A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
Published on 1. November 2007
978-0-19-160724-0 (ISBN)
Description
This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.
The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective?
Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.
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01/2008
Oxford University Press, USA
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11/2007
Oxford University Press
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Debraj Ray is Julius Silver Professor of Economics and Director of Graduate Studies in Economics at New York University. He has held long-term appointments at Stanford University, the Indian Statistical Institute, and Boston University. He has held numerous visiting appointments at Harvard University, MIT, the Instituto de Matemática Pura e Aplicada (Rio De Janeiro), the People's University of China (Beijing), and the London School of Economics. He is a Permanent Research Affiliate of the Instituto de Análisis Económico (Barcelona).
Professor Ray is a Fellow of the Econometric Society, a recipient of the Mahalanobis Memorial Medal, and a recipient of the Outstanding Young Scientists Award (in the area of mathematics) from the Indian National Science Academy. He received the Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching at Stanford and the Gittner Award for Teaching Excellence in Economics at Boston University.
Content
- Preface
- 1: Introduction
- Part 1 The Setting
- 2: Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements
- 3: Coalitions, Cooperation, and Non-Cooperation
- Part 2 The Bargaining Approach to Coalitions Formation
- 4: Irreversible Agreements
- 5: Irreversible Agreements: Symmetric Games
- 6: Applications
- 7: Irreversible Agreements: The General Case
- 8: A Framework for Reversible Commitments
- 9: Reversible Agreements Without Externalities
- 10: Reversible Agreements With Externalities
- Part 3 A Blocking Approach to Coalition Formation
- 11: Blocking
- 12: Irreversible Commitments
- 13: The Blocking Approach in Real Time
- 14: Directions
