Warrant and Proper Function
Published on 27. May 1993
256 pages
978-0-19-802405-7 (ISBN)
Description
In this companion volume to Warrant: The Current Debate, Alvin Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment. Although this book is in some sense a sequel to its companion volume, the arguments do not presuppose those of the first book and it stands alone as a stimulating contribution to epistemology.
More details
Other editions
Additional editions
Alvin Plantinga
Warrant and Proper Function
Book
07/1993
Oxford University Press Inc
€80.30
Shipment within 15-20 days
Alvin Plantinga
Warrant and Proper Function
Book
07/1993
Oxford University Press Inc
€256.00
Shipment within 15-20 days
Content
- Intro
- Contents
- 1. Warrant: A First Approximation
- I. Proper Function
- II. The Design Plan
- III. Reliability
- 2. Warrant: Objections and Refinements
- I. The Design Plan
- II. Two Concluding Comments
- 3. Exploring the Design Plan: Myself and My Past
- I. Knowledge of Myself
- II. Memory
- 4. Other Persons and Testimony
- I. Other Persons
- II. Testimony
- 5. Perception
- I. Perceptual Belief as Knowledge
- II. Perceptual Experience
- III. Perceptual Beliefs as Basic
- IV. Perceptual Beliefs Formed on the Basis of Experience
- V. Nature, Nurture, and Perceptual Judgments
- 6. A Priori Knowledge
- I. A Priori Knowledge Initially Characterized
- II. A Priori Knowledge Is Knowledge
- III. Fallibilistic A Priorism
- IV. A Priori Knowledge and the Causal Requirements
- V. Why Propositions Cannot Be Concrete
- VI. Back to the Causal Requirement
- 7. Induction
- I. The Old Riddle of Induction
- II. The New Riddle of Induction
- 8. Epistemic Probability: Some Current Views
- I. Epistemic Probability and Statistical Probability
- II. Theories of Epistemic Probability
- 9. Epistemic Conditional Probability: The Sober Truth
- I. The Two Faces of Epistemic Probability
- II. An Account of the Normative Component
- III. Replies and Comments
- 10. Coherence, Foundations, and Evidence
- I. Coherence and Foundations
- II. Evidentialism
- 11. Naturalism versus Proper Function?
- I. Naturalistic Analyses of Proper Function
- II. So What's a Poor Naturalist to Do?
- 12. Is Naturalism Irrational?
- I. The Problem
- II. Darwin's Doubt
- III. A Preliminary Argument against Naturalism
- IV. The Main Argument Against Naturalism
- Index
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Z
