Plural and Conflicting Values
1st Edition
Published on 8. March 1990
375 pages
978-0-19-151974-1 (ISBN)
Description
Plural values and conflicting values are often held to be conceptually problematic, threatening the very possibility of ethics, or at least of rational ethics. This book rejects this view. The author first demonstrates why it is so important to understand the issues raised by plural and conflicting values. This includes a full discussion of Aristotle's treatment of the issues. He then goes on to show that plurality and conflict are commonplace and generally unproblematic features of our everyday choice and action, and that they do allow for a sound and rational ethic.
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Michael Stocker
Plural and Conflicting Values
Book
10/1992
Clarendon Press
€86.66
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Michael Stocker
Plural and Conflicting Values
Book
12/1989
Clarendon Press
€86.66
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Content
- Intro
- Contents
- Introduction
- PART I: CONFLICT
- 1. Dirty Hands and Ordinary Life
- 1: Some structures of overall, action-guiding evaluations
- 2: Some foundational features of choice and action
- 3: How are these costs taken up?
- 4: The special moral nature of dirty features
- 5: Some features of dirty hands and similar acts
- 6: Strange theories of value and the denial of dirty hands
- 7: Moral emotions and dirty hands
- 8: Dirty hands and acceptable moral theories
- 2. Moral Immorality
- 1: Admirable immorality, an introduction
- 2: Overridingness and admirable immorality
- 3: Overvaluing and admirability
- 4: The unavoidable evils in admirable immorality
- 5: Conclusion
- 3. Dirty Hands and Conflicts of Values and of Desires in Aristotle's Ethics
- 1: Dirty hands: A brief characterization
- 2: That Aristotle allows for dirty hands
- 3: Eudaimonia: The implications of mixed actions
- 4: Acting for eudaimonia and for eudaimonia
- 5: Conflicts of values and of desires, and Aristotle
- 6: Conflicts of desire in Aristotle
- 7: Some comments on Aristotelian pleasures and conflicts
- 8: Courage and pleasure
- 9: Conclusion
- 4. Moral Conflicts: What They Are and What They Show
- 1: The incompossibility account and modifications
- 2: Conflicts of prima facie duties and of overall duties
- 3: The shared assumption that ethics is action-guiding
- 4: Non-action-guiding act evaluations
- 5: Why there are non-action-guiding act evaluations
- 6: Non-action-guiding act evaluations and ethics
- 7: Conflicts and non-action-guiding act evaluations
- 8: Other conflicts
- 9: The real importance of conflicts for ethical theory
- PART II: PLURALITY AND JUDGEMENT
- 5. Courage, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Possibility of Evaluative and Emotional Coherence
- 1: Courage and the Doctrine
- 2: The mean-of courage and more generally
- 3: One value, many values
- 4: The mean of courage
- 5: Real unities
- 6: Real unities and the usefulness of the Doctrine
- 7: Complex unities
- Appendix 1: Pears's solution
- Appendix 2: The object of tharsos
- 6. Plurality and Choice
- 1: Three marks of plurality
- 2: Obvious plurality and its denial
- 3: A confusion of commensurability and comparability
- 4: Choice and plurality
- 5: Against these being evaluative differences
- 6: Pluralism and an aesthetic of pleasure
- 7: Pluralism and pleasure as more usually considered
- 8: No special theory of judgement for plurality
- 9: Simplicity
- 10: Other understandings of monism
- 11: Difficulties with sortal comparisons
- 12: Conclusion
- PART III: PLURALITY AND CONFLICT
- 7. Akrasia: The Unity of the Good, Commensurability, and Comparability
- 1: The Protagorean Predicament
- 2: The Protagorean argument
- 3: Commensurability and comparability
- 4: Comparability, affectivity, and fragmentation
- 5: Hedonism allows for akrasia
- 6: Hedonistic incommensurability reconsidered
- 7: Single and plural values and objects of attraction
- 8: Are there any unitary values or attractions?
- 9: Value finality
- 10: Value maximization
- 11: Hedonism as a pure intellectual idea
- 8. Monism, Pluralism, and Conflict
- 1: Instances and sorts of values and conflicts
- 2: Time and conflict
- 3: People, contemporaneous conflict, and plurality
- 4: Differential care and rational conflict
- PART IV: MAXIMIZATION
- 9. Maximization: Some Conceptual Problems
- 1: That maximization is not conceptually true
- 2: Betterness is the moreness of the good: Some conceptual problems of evaluative maximization
- 3: A suggestion about false pleasures
- 10. Maximization: Some Evaluative Problems
- 1: That the best is not morally required
- 2: Maximization, moral psychology, and levels of goods
- 3: Goods are not simply good enough
- 4: A familiar example which seems maximizing but is not
- 5: Aristotle on maximization
- 6: Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index Locorum
- Index of Names
- A
- B
- C
- D
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Y
- General Index
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
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