Notation
- 2.2 DDH
- 2.3 EQS Signature Schemes
- 2.4 Computational Problems
- 3 Our Impossibility Result
- References
- Fully Dynamic Attribute-Based Signatures for Circuits from Codes
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Fully Dynamic Attribute-Based Signatures
- 2.1 Syntax
- 2.2 Formulation of the Security Requirements
- 3 Code-Based FDABS for Boolean Circuits
- 3.1 Preliminaries on Code-Based Cryptographic Tools
- 3.2 Description of the Scheme
- 3.3 Analysis of the Scheme
- 4 Supporting Zero-Knowledge Protocols
- 4.1 A Refined Abstraction of Stern's Protocol
- 4.2 Stern-Like Techniques: Previous Ideas and Our Enhancements
- 4.3 Supporting Zero-Knowledge Protocol for Algorithm Sign
- References
- On Instantiating Unleveled Fully-Homomorphic Signatures from Falsifiable Assumptions
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Puncturable Pseudorandom Functions
- 2.2 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
- 2.3 Indistinguishability Obfuscation
- 2.4 Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proofs
- 2.5 Fully Homomorphic Signatures
- 3 Construction
- 3.1 Choice of Parameters
- 3.2 Correctness of the FHS
- 4 Proof of Unforgeability
- References
- Updatable Policy-Compliant Signatures
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Updatable PCS Description
- 1.2 On Policy Updatability
- 1.3 Challenges and Interactivity
- 1.4 Technical Overview
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 A Model for Interactive and Non-interactive PCS with Updates
- 3.1 Model Basics
- 3.2 Correctness and Security for PCS with Updates
- 4 Non-interactive Updatable Policy-Compliant Signatures
- 4.1 Two-Input Partially Hiding (Predicate-Only) Predicate Encryption
- 4.2 Non-interactive UPCS Scheme
- 4.3 Relationship Between UPCS and 2-PHPE
- 5 Interactive Updatable Policy-Compliant Signatures
- 5.1 Interactive UPCS Using Predicate Encryption
- References
- Registered Attribute-Based Signature
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Results
- 1.2 Related Work
- 2 Technique Overview
- 2.1 Registered Attribute-Based Signature
- 2.2 Slotted Registered ABS
- 2.3 Discussion and Open Problem
- 3 Preliminaries
- 3.1 Prime-Order Bilinear Groups
- 3.2 Slotted Registered Attribute-Based Signature
- 3.3 Registered Attribute-Based Signature
- 3.4 Predicate Encodings
- 4 Slotted Registered ABS
- 4.1 Scheme
- 4.2 Security
- 4.3 From G2, -1 to G2,
- 4.4 Lemmata
- 5 Concrete Slotted Registered ABS
- References
- Threshold Structure-Preserving Signatures: Strong and Adaptive Security Under Standard Assumptions
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contributions
- 1.2 Technical Overview
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Threshold Structure-Preserving Signatures
- 3.1 TSPS: Syntax and Security Definitions
- 3.2 Core Lemma
- 3.3 Our Threshold SPS Construction
- 3.4 Security
- 3.5 Proof of Core Lemma
- 4 Conclusion
- References
- Multi-Signatures for Ad-Hoc and Privacy-Preserving Group Signing
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Ad-Hoc Group Signing with Long-Term Keys
- 1.2 Our Contributions
- 1.3 Related Work
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Multi-Signatures with Deterministic Key Aggregation
- 3 Multi-Signatures with Verifiable Key Aggregation
- 3.1 Syntax and Correctness
- 3.2 Unforgeability Notions
- 4 Privacy Framework for MSvKA
- 4.1 Security Games
- 4.2 Impossibility Results and Relations
- 5 Our Multi-Signature Constructions
- 5.1 Our randBLS-1 Construction
- 5.2 Our randBLS-2 Construction
- 6 Weaker Privacy and Analysis of Existing Constructions
- 6.1 Privacy Model for Deterministic Schemes: AbOPK
- 6.2 Analysis of BLS and Schnorr Multi-Signatures
- 7 Applications
- References
- ReSolveD: Shorter Signatures from Regular Syndrome Decoding and VOLE-in-the-Head
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contributions
- 1.2 Technical Overview
- 1.3 Paper Organization
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Notation
- 2.2 Hash Functions
- 2.3 Regular Syndrome Decoding
- 2.4 Information-Theoretic Message Authentication Codes
- 2.5 Designated-Verifier Zero-Knowledge for Quadratic Relations
- 2.6 The Zero-Knowledge Functionality
- 3 VOLE-in-the-Head and Linear Sketching
- 3.1 VOLE-in-the-Head
- 3.2 The Linear Sketching Technique
- 4 Designated-Verifier ZK from Linear Sketching
- 4.1 Protocol Description
- 4.2 Security Proof
- 5 ReSolveD: Shorter Signatures from RSD and VOLEitH
- 5.1 Signature Description
- 5.2 Security Proof
- 5.3 Communication
- 6 Performance Evaluation
- 6.1 Parameters
- 6.2 Comparison with Other Post-Quantum Signature Schemes
- References
- Probabilistic Hash-and-Sign with Retry in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Contributions
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Notations and Terminology
- 2.2 Digital Signature and Trapdoor Function
- 2.3 Preimage-Sampleable Function
- 2.4 Security Games in Multi-key/Multi-instance Settings
- 2.5 Hash-and-Sign Paradigm
- 2.6 Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM)
- 2.7 Proof Techniques in QROM
- 3 Existing Security Proofs
- 4 New Security Proof
- 4.1 Extension to SEUF-CMA Security
- 4.2 Applications of New Security Proof
- 5 Security Proof of Hash-and-Sign with Prefix Hashing in Multi-key Setting
- References
- Formalizing Hash-then-Sign Signatures
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Contributions
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Notation
- 2.2 Signature Schemes
- 3 Hash-then-Sign Signatures: HtS
- 3.1 DSS-UF Does Not Imply HtS-UF
- 3.2 Practical Non-Examples of HtS-DSS
- 4 Case Study: DLP-Based Signature Schemes
- 4.1 ECKCDSA
- 4.2 ECDSA
- 4.3 SM2
- 4.4 GOST
- 5 From MD-Based DSS to HtS-DSS
- 6 Conclusion
- A Detailed Proofs
- A.1 Detailed proof of ECDSA
- A.2 Detailed Proof of SM2
- A.3 Detailed Proof of GOST
- B Reduction for Proving Theorem5
- References
- Attacks
- Breaking Parallel ROS: Implication for Isogeny and Lattice-Based Blind Signatures
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Contribution
- 2 Preliminary
- 2.1 Cyclic Effective Group Action Model
- 2.2 Lattices
- 2.3 Blind Signature
- 2.4 ROS Problem
- 3 Parallel ROS
- 3.1 Definition of Parallel ROS
- 3.2 Breaking Parallel ROS for Small Challenge Space
- 3.3 Breaking Parallel ROS for Large Challenge Space
- 4 Implications of Attack
- 4.1 Isogeny-Based Blind Signature: CSI-Otter
- 4.2 Lattice-Based Blind Signatures: Blaze+ and BlindOR
- 4.3 Blind Signature Based on Parallel Schnorr
- References
- On the Possibility of a Backdoor in the Micali-Schnorr Generator
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Technical Overview
- 2 Background
- 2.1 The RSA PRG
- 2.2 The Micali-Schnorr PRG (MS PRG)
- 2.3 Related Work
- 3 Security Reductions for the MS and RSA PRGs
- 4 Ruling Out Black-Box Attacks
- 4.1 Micali-Schnorr Is Secure with a PRG
- 4.2 MS PRG Is Still Secure When Implemented with a Random Permutation
- 4.3 RSA-PRG as a Sponge
- 5 Algebraic Attacks
- 5.1 Notions of Cryptographic Subversion
- 5.2 Algorithmic Background: Multivariate Coppersmith's Method
- 5.3 Attacks on RSA PRG
- 5.4 Attacks on MS PRG
- 6 Impact on Cryptographic Protocols
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Cryptanalysis of the Peregrine Lattice-Based Signature Scheme
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Notation
- 2.2 Lattices
- 2.3 Statistics and Probability
- 2.4 Cyclotomic Rings and NTRU
- 3 The Peregrine Signature Scheme
- 4 Learning a Hidden Transformation
- 4.1 The Algorithmic Framework
- 4.2 The Case of Peregrine
- 5 Practical Key Recovery Attack Against Peregrine
- 5.1 Gradient Descent
- 5.2 Correcting Approximate Errors with Lattice Decoding
- 5.3 Experimental Results
- 6 Conclusion and Perspectives
- References
- Improved Cryptanalysis of HFERP
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contribution
- 2 Schemes
- 2.1 C*
- 2.2 HFE and Variants
- 2.3 Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar
- 2.4 Rainbow
- 2.5 HFERP
- 3 Relevant Attacks
- 3.1 Direct Attack
- 3.2 MinRank Attacks
- 3.3 Simple Attack
- 3.4 Other Techniques
- 4 HFERP Simple Attack: Divide and Conquer
- 4.1 Finding y Vector
- 4.2 Inverting U
- 4.3 Inverting T
- 4.4 Divide and Conquer
- 5 HFERP Support Minors Direct Attack
- 6 Updated Complexities
- 6.1 Simple Attack: Divide and Conquer
- 6.2 Big-Field Support Minors MinRank Attack
- 7 Conclusion
- A Toy Example
- B Note on Updated Complexities
- References
- Author Index
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