
Information Security Practice and Experience
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Content
- Title Page
- Preface
- ISPEC 2012
- Table of Contents
- Digital Signatures
- A Pre-computable Signature Scheme with Efficient Verification for RFID
- Introduction
- Preliminaries and Definitions
- Definition of Our Signature
- Bilinear Groups
- Complexity Assumptions
- Our Signature Scheme
- Construction
- Correctness
- Security
- Application to RFID
- Hardware Requirement
- Comparisons
- Signature Verification of Partially Known Messages
- Conclusion
- References
- Redactable Signatures for Independent Removal of Structure and Content
- Introduction
- Attacking the Kundu-Scheme
- Preliminaries, Notations and Security Properties
- Security Properties
- Aggregate Signatures and Bilinear Pairings
- RSS Construction Using Aggregate Signatures
- High-Level Description of Our Construction
- Instantiation Using the BGLS-Scheme
- Modifications
- Performance Measurements
- Conclusion and Open Questions
- References
- Public Key Cryptography
- Improved Efficiency of Chosen Ciphertext Secure Encryption from Factoring
- Introduction
- Motivation
- Our Contribution
- Outline
- Definitions
- Key Encapsulation Mechanism
- Target Collision Resistant Hash Function
- New Variant of HK09
- Security Proof
- Efficiency
- The case of QRN group.
- The case of semi-smooth subgroup group.
- Conclusion
- References
- Deniable Encryptions Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
- Introduction
- Other Related Work
- Our Contribution
- Organization
- Preliminaries
- Notations
- Deniable Encryption
- Building Blocks
- A Deniable Encryption Scheme Secure under Chosen Ciphertext Attacks
- Construction
- Security Proof
- Conclusion
- References
- Computational Soundness of Indistinguishability Properties without Computable Parsing
- Introduction
- The Symbolic Model
- Terms
- Predicates, Conditions, Frames and Static Equivalence
- Processes
- Computational Interpretation
- Computational Interpretation of Terms and Predicate Symbols
- Interactive Turing Machines
- Cryptographic Assumptions
- The Main Result
- Computation Trees
- Partial Unraveling
- Replacing Plaintexts
- Ruling Out Coincidences
- Ruling Out Predictions
- Trace Mapping
- Conclusion
- References
- Cryptanalysis I: Differential Attacks
- New Impossible Differential Attacks on Camellia
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Notations
- Description of Camellia
- Encryption Procedure.
- Key Schedule.
- New 7-Round Impossible Differentials of Camellia with 2 FL/FL-1 Layers
- Impossible Differential.
- Impossible Differential Attacks on Camellia with FL/FL-1 Layers
- Impossible Differential Attack on 11-Round Camellia-128
- Complexity.
- Impossible Differential Attack on 11-Round and 12-Round Camellia-192
- Attack on 11-round Camellia-192.
- Attack on 12-round Camellia-192.
- Complexity.
- Impossible Differential Attack on 14-Round Camellia-256
- Complexity.
- Conclusion
- References
- Impossible Differential Attacks on Reduced-Round LBlock
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Some Notations
- Overview of LBlock
- 14-Round Impossible Differentials of LBlock
- Impossible Differential Attacks on 21-Round LBlock
- Some Properties of LBlock
- Some Observations on the Key Schedule of LBlock
- Attack Procedure
- Complexity of the Attack
- Conclusion
- References
- New Truncated Differential Cryptanalysis on 3D Block Cipher
- Introduction
- Description of 3D Block Cipher
- Previous Works on 3D Block Cipher
- Key-Recovery Attack on 11-Round 3D Block Cipher
- Truncated Differential Path
- How to Obtain Chosen Plaintext
- How to Recover a User Key
- Differential Attack with Early Aborting Technique
- Conclusion of 11-Round Attack
- Extended Attack on 13-Round 3D Block Cipher
- Truncated Differential Path
- How to Obtain Another Right Pair
- How to Recover a User Key
- Conclusion of 13-Round Attack
- Conclusion
- References
- Applications I.i: Oblivious Transfer
- T-out-of-n Distributed Oblivious Transfer Protocols in Non-adaptive and Adaptive Settings
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Notations and Definitions
- Security Model
- One-Round t-out-of-n DOT Protocol
- Principle of the Protocol
- Description of the Protocol
- Correctness and Security of the Protocol
- Adaptive DOT Protocol with Limited Queries
- Description of the Protocol
- Correctness and Security of the Protocol
- Adaptive DOT Protocol with Unlimited Queries
- Description of the Protocol
- Correctness and Security of the Protocol
- Efficiency Consideration
- References
- A Code-Based 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer Based on McEliece Assumptions
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Security Definition of Oblivious Transfer
- Security Assumptions
- Overview of McEliece PKC
- Review of the Passively Secure 1- out-of-2 Protocol for OT by Dowsley et al.
- The OT Protocol
- Security of the Protocol against Active Adversary
- 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer
- The 1-out-of-N OT Scheme
- Security of the Scheme
- Efficiency and Parameters of the Proposed Scheme
- Conclusion
- References
- Applications I.ii: Internet Security(Works-in-Progress)
- Towards Fine-Grained Access Control on Browser Extensions
- Introduction
- Background Overview
- Basic Notions
- Firefox Overview
- JavaScript Extensions of Firefox
- Browser Extension Security Policy Framework
- Motivation
- Architecture
- Access Control Module
- Dynamic Regulations Module
- Implementation
- Position to Achieve the Framework
- Resource Acquiring Component
- Evaluation
- Compatibility with Legitimate JSEs
- Effectiveness on Restricting Malicious JSEs
- Performance
- Related Work
- Conclusion
- References
- Enhanced STE3D-CAP: A Novel 3D CAPTCHA Family
- Introduction
- Our Contributions
- Related Work
- CAPTCHA Security
- CAPTCHA Usability
- 3D CAPTCHAs
- Enhanced Stereoscopic 3D CAPTCHA: STE3D-CAP-e
- Design and Implementation
- Issues Unique to STE3D-CAP-e
- New AI Problem Family
- Security Analysis
- Brute Force Attacks
- Single Image Attacks
- Usability
- Pilot Study Conclusions
- Conclusion
- References
- Key Management
- High-Entropy Visual Identification for Touch Screen Devices
- Introduction
- Visual Cryptography
- System Overview
- Prior Work
- Design
- Threat Model
- The Challenge Schema
- System Game
- Visual Secret Shares That Don't Leak
- Incomplete Erasure Attacks
- Implementation
- Estimating Timing
- Future Work
- Conclusion
- A Framework for Security Analysis of Key Derivation Functions
- Introduction
- Key Derivation Functions
- General Security Framework
- Defining the Security Models
- Known Public Inputs Attack - KPM-Secure
- Known Public Inputs Attack - KPS-Secure
- Adaptive Chosen Context Information Attack (CCM)
- Adaptive Chosen Context Information Attack (Krawczyk)
- Adaptive Chosen Public Inputs Attack (CPM)
- Relating These Five Security Models
- Implications between Security Models
- Non-implications between Security Models
- Conclusion
- References
- Applied Cryptography
- On the Equivalence of Two Definitions of Visual Cryptography Scheme
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- The Equivalence of Two Definitions of Basis Matrix VCS
- The Equivalence of Two Definitions of Threshold Basis Matrix VCS
- The Equivalence of Two Definitions of General Access Structure Basis Matrix VCS
- The Equivalence of Two Definitions of General Access Structure SIVCS
- The Inequivalence of Two Definitions of Non-basis Matrix VCS
- Conclusions
- References
- Key Length Estimation of Pairing-Based Cryptosystems Using ?T Pairing
- Introduction
- Outline of Function Field Sieve
- DLP and ?T Pairing
- FFS
- Known Evaluation Methods
- Asymptotic Evaluation Formulas
- Granger's Evaluation Formula
- New Evaluation Formulas for Efficient Implementation of FFS
- Well-Used Efficient Algorithms for FFS
- Criteria for Sufficient Number of Relations
- New Evaluation Formulas
- Estimation of Key Length
- Conclusions
- References
- Lightweight Integrity for XOR Network Coding in Wireless Sensor Networks
- Introduction
- Related Work
- Preliminaries
- Requirements
- Notation
- System and Network Assumptions
- Threat Model [16]
- Universal Hash Functions (UHFs)
- MAC Based on UHFs
- The Yu's Scheme
- Problem Statement
- Our Scheme
- Discussion
- Security
- Efficiency
- Conclusion
- References
- Applications II.i: PINs
- iPIN and mTAN for Secure eID Applications
- Introduction
- Motivation
- The eID Functionality of the German Identity Card
- Identity Theft Attacks Concerning the eID Functionality
- Approach and Outline
- Background
- PACE
- Multiparty Computation
- iPINandmTANforeIDCards
- Preliminaries
- Variant 1: Multiparty Decryption of Nonce
- Variant 2: Secret Shared PIN
- Variant 3: PACE with mTAN
- Variant 4: Remote PACE and EAC
- Variant 5: Combination
- Analysis
- Security Analysis
- Feasibility
- Conclusion and Future Work
- References
- Applications II.ii: Fundamentals (Works-in-Progress)
- Secure Distributed Computation of the Square Root and Applications
- Introduction
- Cryptographic Primitives and Definitions
- Mathematical Foundations
- Newton-Raphson Method
- Goldschmidt's Algorithm
- Computation of the Starting Value
- Description and Analysis of the Algorithms
- Norm
- Approximation
- Goldschmidt's Algorithm
- Security
- Application to QR-Decomposition
- Secure Computation of the QR-Decomposition
- Multiplication with a Householder-Matrix
- Computation of the QR-Decomposition
- Experimental Results
- The Setup
- Computation of the Square Root
- Computation of the QR-Decomposition
- Conclusion and Further Work
- References
- Prevent Kernel Return-Oriented Programming Attacks Using Hardware Virtualization
- Introduction
- Return-Oriented Programming Attack
- ROP Introduction
- Challenges for Defense Kernel ROP Attacks
- Our Solution
- ROP Attack Defense Overview
- Hardware Virtualization
- Implementation and Evaluation
- Related Work
- Conclusion
- References
- Cryptanalysis II: Fault Attacks and Key Recovery
- Structure-Based RSA Fault Attacks
- Introduction
- Background
- Protection of Integrity and Authenticity
- Related Work
- Structure-Based Fault Attack
- Enabling the Attack
- Conducting the Attack
- Infeasibility of Trivial Attacks
- Proof-of-Concept Practical Attack
- System Overview
- File Verification
- Attacking the Exponent
- Attacking the Modulus
- Impact on the STB
- Further Attacks
- 3G Access Point
- PGP Key Vulnerability
- Conclusion
- References
- Fault Analysis of the KATAN Family of Block Ciphers
- Introduction
- A Brief Description of KATAN
- An Overview of the Cube and Extended Cube Attacks
- Fault Analysis of KATAN
- Attack on KATAN32
- Attack on KATAN48
- Attack on KATAN64
- Attack Complexity
- Conclusion
- References
- Biclique Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round Piccolo Block Cipher
- Introduction
- A Brief Description of Piccolo
- Notations
- Description of Piccolo
- Biclique Cryptanalysis of Piccolo
- Definition of Biclique
- Pattern of Biclique Cryptanalysis of Piccolo
- Key Recovery for Reduced-Round Piccolo
- Key Recovery for Full Round Piccolo-80
- Key Recovery for 28-Round Piccolo-128
- Conclusion
- References
- On the CCA-1 Security of Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption over the Integers
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Notations
- Gentry's Framework
- Overview of vDGHV SHE Scheme
- Security Models
- LMSV CCA-1 Attack
- Our CCA-1 Attack
- The Attack
- Correctness
- Efficiency
- An Example
- Implementation
- Discussions
- On the Difference between Our Attack and LMSV Attack
- On Adapting Our Attack to SHE Schemes with Ideal Lattice
- On LMSV SHE CCA-1 Approach
- Conclusion
- References
- Cryptanalysis III: Key Recovery (Works-in-Progress
- Partial Key Exposure on RSA with Private Exponents Larger Than N
- Introduction
- LLL and Multivariate Polynomials
- Lattices
- KeyRecoveryfromKnownMSBs
- Preliminaries
- Trivariate Approach: ß 3/2 - a
- Bivariate Approach: ß & 3/2 - a
- KeyRecoveryfromKnownLSBs
- Practical Experiments
- Results for Attack on MSBs
- Results for Attack on LSBs
- Conclusion
- References
- Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round ICEBERG
- Introduction
- Description of ICEBERG
- Non-linear Layer ?
- Linear Layer K
- Linear Cryptanalysis of 6-Round ICEBERG
- Linear Characteristic of 6-Round ICEBERG
- 6-Round Linear Characteristic
- Linear Attacks against 7-Round ICEBERG
- Linear Attacks under Weak Keys against 7-Round ICEBERG
- Summary
- References
- Overcoming Significant Noise: Correlation-Template-Induction Attack
- Introduction
- Preliminary
- Correlation Power Analysis
- Template Attack
- Correlation-Template-Induction Attack
- Our Attack Model
- Efficiency Analysis
- Experimental Results
- Conclusion
- References
- Author Index
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