
Post-Quantum Cryptography
Description
Alles über E-Books | Antworten auf Fragen rund um E-Books, Kopierschutz und Dateiformate finden Sie in unserem Info- & Hilfebereich.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQCrypto 2016, held in Fukuoka, Japan, in February 2016.
The 16 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 42 submissions. The papers cover all technical aspects of multivariate polynomial cryptography, code-based cryptography, lattice-based cryptography, quantum algorithms, post-quantum protocols, and implementations.
More details
Other editions
Additional editions

Content
- Intro
- Preface
- Organization
- Contents
- IND-CCA Secure Hybrid Encryption from QC-MDPC Niederreiter
- 1 Introduction
- 2 QC-MDPC Codes in a Nutshell
- 2.1 (QC-)MDPC Codes
- 2.2 The QC-MDPC Niederreiter Cryptosystem
- 2.3 Decoding (QC-)MDPC Codes
- 3 Hybrid Encryption with Niederreiter
- 3.1 Constructing Hybrid Encryption from Niederreiter
- 3.2 QC-MDPC Niederreiter Hybrid Encryption
- 4 QC-MDPC Niederreiter on ARM Cortex-M4
- 4.1 Polynomial Representation
- 4.2 QC-MDPC Niederreiter Key-Generation
- 4.3 QC-MDPC Niederreiter Encryption
- 4.4 QC-MDPC Niederreiter Decryption
- 5 QC-MDPC Niederreiter Hybrid Encryption on ARM Cortex-M4
- 5.1 Hybrid Key-Generation
- 5.2 Hybrid Encryption
- 5.3 Hybrid Decryption
- 6 Implementation Results
- 6.1 QC-MDPC Niederreiter Results
- 6.2 QC-MDPC Niederreiter Hybrid Encryption Results
- 6.3 Comparison with Previous Work
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- RankSynd a PRNG Based on Rank Metric
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Generalities on the Rank Metric
- 3 Cryptography Based on Rank Metric
- 3.1 A Difficult Problem
- 3.2 Complexity of Practical Attacks
- 4 One-Way Functions Based on Rank Metric
- 5 A PRNG Based on Rank Metric Codes
- 5.1 Description of the Generator
- 5.2 Security of the Generator
- 6 Quantum Attacks
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Applying Grover's Algorithm to AES: Quantum Resource Estimates
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries: Grover's Algorithm
- 3 Implementing the Boolean Predicate---Testing a Key
- 3.1 Ensuring Uniqueness of the Solution
- 3.2 Reversible and Quantum Circuits to Implement AES
- 3.3 Resource Estimates: Reversible AES Implementation
- 3.4 Resource Estimates: Grover Algorithm
- 4 Conclusion
- References
- Post-Quantum Security of the CBC, CFB, OFB, CTR, and XTS Modes of Operation
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Techniques
- 1.2 Related Work
- 1.3 Organisation
- 2 Notation and Tools
- 2.1 Modes of Operation
- 3 Quantum Attacks on CBC, CFB, and XTS Based on Standard Secure PRF
- 3.1 Construction of the Block Cipher for CBC
- 3.2 Attack on CBC Mode of Operation
- 4 IND-qCPA Security of OFB and CTR Modes of Operation
- 5 IND-qCPA Security of CBC and CFB Mode of Operation
- References
- Post-Quantum Security Models for Authenticated Encryption
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Security Definitions
- 3 Main Theorem
- 4 Quantum-Resistant Strongly Unforgeable Signature Schemes
- 4.1 Strong Designated Verifier Signatures from Isogenies
- 4.2 Ring-LWE Signatures
- 5 Quantum-Resistant Authenticated Encryption Schemes
- 6 Overhead Calculations and Comparisons
- 6.1 Communication Overhead
- 6.2 Public Key Overhead
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Quantum Collision-Resistance of Non-uniformly Distributed Functions
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Main Result
- References
- An Efficient Attack on a Code-Based Signature Scheme
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Description of the LDGM Code Based Signature Scheme Proposed in BBCRS+13
- 3 The Idea Underlying the Attack
- 3.1 Correlations Between Bits of the Signature
- 3.2 An Additional Source of Correlations
- 3.3 Obtaining Low Weight Codewords of the Code with Parity-Check Matrix H'
- 4 Recovering S up to a Column Permutation
- 5 Recovering Q up to a Column Permutation
- 6 Forging New Signatures
- 7 Experimental Results
- 8 Conclusion
- A Proof of Proposition 2
- B Proof of Proposition 3
- References
- Vulnerabilities of ``McEliece in the World of Escher''
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background: McEliece Schemes
- 2.1 Public and Private Keys
- 2.2 Private Generator and Parity Check Matrices
- 2.3 Error Sets
- 3 Improving Information Set Decoding for the Error Vector
- 4 Information Set Decoding for the Private Key
- 4.1 Using the Nonrandom P
- 5 Experimental Results
- 6 Countermeasures
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Cryptanalysis of the McEliece Public Key Cryptosystem Based on Polar Codes
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Basic Facts
- 3 Decreasing Monomial Codes
- 4 Cryptanalysis
- 4.1 Step 1 -- Minimum Weight Codewords Searching
- 4.2 Step 2 -- Signature of Orbits in Wmin
- 4.3 Step 3 -- Computation of orbits in Wmin
- 4.4 Step 4 -- Identification of Affine Spaces
- 4.5 Step 5 -- Equivalence Problem for a Short Decreasing Monomial Code
- 4.6 Step 6 -- Induction Step
- 5 Implementation of the Attack on a [2048,614]-Polar Code
- 6 Conclusion
- A Proofs of the Results of Section 3
- A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
- A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
- A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
- A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
- B Proof of the Results of Section 4
- B.1 Proof of Theorem 4
- B.2 Proof of Proposition 4
- B.3 Proof of Proposition 5
- References
- Analysis of Information Set Decoding for a Sub-linear Error Weight
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Generic Decoding
- 2.1 Information Set Decoding and Some Variants
- 3 Asymptotic Analysis
- 3.1 Main Theorem
- 3.2 Asymptotic Behaviour of the Workfactors
- 4 Comparing with Observations
- 4.1 Asymptotic Complexity of ISD Variants
- 4.2 Non Asymptotic Complexity of ISD Variants
- 5 Conclusion
- A Proof of Proposition1
- B Proofs of Main Theorem Section
- References
- On the Differential Security of the HFEv- Signature Primitive
- 1 Introduction and Outline
- 2 Big Field Signature Schemes
- 2.1 HFE
- 2.2 HFEv-
- 3 Differential Symmetry
- 3.1 Linear Symmetry for HFEv
- 3.2 HFEv-
- 4 Differential Invariants
- 4.1 Minimal Generators over Intermediate Subfield
- 4.2 Invariant Analysis of HFEv
- 4.3 HFEv-
- 5 Degree of Regularity, Q-Rank and Parameters
- 6 Conclusion
- References
- Extension Field Cancellation: A New Central Trapdoor for Multivariate Quadratic Systems
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Notation and Definitions
- 2.2 Multivariate Quadratic Systems
- 3 Central Map
- 3.1 The Basic Construction
- 3.2 Modifiers
- 4 Efficiency
- 4.1 Recommended Parameters
- 4.2 Complexity
- 4.3 Speed
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- Security Analysis and Key Modification for ZHFE
- 1 Introduction
- 2 HFE
- 3 Q-Rank
- 4 ZHFE
- 5 Analysis of ZHFE
- 5.1 Algebraic
- 5.2 Differential Symmetric
- 5.3 Differential Invariant
- 5.4 Q-Rank
- 5.5 Equivalent Keys
- 6 ZHFE Key Modification, ZHFE-
- 6.1 Design
- 6.2 Analysis
- 6.3 Suggested Parameters
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Efficient ZHFE Key Generation
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The ZHFE Encryption Scheme
- 3 New Method
- 3.1 Structure of the Matrix
- 3.2 The Matrix over the Small Field
- 3.3 An Algorithm to Solve the System
- 4 Complexity of the New Method
- 5 Remarks About Security
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Additively Homomorphic Ring-LWE Masking
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 3 Additively Homomorphic Ring-LWE Masking
- 4 Discussion
- 4.1 Analysis
- 4.2 Comparison with Previous Work
- 4.3 Error Rates
- 5 Implementation Results
- 6 Experimental Results
- 7 Conclusion
- A An Attack on the Multiplication
- References
- A Homomorphic LWE Based E-voting Scheme
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Definition of Single Pass E-voting Schemes
- 2.2 Security Model
- 3 (Cryptographic) Building Blocks
- 3.1 Signatures
- 3.2 Scale-Invariant LWE Encryption
- 3.3 LWE Symmetric Encryption
- 3.4 Homomorphism
- 3.5 Publicly Verifiable Decryption for LWE
- 3.6 Concatenated LWE, with Distributed Decryption
- 4 Detailed Description of Our E-voting Protocol
- 4.1 Setup Phase
- 4.2 Voter Registration
- 4.3 Voting Phase
- 4.4 Processing a Ballot in BB
- 4.5 Tallying and Verification
- 5 Correctness and Security Analysis
- 5.1 Correctness and Verifiability
- 5.2 Privacy
- 6 Discussion and Conclusion
- References
- Author Index
System requirements
File format: PDF
Copy protection: Watermark-DRM (Digital Rights Management)
System requirements:
- Computer (Windows; MacOS X; Linux): Use the free software Adobe Reader, Adobe Digital Editions, or any other PDF viewer of your choice (see eBook Help).
- Tablet/Smartphone (Android; iOS): Install the free app Adobe Digital Editions or another reading app for eBooks, e.g., PocketBook (see eBook Help).
- E-reader: Bookeen, Kobo, Pocketbook, Sony, Tolino and many more (only limited: Kindle).
The file format PDF always displays a book page identically on any hardware. This makes PDF suitable for complex layouts such as those used in textbooks and reference books (images, tables, columns, footnotes). Unfortunately, on the small screens of e-readers or smartphones, PDFs are rather annoying, requiring too much scrolling.
This eBook uses Watermark-DRM, a „soft” copy protection. This means that there are no technical restrictions to prevent illegal distribution. However, there is a personalised watermark embedded in the eBook that can be used to identify the purchaser of the eBook in the event of misuse and to provide evidence for legal purposes.
For more information, see our eBook Help page.