Introducing Game Theory
A Graphic Guide
Published on 2. March 2017
176 pages
978-1-78578-083-7 (ISBN)
Description
When should you adopt an aggressive business strategy? How do we make decisions when we don't have all the information? What makes international environmental cooperation possible?
Game theory is the study of how we make a decision when the outcome of our moves depends on the decisions of someone else. Economists Ivan and Tuvana Pastine explain why, in these situations, we sometimes cooperate, sometimes clash, and sometimes act in a way that seems completely random.
Stylishly brought to life by award-winning cartoonist Tom Humberstone, Game Theory will help readers understand behaviour in everything from our social lives to business, global politics to evolutionary biology. It provides a thrilling new perspective on the world we live in.
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03/2017
Icon Books
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Persons
Dr Ivan and Dr Tuvana Pastine are American and Turkish university lecturers working in Ireland. They specialize in applications of game theory and have published jointly and separately on a wide variety of fields, analyzing coordinating advertising and price dynamics, political campaign financing, affirmative action in education, sovereign default, speculative attacks, labour migration and international trade.
Tom Humberstone is a comics artist and illustrator. He is the editor and publisher of UK comics anthology Solipsistic Pop and former cartoonist for New Statesman. His illustration clients include the Guardian, VICE, the Independent, Stylist, OUP, and many more.
Content
- Intro
- Contents
- Title Page
- Copyright
- Why is it called "game theory"?
- Working with models
- "It's a draw."
- Dealing with complexity: art and science
- Rationality
- Keynes' Beauty Contest
- Thaler's Guessing Game
- Problems with rationality and common knowledge of rationality
- Booms and crashes: applying rationality to financial markets
- Simultaneous-move games
- Strategic form of the game
- Payoffs
- Nash equilibrium
- Prisoners' Dilemma
- Pareto efficiency
- Network engineering
- The tragedy of the commons
- Nuclear build-up
- Cooperation
- Education
- Environmental policy and cooperation
- Multiplicity of equilibria
- Multiplicity of equilibria: Battle of the Sexes
- Social norms
- Coordination devices
- Banking and expectations: bank runs
- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
- The Currency Speculation Game
- The Chicken Game
- The Exit Game
- Criticism and defence of mixed strategies
- Tax evasion
- Repeated interaction
- At the end of the game
- What if there is no definite last stage?
- Prisoners' Dilemma experiment
- Evolutionary game theory
- Hawk-Dove Game
- The Hawk-Dove Game with small cost of conflict
- The Hawk-Dove Game with large cost of conflict
- Evolutionary stability as an equilibrium refinement
- Sequential-move games
- A dynamic Battle of Sexes Game
- The extensive form of the game
- Subgame perfection
- Non-credible threats
- Credit markets
- Microcredit
- Nuclear deterrence
- Information problems
- Asymmetric information
- Asymmetric information and unemployment
- More on asymmetric information
- Signalling product quality
- Warranties as a signalling device
- Advertising as a signalling device
- Religious ritual as a signalling device
- Decision making in groups
- Where we've come from .
- . and where to go from here
- About the Authors
- Index
