
Algorithmic Game Theory
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Content
- Title
- Preface
- Organization
- Table of Contents
- Invited Talks
- Computational Game Theory
- Computation and Incentives of Competitive Equilibria in a Matching Market
- Introduction
- First Approaches
- Future Challenges
- References
- Session 1: Auctions and Advertising
- Repeated Budgeted Second Price Ad Auction
- Introduction
- The Model
- Pure Nash Equilibrium
- Properties of a Pure Nash Equilibrium
- Critical Bid
- PNE Existence: Special Cases
- PNE Existence: General Case
- Repeated Budget Auction
- Bidding Strategies and Dynamics
- Convergence
- Simulations
- References
- Prompt Mechanism for Ad Placement over Time
- Introduction
- The Model
- The Gravity Algorithm
- Truthfulness
- Promptness
- Approximation Ratio
- Big Ads Approximation Ratio
- Small Ads Approximation Ratio
- Concluding Remarks
- References
- The Multiple Attribution Problem in Pay-Per-Conversion Advertising
- Introduction
- Inefficiency of the Last- Impression Attribution Scheme
- The Model
- The Ad Allocation Problem
- Computing the Values
- The General Recurrence
- Closed-form Solution for Constant R
- Pricing and Publisher Fairness
- The Uniform Pricing Method
- Publisher Fairness
- Fair Payments via Max-Flow Min-Cut
- Conclusion
- References
- On Communication Protocols That Compute Almost Privately
- Introduction
- Economic Motivation
- Summary of Our Contributions
- Summary of Prior Related Works
- Privacy-Preserving Computation
- Binary Space Partition (Bsp)
- The Model and Basic Definitions
- Two-Party Approximate Privacy Model of FJS10
- Dissection Protocols and Tiling Functions for 2-Party Computation
- Two-Party Dissection Protocol for Tiling Functions
- Boolean Tiling Functions
- Average and Worst Case Par for Non-Boolean Tiling Functions
- Extensions of the Basic Two-Party Setup
- Non-tiling Functions
- Multi-party Computation
- Analysis of the Bisection Protocol for Two Functions
- References
- Session 2: Quality of Solutions
- Dynamic Inefficiency: Anarchy without Stability
- Introduction
- Our Results
- Preliminaries
- Dynamic Inefficiency in Job Scheduling
- Random Walk Dynamic
- Conclusion
- References
- Throw One's Cake - and Eat It Too
- Introduction
- Definitions and Preliminaries
- Utilitarian Welfare
- Egalitarian Welfare
- Pareto-Dominant Partial Divisions
- Discussion and Open Problems
- References
- The Price of Optimum in a Matching Game
- Introduction
- Related Work
- Motivation, Organization and Results
- The Strategic Game and the Optimization Problem
- Feasible Solutions
- Complexity and Approximation
- Conclusion
- References
- Pareto Optimality in Coalition Formation
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Perfection and Pareto Optimality
- The Preference Refinement Algorithm
- Computational Results
- General Hedonic Games
- Roommate Games
- W-Hedonic Games
- B-Hedonic Games
- Conclusions
- References
- Session 3: Externalities
- Externalities among Advertisers in Sponsored Search
- Introduction
- A Model for Externalities in Keyword Auctions
- An Exact Algorithm Based on Color Coding
- O(c)-Approximation Algorithms for Positive Externalities
- On the GSP Mechanism with Externalities
- References
- Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets
- Introduction
- Model and Notation
- Existence of Stable Matchings
- Efficiency of Stable Matchings
- Related Models
- Discussion of Results
- Concluding Remarks
- References
- Steady Marginality: A Uniform Approach to Shapley Value for Games with Externalities
- Introduction
- Definitions and Notation
- Axiomatic Characterization
- Constant-Coalition Games
- Uniqueness of the Value
- A Comparison of Various Marginality Definitions
- Conclusions
- References
- Session 4: Mechanism Design
- Scheduling without Payments
- Introduction
- Model
- The Case of a Single Task
- Truthful Mechanisms for One Task
- An Optimal Truthful Mechanism
- Extension to Many Tasks and Discussion
- References
- Combinatorial Agency of Threshold Functions
- Introduction
- Model
- Transition Behavior of the Optimal Contract
- Price of Unaccountability
- Composition of Anonymous Technologies
- Majority-of-ANDs
- Majority of ORs
- AND of Majority
- References
- Lower Bound for Envy-Free and Truthful Makespan Approximation on Related Machines
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Lower Bound on Anonymous Mechanisms
- Characterizing Scalable Mechanisms on Two Machines
- Payments for Known Allocation Rules
- References
- A Truthful Mechanism for Value-Based Scheduling in Cloud Computing
- Introduction
- Definitions and Notation
- Approximation Algorithm for BFS
- LP Relaxation of BFS with Deadline Valuation Functions
- Extension to General Valuation Functions
- Decomposing an Optimal MND Fractional Solution
- Truthfulness-in-Expectation
- The Fractional VCG Mechanism
- A New Efficient Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanism
- References
- Session 5: Complexity
- Random Bimatrix Games Are Asymptotically Easy to Solve
- Introduction
- Games and Nash Equilibria
- Notation
- Bimatrix Games
- Nash Equilibria and Approximate Nash Equilibria
- Random Bimatrix Games
- Approximate Nash Equilibria in Random Games
- Well-Supported Nash Equilibria in Random Games
- References
- Complexity of Rational and Irrational Nash Equilibria
- Introduction
- Definitions and Preliminaries
- Complexity of NASH-EQUIVALENCE and RATIONAL NASH
- Complexity of NASH-REDUCTION and IRRATIONAL NASH
- Epilogue
- References
- Diffusion in Social Networks with Competing Products
- Introduction
- Background
- Contributions
- Preliminaries
- Reachable Outcomes
- Unavoidable Outcomes
- Unique Outcomes
- Product Adoption in Networks without Unique Outcomes
- Conclusions and Future Work
- References
- Session 6: Network Games
- A Clustering Coefficient Network Formation Game
- Introduction
- Related Work
- Preliminaries
- A (Partial) Catalog of CC Game Nash Equilibria
- General Properties of CC Game Nash Equilibria
- The Price of Anarchy
- Intractability of Best Responses
- References
- On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Integer-Splittable Weighted Congestion Games
- Introduction
- Related Work
- Our Contribution
- The Model
- Non-existence of PSNE
- Convex Increasing ISWCGs
- Violating the Finite Improvement Property
- Nash Equilibria
- Conclusions
- References
- On Dynamics in Basic Network Creation Games
- Introduction
- Related Work
- Model and Definitions
- Our Contribution
- Playing on a Tree
- Improving Response Dynamics on Trees
- Best Response Dynamics on Trees
- Computing a Best Response on Trees
- Playing on General Graphs
- Best Response Dynamics on General Graphs
- Computing a Best Response in General Graphs
- References
- Session 7: Pricing
- Pricing Exotic Derivatives Using Regret Minimization
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Arbitrage-Free Bounds
- Price Bounds for a Variety of Options
- Convex Path-Independent Derivatives
- Empirical Results
- References
- Strategic Pricing in Next-Hop Routing with Elastic Demands
- Introduction
- Model
- Uniform Nash Equilibrium and Price of Stability
- Computing a Good Nash Equilibrium
- Reasonable Assumptions and Price of Anarchy
- Non-linear Utility and Price Functions
- References
- Session 8: Routing Games
- Weakly-Acyclic (Internet) Routing Games
- Introduction
- Weakly-Acyclic Games
- (Internet) Routing Games
- Our Contributions: Weakly-Acyclic Routing Games
- Organization
- Model
- Weakly-Acyclic Games
- (Internet) Routing Games
- Illustration: Simple Weakly-Acyclic Routing Games
- Routing Games with Byzantine Players
- Routing Policies
- Positive Result
- Backup Routing Games
- Commercial Backup-Routing Games
- Positive Result
- References
- Efficiency of Restricted Tolls in Non-atomic Network Routing Games
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Computing Optimal -Restricted Tolls
- Characterization of Inducible Flows for Single-Commodity Networks
- Computing Optimal Tolls in Parallel-Arc Networks
- General Efficiency of -Restricted Tolls
- References
- Stochastic Selfish Routing
- Introduction
- The Model
- Exogenous Standard Deviations
- Endogenous Standard Deviations
- Succinct Representations of Equilibria
- Price of Anarchy
- Conclusions and Open Problems
- References
- Author Index
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