
Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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The 54 full papers included in these proceedings were carefully reviewed and selected from 230 submissions. They have been organized in topical sections as follows: Part I: Cryptographic protocols; encrypted data; signatures; Part II: Post-quantum; lattices; wireless and networks; privacy and homomorphic encryption; symmetric crypto; Part III: Blockchain; smart infrastructures, systems and software; attacks; users and usability.
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Content
- Intro
- Preface
- Organization
- Abstracts of Keynote Talks
- Applying Machine Learning to Securing Cellular Networks
- Real-World Cryptanalysis
- CAPTCHAs: What Are They Good For?
- Contents - Part I
- Contents - Part II
- Contents - Part III
- Cryptographic Protocols
- CryptoZoo: A Viewer for Reduction Proofs
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Related Work
- 3 State-Separating Proofs
- 4 A Proof Viewer for SSPs
- 4.1 Proof Viewing Concepts
- 4.2 Implementation Considerations
- 5 Case Study: IND-CPA Vs. Simulation-Based Security
- 6 Case Study: Constant-Depth GGM Tree
- 7 Case Study: Yao's Garbling Scheme
- 8 Comparison
- 8.1 Yao's Garbling Scheme
- 8.2 SSP Proofs of TLS 1.3
- 8.3 SSP Proofs of the MLS Key Schedule
- 8.4 Formal Verification Tools for SSPs
- 9 Conclusion and Future Work
- References
- Element Distinctness and Bounded Input Size in Private Set Intersection and Related Protocols
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Related Work and Background
- 2.1 Private Set Intersection (PSI)
- 2.2 PSI Variants
- 2.3 PSI with Restrictions
- 2.4 PSI with Multiset Input
- 2.5 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
- 2.6 Homomorphic Encryption
- 3 Proving Element Distinctness
- 3.1 Puzzle-Based PoED Construction
- 3.2 Analysis of PoED-Puzzle Protocol
- 4 PSI with Element Distinctness Check
- 4.1 Adversary Model
- 4.2 Definition of AD-PSI
- 4.3 A Construction for AD-PSI Based on PoED-puzzle
- 4.4 Alternative AD-PSI and Modified Construction
- 5 AD-PSI Variants
- 5.1 PSI-CA with Element Distinctness (AD-PSI-CA)
- 5.2 PSI-X with Element Distinctness (AD-PSI-X)
- 5.3 PSI-DT with Element Distinctness (AD-PSI-DT)
- 6 Completing Bounded-Size-Hiding-PSI
- 7 Authorized PSI with Element Distinctness
- 7.1 AD-APSI Definition
- 7.2 AD-APSI Construction
- 7.3 Security Analysis
- 8 Conclusion
- A Security Proof for AD-PSI-puzzle
- B AD-PSI Variants
- C Security Proof for AD-APSI
- References
- A New Approach to Efficient and Secure Fixed-Point Computation
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Related Work
- 1.2 Construction Blueprint
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 UC Functionalities
- 3 Truncation
- 3.1 RNS in MPC
- 3.2 Fixed-Point Arithmetic
- 4 The Construction
- 4.1 Preprocessing
- 4.2 Lifting
- 4.3 Probabilistic Truncation
- 4.4 Error Reduction
- 5 Efficiency
- 5.1 Implementation
- 5.2 Comparison with Related Techniques
- References
- Auditable Attribute-Based Credentials Scheme and Its Application in Contact Tracing
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Auditable Attribute-Based Credentials Scheme
- 3.1 Auditable Public Keys
- 3.2 Formal Definitions of Auditable ABC
- 3.3 Our Constructions and Analysis
- 4 Application: Contact Tracing
- 4.1 An Auditable ABC-Based Construction
- 4.2 Security and Analysis
- 4.3 Implementation
- 5 Conclusion
- A The Necessity of Enhancing Contact Tracing Systems
- B The SPS-EQ Scheme from ch4spseqspspkc2022
- C Extending the BLS Signature ch4bls01 with APK
- References
- Verification Protocol for Stable Matching from Conditional Disclosure of Secrets
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contribution
- 1.2 Applications
- 1.3 Organization
- 2 Related Works
- 2.1 Stable Matching
- 2.2 Conditional Disclosure of Secrets
- 2.3 Multi-client Verifiable Computation
- 3 Preliminaries
- 3.1 Stable Matching
- 3.2 Conditional Disclosure of Secrets
- 3.3 Multi-client Verifiable Computation
- 3.4 Secret Sharing
- 4 Proposed CDS Schemes
- 4.1 CDS Scheme for Unstable Matching
- 4.2 CDS Scheme for Stable Matching
- 4.3 Possible Improvements
- 5 Verification Protocol for Stable Matching
- 6 Implementation
- 7 Concluding Remarks
- References
- Non-malleable Fuzzy Extractors
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Results
- 1.2 Related Work
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 (Keyless) Fuzzy Extractors
- 2.2 Non-malleable Codes
- 3 Non-malleable Fuzzy Extractors
- 4 Construction
- 5 Fuzzy Tamper-Resilient Security
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Upgrading Fuzzy Extractors
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contribution
- 1.2 Related Work
- 1.3 Discussion and Future Work
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Entropy Definitions
- 2.2 Obfuscation Definitions
- 2.3 Fuzzy Extractors
- 3 Weakly-Private Fuzzy Extractors
- 3.1 Weakly Private FE from FE and MBCC Obfuscation
- 3.2 Weakly Private FE from Secure Sketch and MBCC Obfuscation
- 4 Robustness
- 5 Reuse
- A Privacy vs FE Security
- B Reusability from Composable MBCC Obfuscation
- References
- X-Lock: A Secure XOR-Based Fuzzy Extractor for Resource Constrained Devices
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Related Works
- 3 Background
- 4 X-Lock: Construction Details
- 5 X-Lock: Algorithm Analysis
- 5.1 Security Analysis
- 5.2 Bias and Correlation Analysis
- 5.3 Costs Analysis
- 6 Implementation and Comparison
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Encrypted Data
- Efficient Clustering on Encrypted Data
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Related Works
- 3 Background
- 3.1 Approximate Homomorphic Encryption CKKS
- 3.2 Newton's Method
- 4 System Architecture and Threat Model
- 4.1 System Architecture
- 4.2 Threat Model
- 4.3 Security
- 5 Fully Privacy-Preserving Clustering Scheme Based on FHE
- 5.1 Preliminaries
- 5.2 Ciphertext Comparison
- 5.3 Ciphertext Division
- 5.4 Converting the One-Hot Vectors to Label in Plaintexts
- 5.5 The Complete Algorithm for Privacy-Preserving Clustering
- 5.6 Security Proof
- 6 An Optimized Algorithm
- 6.1 Block Clustering Scheme
- 6.2 Block Clustering Scheme with Cluster Selection
- 7 Experiment Results
- 7.1 Experiment Setup
- 7.2 Clustering Accuracy
- 7.3 Run Time
- 7.4 Performance of Block Clustering Scheme with Cluster Selection
- 8 Conclusions
- References
- Generic Construction of Forward Secure Public Key Authenticated Encryption with Keyword Search
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 PAEKS
- 2.2 0/1 Encodings
- 3 Definition of FS-PAEKS
- 4 Our Generic Construction of FS-PAEKS
- 5 Security Analysis
- 6 Vulnerability of the Jiang Et Al. FS-PAEKS Scheme
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Encryption Mechanisms for Receipt-Free and Perfectly Private Verifiable Elections
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contributions
- 1.2 Our Techniques
- 1.3 Related Work
- 1.4 Overview of Paper
- 2 Background
- 2.1 Assumptions and Primitives
- 2.2 Traceable Receipt-Free Encryption (TREnc)
- 2.3 Commitment Consistent Encryption (CCE)
- 3 The Construction of Our Scheme
- 3.1 Description
- 3.2 Verification Equations
- 3.3 Security Analysis
- 3.4 Efficiency
- 4 Application to E-Voting
- 4.1 Voting Scheme with a Homomorphic Tally
- 4.2 Voting Scheme with a Mixnet Tally
- 5 Conclusion
- A Scheme Description for Complex Ballots
- B Deferred Proofs
- B.1 Correctness
- B.2 Strong Randomizability
- B.3 TCCA Security
- B.4 Traceability
- B.5 Verifiability
- References
- Two-Party Decision Tree Training from Updatable Order-Revealing Encryption
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Related Work
- 1.2 Our Contribution
- 1.3 Outline
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 The Universal Composability Model
- 2.2 Order-Revealing Encryption
- 2.3 Decision Tree Training
- 3 Updatable Order-Revealing Encryption
- 4 Secure Decision Tree Training
- 4.1 Variations of the Training Process
- 4.2 Graceful Degradation Using Enclaves
- 5 Analysis of the Leakage
- 5.1 Leakage for Random Message Selection
- 5.2 Additional Leakage for Malicious Message Selection
- 5.3 Transformation for Non-uniform Distributions
- 6 Implementation and Evaluation
- 6.1 Evaluation of the Updatable ORE Scheme
- 6.2 Evaluation of the Protocol
- 7 Conclusion
- A A Brief Introduction to the UC Framework
- References
- KIVR: Committing Authenticated Encryption Using Redundancy and Application to GCM, CCM, and More
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Research Challenges
- 1.2 Contributions
- 1.3 Organization
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Committing Security with Plaintext Redundancy
- 3.1 Plaintext with Redundancy
- 3.2 Definitions for Committing Security with Redundancy
- 4 KIVR Transform
- 4.1 Specification of KIVR
- 4.2 Security of KIVR
- 5 Committing Security of KIVR with CTR-Based AE
- 5.1 Specification of CTR-Based AE
- 5.2 CMT-4-Security of KIVR[CTRAE]
- 6 Proof of Theorem 1
- 6.1 Tools
- 6.2 Symbol Definitions
- 6.3 Deriving the CMT-4-Security Bound
- 6.4 Bounding Pr[(C,T)=(C,T) coll]
- 7 Committing Security of KIVR with GCM, GCM-SIV, and CCM
- 7.1 Specifications of GCM, GCM-SIV, and CCM
- 7.2 CMT-4-Security of KIVR[GCM], KIVR[GCM-SIV], and KIVR[CCM]
- 7.3 Tightness of the CMT-4-Security of KIVR[GCM] and KIVR[GCM-SIV]
- 7.4 On the Tightness of CMT-4-Security of KIVR[CCM]
- 8 Committing Security of KIVR with CTR-HMAC
- 8.1 Specification of CTR-HMAC
- 8.2 CMT-4-Security Bound of KIVR[CTR-HMAC]
- 8.3 Tightness of the CMT-4-Security of KIVR[CTR-HMAC]
- 9 Conclusion
- A Multi-user Security for AE
- B Multi-user PRF Security
- C mu-AE Security of AE Schemes with KIVR
- D Proof of Theorem 2 for KIVR[GCM-SIV]
- E Proof of Theorem 3
- References
- Signatures
- Subversion-Resilient Signatures Without Random Oracles
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Subversion-Resilient Signatures with Watchdogs
- 1.2 Technical Challenges
- 1.3 Our Contributions
- 1.4 Alternative Models
- 2 Model and Preliminaries
- 2.1 Notation and Model
- 2.2 Subversion-Resilience
- 2.3 Achieving Subversion-Resilience
- 2.4 Assumptions
- 2.5 Pseudorandom Functions
- 3 Subversion-Resilient One-Way Functions
- 3.1 One-Way Permutations
- 3.2 Subversion-Resilient One-Way Functions
- 4 Subversion-Resilient Hash Functions
- 5 Subversion-Resilient Signatures
- 5.1 Digital Signatures
- 5.2 Lamport Signatures
- 5.3 The Naor-Yung Construction
- 6 Discussion
- References
- Practical Lattice-Based Distributed Signatures for a Small Number of Signers
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Contribution
- 1.2 Technical Overview
- 1.3 Related Work
- 2 Background
- 3 Distributed Signature Protocol
- 3.1 Protocol Description
- 3.2 Security Analysis
- 3.3 Concrete Parameters
- A More Related Work
- B Additional Background
- B.1 Forking Lemma
- C Hardness Estimation of MLWE and MSIS
- D Indistinguishability of Hybrids H2 and H1
- References
- Building MPCitH-Based Signatures from MQ, MinRank, and Rank SD
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 The MPC-in-the-Head Paradigm
- 2.2 Methodology
- 2.3 Matrix Multiplication Checking Protocol
- 3 Proof of Knowledge for MQ
- 4 Proofs of Knowledge for MinRank and Rank SD
- 4.1 Matrix Rank Checking Protocols
- 4.2 Proof of Knowledge for MinRank
- 4.3 Proof of Knowledge for Rank SD
- 5 Running Times
- A Methodology
- A.1 MPCitH Optimizations
- B State of the Art - Performances
- B.1 Multivariate Quadratic Problem
- B.2 MinRank Problem
- B.3 Rank Syndrome Decoding Problem
- C Benchmark Analysis
- References
- Exploring SIDH-Based Signature Parameters
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Protocols and Digital Signatures
- 2.2 Supersingular Isogenies
- 2.3 Quaternion Algebra
- 2.4 SIDH
- 2.5 Algorithms for Computing Isogenies
- 3 Signatures Based on SIDH Squares
- 3.1 Proposed Constructions
- 4 Analysis of KLPT-Based Attacks
- 4.1 The KLPT Algorithm for Extremal Order
- 4.2 KLPT Algorithm for Non-extremal Order
- 4.3 Parameters Secure Against KLPT-Based Attacks
- 5 Analysis of Other Attacks
- 5.1 Attacks Based on the SIDH Attacks
- 5.2 Attacks on the Zero-Knowledge Property
- 6 Concrete Instantiations and Parameters Size
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Biscuit: New MPCitH Signature Scheme from Structured Multivariate Polynomials
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Overview of MPCitH-Based Signature Schemes
- 1.2 Organization of the Paper and Main Results
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Notations
- 2.2 The PowAff2u Problem
- 2.3 Digital Signature Scheme
- 2.4 5-Pass Identification Schemes
- 2.5 MPC-in-the-Head: From MPC to Zero-Knowledge
- 2.6 Proof Systems for Arbitrary Circuits
- 3 Interactive Protocols for PowAff2
- 3.1 Multi-Party Computation Protocol for PowAff2
- 3.2 Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge for PowAff2
- 4 Biscuit Signature Scheme
- 4.1 Parameters
- 5 Security Analysis
- 5.1 About the Hardness of PowAff2
- 5.2 Key Recovery Attacks
- 5.3 Forgery Attacks
- 5.4 Existential Unforgeability
- 6 Implementation
- 6.1 Canonical Representation Optimization
- 6.2 Hypercube Optimization
- 6.3 Vectorization
- 6.4 Performances and Memory Consumption
- References
- Author Index
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