
Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2021
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The 27 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 100 submissions.
CT-RSA is the track devoted to scientific papers on cryptography, public-key to symmetric-key cryptography and from crypto-graphic protocols to primitives and their implementation security.
*The conference was held virtually.
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Content
- Intro
- Preface
- Organization
- Contents
- Secure Fast Evaluation of Iterative Methods: With an Application to Secure PageRank
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Banach Fixed Point Theorem and the Power Method
- 4 Stability of PageRank
- 4.1 Traditional Stability of PageRank
- 4.2 Stability Due to Approximate Computations
- 5 Effect of Early Termination of PageRank
- 6 A Multiparty Actively-Secure Protocol for the PageRank Algorithm
- A Converses to Banach's Fixed Point Theorem
- References
- Compilation of Function Representations for Secure Computing Paradigms
- 1 Introduction
- 2 M-Circuits
- 2.1 Defining an M-Circuit
- 2.2 Executing an M-Circuit
- 2.3 Compiling M-Circuits
- 2.4 Security of M-Circuits
- 3 M-Circuits for Multi-party Computation
- 4 M-Circuits for MPC-in-the-Head
- 4.1 The Underlying MPC Protocol
- 4.2 Sub-procedures for MPCitH
- 4.3 The Construction of HVZK Argument of Knowledge
- 5 Using Different Correlated Randomness Sources
- 5.1 Dot-Product Computation
- 5.2 Matrix Triples
- 5.3 Tiny-Tables
- 6 Sacrificing
- 7 Executable Gadgets
- References
- Oblivious TLS via Multi-party Computation
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Notation and Preliminaries
- 2.1 An Overview of TLS 1.3
- 2.2 Multiparty Computation Protocols
- 3 Overview of the Solution
- 4 Handshake Operations
- 4.1 Diffie-Hellman
- 4.2 Signature Generation
- 5 Record Layer Operations
- 5.1 AES-GCM
- 6 Security and Performance
- 6.1 Performance
- References
- Noisy Simon Period Finding
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Simon's Algorithm in the Noisy Case
- 3 Quantum Period Finding on IBM-Q16
- 3.1 Function Choice
- 3.2 Minimizing the Gate Count of fs
- 3.3 Experiments on IBM Q 16
- 4 Smoothing Techniques
- 4.1 Quality Measures Statistics
- 5 LSN is Polynomial Time Equivalent to LPN
- 6 Theoretical Error Handling for Simon's Algorithm
- 7 Practical Error Handling for Simon's Algorithm
- References
- A Bunch of Broken Schemes: A Simple yet Powerful Linear Approach to Analyzing Security of Attribute-Based Encryption
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contribution
- 1.2 Technical Details
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Formal Definition of (Multi-authority) Ciphertext-Policy ABE
- 2.2 The Security Model and Our Attack Models
- 3 Warm-Up: Attacking DAC-MACS (YJR+13 )
- 4 Systematizing Our Methodology
- 4.1 The Common Structure Implies a More Concise Notation
- 4.2 Modeling Knowledge of Exponents - Extending Zp
- 4.3 Formal Definitions of the Attacks in the Concise Notations
- 4.4 Definitions of Multi-authority-specific Attacks
- 4.5 Our Heuristic Approach
- 5 Examples of Our Attacks Demonstrating the Approach
- 5.1 Example Without Corruption: The YJR+13 scheme
- 5.2 Example with Corruption: The YJ14 scheme
- 5.3 Example Without Corruption: The JLWW13 scheme
- 6 More Attacks, on Several Other Schemes
- 6.1 Single-Authority ABE
- 6.2 Multi-authority ABE
- 7 Discussion
- References
- Zero-Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis with Equal Treatment for Plaintexts and Tweakeys
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Zero-Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis with Equal Treatment for Plaintexts, Keys, and Tweaks
- 4 Applications
- 4.1 Application to TWINE
- 4.2 Application to LBlock
- 4.3 Application to SKINNY
- 5 Conclusion
- A Zero-Correlation Linear Hulls for SKINNY-64/192
- References
- SoK: Game-Based Security Models for Group Key Exchange
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Systemizing Group Key Exchange Models
- 1.2 Basic Notions in Group Key Exchange
- 2 Syntax Definitions
- 2.1 Quantities
- 2.2 Setup Assumptions
- 2.3 Operations
- 2.4 Return Values
- 2.5 Our Syntax Proposal
- 3 Communication Models
- 3.1 Partnering
- 3.2 Our Partnering Proposal
- 4 Security Definitions
- 4.1 Our Security Proposal
- 5 Concluding Remarks and Open Problems
- References
- EPID with Malicious Revocation
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Related Works
- 1.2 Our Contributions
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Specification of EPID
- 3.1 Syntax
- 3.2 Security Model
- 4 Our First Construction
- 4.1 Description
- 4.2 Security Proofs
- 5 An Efficient Variant with Limited Concurrent Enrolments
- 5.1 Description
- 6 Conclusion
- References
- Signed Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange with Tight Security
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contribution
- 1.2 Protocol Comparison
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Security Model for Two-Message Authenticated Key Exchange
- 4 Verifiable Key Exchange Protocols
- 4.1 Example: Plain Diffie-Hellman Protocol
- 5 Signed Diffie-Hellman, Revisited
- References
- Lattice-Based Proof of Shuffle and Applications to Electronic Voting
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contribution
- 1.2 Related Work
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 The Rings R and Rp
- 2.2 The Discrete Gaussian Distribution
- 3 Lattice-Background: Commitments and ZK Proofs
- 3.1 Lattice-Based Commitments
- 3.2 Zero-Knowledge Proof of Linear Relations
- 4 Protocol: Zero-Knowledge Proof of Correct Shuffle
- 5 Applications to Electronic Voting
- 5.1 Verifiable Encryption
- 5.2 Return Codes
- 5.3 The Voting Scheme
- 6 Performance
- 6.1 Size
- 6.2 Timings
- 6.3 Comparison
- References
- More Efficient Shuffle Argument from Unique Factorization
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Coefficient-Product Argument
- 4 A Characterization of Permutation Matrices
- 5 Shuffle Argument
- 6 Efficiency
- 7 Discussions
- References
- Cryptanalysis of a Dynamic Universal Accumulator over Bilinear Groups
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Au et al. Dynamic Universal Accumulator
- 2.1 Security Model and Attack Scenarios
- 3 Breaking Collision Resistance in the -Based Construction
- 4 The -Recovery Attack for the -Based Construction
- 4.1 Recovering fV()
- 4.2 Recovering
- 4.3 Estimating the Minimum Number of Witnesses Needed
- 5 Improving the -Recovery Attack
- 5.1 The Random-y Sieving Attack
- 5.2 The Chosen-y Sieving Attack
- 6 Experimental Results
- 7 Weak Non-membership Witnesses
- 8 Preventing Witness Forgery in the CRS-Based Construction
- 8.1 How to Ensure Some Accumulated Elements Remain Unknown
- 8.2 Recovering the CRS
- 9 Conclusions
- References
- FAN: A Lightweight Authenticated Cryptographic Algorithm
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Specification of FAN
- 2.1 Notations
- 2.2 State and Functions
- 2.3 Initialization
- 2.4 Processing Associated Data
- 2.5 Encryption
- 2.6 Finalization
- 2.7 Decryption and Verification
- 3 Design Rationale
- 3.1 Structure
- 3.2 S-Box
- 3.3 L-Layer
- 3.4 AEAD Mode
- 4 Security Analysis
- 4.1 Related Key Chosen IV Attack
- 4.2 Cube Attack
- 4.3 Randomness Test
- 4.4 Guess-and-Determine Attack
- 4.5 Time-Memory-Data Tradeoff Attack
- 4.6 Differential Attack
- 4.7 Correlation Attack
- 4.8 Algebraic Attack
- 4.9 Side-Channel Attack
- 4.10 Internal State Collision
- 4.11 Attacks on the Finalization
- 5 Performance
- 5.1 Software Performance
- 5.2 Hardware Performance
- 6 Conclusion
- 7 Appendix 1: Test Vector
- 8 Appendix 2: AES MixColumn with 92 XOR Gates
- 9 Appendix 3: Comparison Outline Diagram for Different Phases
- 10 Appendix 4: Gate Count for Fan
- References
- Related-Key Analysis of Generalized Feistel Networks with Expanding Round Functions
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 (Multi-user) RKA Security
- 2.2 The H-Coefficient Technique
- 3 Security Analysis of Expanding Feistel Networks
- 3.1 Bad Transcripts
- 3.2 Analyzing Good Transcripts
- 4 Security Analysis of Alternating Feistel Networks
- 4.1 Bad Transcripts
- 4.2 Analyzing Good Transcripts
- 4.3 AFN Using a Tweakable Round Function and Single Key
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- The Key-Dependent Message Security of Key-Alternating Feistel Ciphers
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 KDM Security and a Generic Lemma
- 3.1 Definitions
- 3.2 A Generic Lemma
- 4 Four-Round KAF
- 5 Attacks
- 5.1 Necessity of Offset-Freeness
- 5.2 Sliding Attacks
- 6 Discussion
- References
- Mesh Messaging in Large-Scale Protests: Breaking Bridgefy
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Contributions
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Reverse Engineering
- 2.2 Primitives Used
- 2.3 Related Work
- 2.4 Alternative Mesh Applications
- 3 Bridgefy Architecture
- 3.1 Bluetooth Messages
- 3.2 Handshake Protocol
- 3.3 Routing via the Bridgefy Server
- 4 Attacks
- 4.1 Privacy
- 4.2 Authenticity
- 4.3 Confidentiality
- 4.4 Denial of Service
- 5 Discussion
- 5.1 Responsible Disclosure
- References
- Inverse-Sybil Attacks in Automated Contact Tracing
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Automated Contact Tracing
- 1.2 False Positives
- 2 Protocol 1: Decentralized, Non-Interactive Exchange
- 2.1 Toy Protocol
- 2.2 Description of Protocol 1
- 3 Security of Protocol 1
- 3.1 Security Game
- 3.2 Security of Protocol 1
- 4 Protocol 2: Decentralized, Using Location for Chaining
- 4.1 Protocol Description
- 4.2 Correctness, Privacy and Epochs
- 5 Security of Protocol 2
- 5.1 Security Against Replay and Relay Attacks
- 5.2 Security Against Inverse-Sybil Attacks
- References
- On the Effectiveness of Time Travel to Inject COVID-19 Alerts
- 1 Introduction
- 2 How GAEN Works
- 3 Summary of Techniques for False Alert Injection
- 4 Time-Traveling Phones
- 4.1 Set Clock Manually
- 4.2 Rogue NTP Server
- 4.3 Rogue Base Station
- 4.4 Rogue GNSS
- 5 Master of Time Attack
- 6 Experiments
- 6.1 Rogue NTP Server
- 6.2 Rogue Base Station
- 6.3 Experimenting the Attack with a Journalist
- 6.4 Other GAEN-based Apps
- 7 KISS Attack
- 7.1 Still-Valid Keys
- 7.2 Consequences of Interoperability
- 8 My-Number Attack
- 9 Countermeasures
- 10 Conclusion
- References
- SoK: How (not) to Design and Implement Post-quantum Cryptography
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Findings
- 2 The Raw Material: Hard Problems
- 2.1 Baseline: Problems that are not Post-quantum
- 2.2 Problems on Lattices
- 2.3 Problems on Codes
- 2.4 Problems on Multivariate Systems
- 2.5 Problems on One-Way and Hash Functions
- 2.6 Problems on Isogenies
- 2.7 Summary of Problems
- 3 Paradigms are Guidelines, not Panaceas
- 3.1 Schnorr Signatures over Lattices
- 3.2 The SQISign Approach for Signatures
- 3.3 Beyond High Soundness Signatures
- 3.4 Full Domain Hash Signatures
- 3.5 Diffie-Hellman and El Gamal
- 4 Return of Symmetric Cryptography
- 4.1 Hash-Based Signatures
- 4.2 Signatures Based on ZKPs and OWFs
- 5 The Implementation Challenges in PQC
- 5.1 Decryption Failures and Reaction Attacks
- 5.2 Implementation Attacks in PQC
- 5.3 Side-Channels and Countermeasures
- References
- Dual Lattice Attacks for Closest Vector Problems (with Preprocessing)
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Contributions
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Lattices
- 2.2 Heuristic Assumptions
- 2.3 Lattice Algorithms and Cost Models
- 2.4 Model
- 3 Algorithms
- 3.1 The Aharonov-Regev Decoder
- 3.2 The Neyman-Pearson Decoder
- 3.3 The Simple Decoder
- 3.4 Distinguishing Algorithms
- 3.5 Search Algorithms
- 3.6 Choosing the Set of Dual Vectors W
- 4 Asymptotics
- 4.1 Output Distributions of the Decoders
- 4.2 Closest Vector Problems with Preprocessing
- 4.3 Closest Vector Problems Without Preprocessing
- 5 Experiments
- 5.1 Setup
- 5.2 Evaluating the Distinguishers
- 5.3 Evaluating the Search Algorithms
- References
- On the Hardness of Module-LWE with Binary Secret
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Algebraic Number Theory Background
- 2.2 Lattices
- 2.3 Probabilities
- 2.4 Ring Leftover Hash Lemma
- 2.5 Module Learning with Errors
- 3 Hardness of M-LWE with Binary Secret
- 3.1 Choice of Embedding for Binary Secrets
- 3.2 First-is-Errorless M-LWE
- 3.3 Extended M-LWE
- 3.4 Reduction to bin-M-LWE
- References
- Multi-party Revocation in Sovrin: Performance through Distributed Trust
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Techniques
- 1.2 Our Contribution
- 1.3 Related Work
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 UC Security and ABB
- 2.2 SPDZ, Shamir, and Derived Protocols
- 2.3 Accumulators
- 2.4 Pairing-Based Accumulator
- 2.5 UC Secure Accumulators
- 3 Multi-Party Public-Key Accumulators
- 3.1 Dynamic (Threshold) Secret-Shared Accumulator from the q-SDH Assumption
- 3.2 SPDZ vs. Shamir Secret Sharing
- 4 Implementation and Performance Evaluation
- 4.1 Evaluation of MPC-q-SDH
- 4.2 Further Improvement
- 5 Applications
- 5.1 Credential Revocation in Distributed Credential Systems
- 5.2 Privacy-Preserving Certificate-Transparency Logs
- References
- Balancing Privacy and Accountability in Blockchain Identity Management
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries and Building Blocks
- 2.1 Notation
- 2.2 Pseudorandom Functions
- 2.3 Blind Signature Schemes
- 2.4 (Ad-Hoc) Threshold Encryption Scheme
- 3 System Design
- 4 ID-Layer Formalization
- 4.1 The ID Layer Functionality
- 4.2 Issuing Credentials - The Functionality
- 5 Formal Protocols Specifications
- 5.1 Identity Layer Protocol
- 5.2 Proof of Security for Identity Layer
- 5.3 Credential Issue Protocol
- 5.4 Proof of Security for Issue Protocol
- 6 Putting Everything Together
- References
- Non-interactive Half-Aggregation of EdDSA and Variants of Schnorr Signatures
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Our Contributions
- 2 Proof-of-knowledge for a Collection of Signatures
- 2.1 Schnorr/EdDSA Signatures
- 2.2 Three-Move (Sigma) Protocol
- 2.3 Proof-of-knowledge
- 3 Non-interactive Half-Aggregation of Schnorr/EdDSA Signatures
- 3.1 Aggregate Signature Security
- 3.2 Half-Aggregation
- 3.3 Half+-Aggregation
- 4 Deterministic Batch Verification of Schnorr Signatures
- 5 Impossibility of Non-interactive Compression by More Than a Half
- Appendix A Related work
- Appendix A.1 Security Proofs
- Appendix A.2 Multi-signatures
- Appendix A.3 Schnorr signature variants
- Appendix A.4 Non-Schnorr schemes
- Appendix A.5 Schnorr batching and aggregation
- Appendix B EdDSA signatures
- Appendix C Single signature security
- Appendix D Proof of Theorem 6
- Appendix E Proof of Theorem 8
- Appendix F Parameter selection for almost-half-aggregation
- Appendix G Formal analysis for the impossibility of non-interactive compression by more than a half
- References
- A Framework to Optimize Implementations of Matrices
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Notations
- 2.2 Existing Heuristics for Optimizing Matrix Implementation
- 2.3 Techniques for Optimizing a Given Implementation
- 3 New Reduction for a Given Matrix Implementation
- 4 A General Framework of Optimization
- 5 Applications
- 5.1 Applications to Random Matrices
- 5.2 Applications to Cipher Matrices
- 6 Conclusion and Future Work
- References
- Improvements to RSA Key Generation and CRT on Embedded Devices
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Notation
- 2 Generating Prime Numbers
- 2.1 Naïve Algorithm
- 2.2 Sieving Algorithms
- 2.3 New Sampling Algorithm with Quadratic Residuosity
- 2.4 Applications
- 3 RSA-CRT Without q-1 Mod p
- 3.1 Inverse-Free RSA Mod pk q
- 3.2 Generalized Batching
- 4 RSA with Compressed Private Keys
- 5 Performance
- 5.1 Discussion
- 6 Future Work
- A Proof of Theorem1
- B Minimizing u
- B.1 Sparse Solutions to Linear Equations
- B.2 Multiple u
- B.3 Quadratic Minimization
- References
- On the Cost of ASIC Hardware Crackers: A SHA-1 Case Study
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Hash Functions and Cryptanalysis
- 2.1 SHA-1 and Related Attacks.
- 2.2 Birthday Search in Practice.
- 2.3 Differential Cryptanalysis
- 3 Hardware Birthday Cluster
- 3.1 Cluster Nodes
- 3.2 Hardware Design of Birthday Slaves
- 4 Verification
- 5 Hardware Differential Attack Cluster Design
- 5.1 Neutral Bits
- 5.2 Storage
- 5.3 Architecture
- 6 Chip Design
- 6.1 Chip Architecture
- 6.2 ASIC Fabrication and Running Cost
- 6.3 Results
- 6.4 Attack Rates and Execution Time
- 7 Cost Analysis and Comparisons
- 7.1 264 Birthday Attack
- 7.2 280 Birthday Attack
- 7.3 Chosen Prefix Differential Collision Attack
- 7.4 Limitations
- 8 Conclusion
- A Chip layout
- References
- Author Index
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