
Dealing with Dominance
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In this useful compilation, local practitioners and academics in twelve countries provide a detailed summary and analysis of the application of their countries' law in this area, drawing on the experience of national competition authorities in dealing with market dominance as well as a wide range of legislation, administrative regulations, and case law. Nine EU member states are covered, as are Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.
Although contributors were specifically asked not to compare their national provisions with Article 82 EC, the book nevertheless provides useful insight on that article, as well. National "borderline cases", of the kind described here, help to clarify the application of Article 82 EC, especially considering that the case law on this provision is often controversial.
Dealing with Dominance is a useful reference tool for the application of the national counterparts to Article 82 EC in Europe and beyond and answers a basic practical need of both national and international competition law practitioners. This book can also be seen as an especially important contribution to the comparative analysis of an increasingly crucial area of economic law.
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Content
- Cover
- Half Title Page
- Title Page
- Copyright Page
- Concise Table of Contents
- Table of Contents
- Editor's Preface
- Preface by The Director General of The Dutch Competition Authority (NMa)
- Questionnaire Submitted to the Contributors
- List of Contributors
- 1. Belgium
- INTRODUCTION
- The applicable substantive provisions
- The Belgian competition authorities
- QUESTIONNAIRE
- Question 1. "What is the definition of a dominant position? Is it the same as or similar to the definition of a dominant position developed by the CoJEC?"
- Question 2. "If and to the extent that market definition plays a role in determining whether an undertaking has a dominant position, are there any differences in comparison with market definition under EC law?"
- Question 3. "Is the Commission Notice with respect to market definition used for this purpose?"
- Question 4. "Is there a market share threshold above which a company can be considered to have a dominant position?"
- Question 5. "Is there any difference with regard to such threshold between merger control and abuse of dominant position?"
- Question 6. "What categories of abuse of dominant position are distinguished?"
- 6(a) Unfair or predatory pricing
- 6(b) Refusals to deal
- 6(c) Exclusionary practices
- 6(d) Discriminatory pricing
- 6(e) Tying
- Question 7. "What cases have the national competition authority dealt with in the area of abuse of dominant position and with what result?"
- 7(a) Decision no 97-VMP-3 of the Competition Council President of 6 May 1997, Cosmétique Active Belgilux v. GB-Unic and Decision 2001-VMP-12 of the Competition Council President of 9 March 2001, Incine/Rendac
- 7(b) Competition Council Decision no 98-RPR-2 of 18 February 1998, Canal+Belgique
- 7(c) Decision 2000-V/M-22 of the Competition Council President of 28 June 2000, ASA Systems/UPEA
- Question 8. "Has an appeal ever been lodged against the respective decisions of the national competition authority? If so, in what cases and with what result?"
- Question 9. "What role is played by objective justifications for abusive behaviour?"
- Question 10. "Is the so-called essential facility doctrine applied in national competition law?"
- Question 11. "Is the concept of a collective dominant position known in national competition law?"
- Question 12. "If so, is it known both in relation to merger control and to abuse of dominant position or in relation to only one of these areas?"
- Question 13. "If so, is the concept applied in a similar way as under EC-law (to the extent that that can be defined)?"
- Question 14. "If the concept of a collective dominant position is known in national competition law, is collective abuse also possible?"
- Question 15. "Can you mention any examples or particularities with respect to the application of the general concept of abuse of a dominant position in relation to liberalised sectors (i.e. not in the form of specific legislation)?"
- Question 16. "Do regulatory authorities in liberalised sectors apply the concept of abuse of dominant position other than on the basis of the sector-specific legislation?"
- Question 17. Other issues
- 17(a) Relationship with the Trade Practices Act
- 17(b) The investigative powers of the competition authorities
- 17(c) Other differences between application by the Courts and the Competition Council of Article 3 of the Competition Act
- 17(d) Cases in which application of the Competition Act was controversial
- 2. France
- INTRODUCTION
- The concept of abuse of dominant position
- The control of abuses
- Abusive conduct and regulated sectors
- List of abbreviations
- QUESTIONNAIRE
- Question 1. "What is the definition of a dominant position? Is it the same as or similar to the definition of a dominant position developed by the CoJEC?"
- A. Definition
- B. The abuse of economic dependence
- (a) The situation of economic dependence
- (i) Economic dependence of distributors/retailers vis-à-vis their suppliers
- (ii) Economic dependence of suppliers vis-à-vis distributors
- (b) Implementation of the criteria: the difficulty to demonstrate a negative effect on the market
- Question 2. "If and to the extent that market definition plays a role in determining whether an undertaking has a dominant position, are there any differences in comparison with market definition under EC law?"
- Transpac
- Mattel
- TF1
- Question 3. "Is the Commission Notice with respect to market definition used for this purpose?"
- Question 4. "Is there a market share threshold above which a company can be considered to have a dominant position?"
- Question 5. "Is there any difference with regard to such threshold between merger control and abuse of dominant position?"
- Question 6. "What categories of abuse of dominant position are distinguished?"
- A. Abuses of dominant position
- B. Abuses of economic dependence
- Question 7. "What cases have the national competition authority dealt with in the area of abuse of dominant position and with what result?"
- A. Abuses of dominant position
- B. Abuses of economic dependence
- Question 8. "Has an appeal ever been lodged against the respective decisions of the national competition authority? If so, in what cases and with what result?"
- Question 9. "What role is played by objective justifications for abusive behaviour?"
- A. Overview
- B. Individual exemptions
- Question 10. "Is the so-called essential facility doctrine applied in national competition law?"
- Weather information
- Héli-Inter
- EDF
- Question 11. "Is the concept of a collective dominant position known in national competition law?"
- Question 12. "If so, is it known both in relation to merger control and to abuse of dominant position or in relation to only one of these areas?"
- Question 13. "If so, is the concept applied in a similar way as under EC-law (to the extent that that can be defined)?"
- Question 14. "If the concept of a collective dominant position is known in national competition law, is collective abuse also possible?"
- Question 15. "Can you mention any examples or particularities with respect to the application of the general concept of abuse of a dominant position in relation to liberalised sectors (i.e. not in the form of specific legislation)?"
- Grolier
- NC Numericâble
- Question 16. "Do regulatory authorities in liberalised sectors apply the concept of abuse of dominant position other than on the basis of the sector-specific legislation?"
- France line
- Subscribers' lists
- 3. Spain
- INTRODUCTION
- A. Spanish legislation
- B. Spanish competition authorities
- QUESTIONNAIRE
- Question 1. "What is the definition of a dominant position? Is it the same as or similar to the definition of a dominant position developed by the CoJEC?"
- Question 2. "If and to the extent that market definition plays a role in determining whether an undertaking has a dominant position, are there any differences in comparison with market definition under EC law?"
- Question 3. "Is the Commission Notice with respect to market definition used for this purpose?"
- Question 4. "Is there a market share threshold above which a company can be considered to have a dominant position?"
- Question 5. "Is there any difference with regard to such threshold between merger control and abuse of dominant position?"
- Question 6. "What categories of abuse of dominant position are distinguished?"
- Question 7. "What cases have the national competition authority dealt with in the area of abuse of dominant position and with what result?"
- 7.1. Abuses of dominant position other than those listed in Article 6
- 7.2. Dominant position and market share
- 7.3. Cases of "Telefónica"
- Question 8. "Has an appeal ever been lodged against the respective decisions of the national competition authority? If so, in what cases and with what result?"
- Question 9. "What role is played by objective justifications for abusive behaviour?"
- Question 10. "Is the so-called essential facility doctrine applied in national competition law?"
- Question 11. "Is the concept of a collective dominant position known in national competition law?"
- Question 12. "If so, is it known both in relation to merger control and to abuse of dominant position or in relation to only one of these areas?"
- Question 13. "If so, is the concept applied in a similar way as under EC-law (to the extent that that can be defined)?"
- Question 14. "If the concept of a collective dominant position is known in national competition law, is collective abuse also possible?"
- Question 15. "Can you mention any examples or particularities with respect to the application of the general concept of abuse of a dominant position in relation to liberalised sectors (i.e. not in the form of specific legislation)?"
- Question 16. "Do regulatory authorities in liberalised sectors apply the concept of abuse of dominant position other than on the basis of the sector-specific legislation?"
- 4. Portugal
- INTRODUCTION
- QUESTIONNAIRE
- Question 1. "What is the definition of a dominant position? Is it the same as or similar to the definition of a dominant position developed by the CoJEC?"
- Question 2. "If and to the extent that market definition plays a role in determining whether an undertaking has a dominant position, are there any differences in comparison with market definition under EC law?"
- Question 3. "Is the Commission Notice with respect to market definition used for this purpose?"
- Question 4. "Is there a market share threshold above which a company can be considered to have a dominant position?"
- Question 5. "Is there any difference with regard to such threshold between merger control and abuse of dominant position?"
- Question 6. "What categories of abuse of dominant position are distinguished?"
- Question 7. "What cases has the national competition authority dealt with in the area of abuse of dominant position and with what result?"
- Question 8. "Has an appeal ever been lodged against the respective decisions of the national competition authority? If so, in what cases and with what result?"
- Question 9. "What role is played by objective justifications for abusive behaviour?"
- Question 10. "Is the so-called essential facility doctrine applied in national competition law?"
- Question 11. "Is the concept of a collective dominant position known in national competition law?"
- Question 12. "If so, is it known both in relation to merger control and to abuse of dominant position or in relation to only one of these areas?"
- Question 13. "If so, is the concept applied in a similar way as under EC-law (to the extent that that can be defined)?"
- Question 14. "If the concept of a collective dominant position is known in national competition law, is collective abuse also possible?"
- Question 15. "Can you mention any examples or particularities with respect to the application of the general concept of abuse of a dominant position in relation to liberalised sectors (i.e. not in the form of specific legislation)?"
- Question 16. "Do regulatory authorities in liberalised sectors apply the concept of abuse of dominant position other than on the basis of the sector-specific legislation?"
- 5. Sweden
- 1. THE COMPETITION ACT
- 2. THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY
- 3. ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION
- 3.1. Introduction
- 3.2. The concept of an undertaking
- 3.3. Geographical scope of application
- 3.4. Assessment of dominance
- 3.5. Substance of prohibition
- 3.5.1. Introduction
- 3.5.2. Unfair prices or other unfair trading conditions, including rebates
- 3.5.3. Discrimination
- 3.5.4. Exclusivity and purchase obligations, including tying practices
- 3.5.5. Refusal to supply
- 3.5.6. Essential facilities
- 3.5.7. Collective dominance
- 3.5.8. Freedom of speech
- 4. CONCLUSION
- 6. Germany
- 1. INTRODUCTION
- 2. STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON THE ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION
- 3. CARTEL AUTHORITIES
- 3.1. Overview
- 3.2. Competence
- 3.2.1. Allocation of competence
- 3.2.2. Exclusive competence of Federal Ministry of Economics
- 3.2.3. Exclusive competence of Federal Cartel Office
- 3.2.4. Authority
- 4. CONTACT ADDRESS FOR THE FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE
- 5. INVESTIGATIONS OF ABUSIVE BEHAVIOUR
- 5.1. Federal Cartel Office
- 5.1.1. Abuse of a dominant position
- 5.1.2. Unfair hindrance/discrimination
- 5.1.3. Superior market power vis-à-vis small- and medium-sized competitors
- 5.2. Länder Cartel Authorities
- 5.2.1. Abuse of a dominant position
- 5.2.2. Unfair hindrance/discrimination
- 5.2.3. Passive discrimination
- 5.2.4. Superior market power vis-à-vis small- and medium-sized competitors
- 6. QUESTIONNAIRE
- Question 1. "What is the definition of a dominant position? Is it the same as or similar to the definition of a dominant position developed by the CoJEC?"
- 1.1. Single market dominance
- (a) No competitors
- (b) Lack of substantial competition
- (c) Paramount market position
- (d) Difference between "Lack of Substantial Competition" and "Paramount Market Position"
- 1.2. Collective market dominance
- (a) Internal competition
- (b) External competition
- 1.3. Vertical dependence ("Relative Market Power")
- (a) Small- and medium-sized undertakings
- (b) Dependence on a certain market
- (c) Sufficient and reasonable possibilities of resorting to other undertakings
- (i) Product range related dependence
- (ii) Dependence caused by shortage
- (iii) Dependence caused by company specific circumstances
- 1.4. Superior market power vis-à-vis small- and medium-sized competitors
- Question 2. "If and to the extent that market definition plays a role in determining whether an undertaking has a dominant position, are there any differences in comparison with market definition under EC law?"
- Question 3. "Is the Commission Notice with respect to market definition used for this purpose?"
- Question 4. "Is there a market share threshold above which a company can be considered to have a dominant position?"
- 4.1. Single market dominance presumption (Sec. 19(3)(1) ARC)
- (a) Administrative proceedings
- (b) Civil proceedings
- 4.2. Presumption of collective market dominance
- 4.3. Relation between the presumptions
- 4.4. Relative market power
- Question 5. "Is there any difference with regard to such threshold between merger control and abuse of dominant position?"
- Question 6. "What categories of abuse of dominant position are distinguished?"
- 6.1. Section 19 ARC: Abuse of a dominant position
- (a) General prohibition of abusive behaviour (Sec. 19(1) ARC)
- (i) Tying practices: abuse
- (ii) Tying practices: justifications
- (b) Abusive hindrance (Sec. 19(4) No. 1 ARC)
- (i) Impairment of the ability of other undertakings to compete
- (ii) In a manner affecting competition in the market
- (iii) Without any objective justification
- (c) Abusive prices or conditions (Sec. 19(4) No. 2 ARC)
- (i) Determination of the reference price
- (ii) Objective justification
- (d) Splitting of prices or conditions (Sec. 19(4)(3) ARC)
- (e) Essential facilities (Sec. 19(4) No. 4 ARC)
- (i) Networks or other infrastructure facilities
- (ii) Competitor on upstream or downstream market
- (iii) Scope of dominance
- (iv) Preferential access of proprietor?
- (v) Facility exclusively used by proprietor
- 6.2. Discrimination and unfair hindrance (Sec. 20 ARC)
- (a) Discrimination and unfair hindrance by dominant undertakings (Sec. 20(1) ARC)
- (i) Distinction
- (ii) Examples for "unfair hindrance"
- (1) Exclusivity
- (2) Rebates and discounts
- (3) Tying
- (4) Sales below cost price
- (iii) Examples of "discrimination"
- (1) Refusal to supply
- (2) Different prices or conditions
- (b) Relative market power (Sec. 20(2) ARC)
- (c) Passive discrimination (Sec. 20(3) ARC)
- (d) Superior market power vis-à-vis small and medium-sized competitors (Sec. 20(4) and (5) ARC)
- (i) Price squeezing
- (ii) Predatory pricing
- (1) The "retailers"-decisions
- (2) Guidelines on predatory pricing
- (3) Reversal of the burden of proof (Sec. 20(4)(2) ARC)
- (iii) Relief of the burden of proof (Sec. 20(5) ARC)
- Question 7. "What cases have the national competition authority dealt with in the area of abuse of dominant position and with what result?"
- Question 8. "Has an appeal ever been lodged against the respective decisions of the national competition authority? If so, in what cases and with what result?"
- Question 9. "What role is played by objective justifications for abusive behaviour?"
- Question 10. "Is the so-called essential facility doctrine applied in national competition law?"
- Question 11. "Is the concept of a collective dominant position known in national competition law?"
- Question 12. "If so, is it known both in relation to merger control and to abuse of dominant position or in relation to only one of these areas?"
- Question 13. "If so, is the concept applied in a similar way as under EC-law (to the extent that that can be defined)?"
- Question 14. "If the concept of a collective dominant position is known in national competition law, is collective abuse also possible?"
- Question 15. "Can you mention any examples or particularities with respect to the application of the general concept of abuse of a dominant position in relation to liberalised sectors (i.e. not in the form of specific legislation)?"
- Question 16. "Do regulatory authorities in liberalised sectors apply the concept of abuse of dominant position other than on the basis of the sector-specific legislation?"
- 16.1. Telecommunications
- 16.2. Postal services
- 16.3. Energy sector
- BIBLIOGRAPHY
- 7. Italy
- 1. INTRODUCTION
- 2. THE RELEVANT PROVISION (LAW NO. 297 OF 10 OCTOBER 1990)
- 3. THE DEFINITION OF "MARKET"
- 4. THE CONCEPT OF DOMINANT POSITION
- 5. CATEGORIES OF ABUSE AND SIGNIFICANT CASES DECIDED BY THE ITALIAN COMPETITION AUTHORITY
- 1. Abusive prices
- 1(a). Predatory pricing
- 1(b). Discriminatory pricing
- 1(c). Excessive prices
- 1(d). Loyalty rebates
- 2. Exclusionary practices
- 3. Tying
- 6. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 82 OF THE EC TREATY BY THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY
- 7. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY'S DECISIONS
- 8. OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INFRINGEMENT
- 9. THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE
- 10. COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE
- 11. ABUSE IN LIBERALISED SECTORS
- 12. COMPETITION AND REGULATION: WHICH RELATIONSHIP?
- 8. Ireland
- LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
- INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
- QUESTIONNAIRE
- Question 1. "What is the definition of a dominant position? Is it the same as or similar to the definition of a dominant position developed by the CoJEC?"
- Question 2. "If and to the extent that market definition plays a role in determining whether an undertaking has a dominant position, are there any differences in comparison with market definition under EC law?"
- Question 3. "Is the Commission Notice with respect to market definition used for this purpose?"
- Question 4. "Is there a market share threshold above which a company can be considered to have a dominant position?"
- Question 5. "Is there any difference with regard to such threshold between merger control and abuse of dominant position?"
- Question 6. "What categories of abuse of dominant position are distinguished?"
- Question 7. "What cases have the national competition authority dealt with in the area of abuse of dominant position and with what result?"
- (a) Refusal to supply
- (b) Imposition of unfair trading terms
- (c) Tie-ins
- Question 8. "Has an appeal ever been lodged against the respective decisions of the national competition authority? If so, in what cases and with what result?"
- Question 9. "What role is played by objective justifications for abusive behaviour?"
- Question 10. "Is the so-called essential facility doctrine applied in national competition law?"
- Question 11. "Is the concept of a collective dominant position known in national competition law?"
- Question 12. "If so, is it known both in relation to merger control and to abuse of dominant position or in relation to only one of these areas?"
- Question 13. "If so, is the concept applied in a similar way as under EC-law (to the extent that that can be defined)?"
- Question 14. "If the concept of a collective dominant position is known in national competition law, is collective abuse also possible?"
- Question 15. "Can you mention any examples or particularities with respect to the application of the general concept of abuse of a dominant position in relation to liberalised sectors (i.e. not in the form of specific legislation)?"
- Question 16. "Do regulatory authorities in liberalised sectors apply the concept of abuse of dominant position other than on the basis of the sector-specific legislation?"
- 9. United Kingdom
- 1. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
- 2. COMPETITION AUTHORITIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
- 3. OFT AND SECTORAL REGULATORS
- 4. COMPETITION COMMISSION
- 5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE
- 6. THE COURTS
- 7. CHAPTER II PROHIBITION
- 8. COMPETITION ACT 1980
- 9. WEBSITES
- 10. COMPETITION ACT 1998
- 11. TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT THRESHOLD
- 12. RETENTION OF SCALE/COMPLEX MONOPOLY
- 13. PUBLIC INTEREST
- 14. CRITICISMS OF FTA
- 15. MARKET REFERENCES UNDER THE ENTERPRISE ACT
- 16. QUESTIONNAIRE
- Question 1. "What is the definition of a dominant position? Is it the same as or similar to the definition of a dominant position developed by the CoJEC?"
- Question 2. "If and to the extent that market definition plays a role in determining whether an undertaking has a dominant position, are there any differences in comparison with market definition under EC law?"
- Question 3. "Is the Commission Notice with respect to market definition used for this purpose?"
- Question 4. "Is there a market share threshold above which a company can be considered to have a dominant position?"
- Question 5. "Is there any difference with regard to such threshold between merger control and abuse of dominant position?"
- Question 6. "What categories of abuse of dominant position are distinguished?"
- Question 7. "What cases have the national competition authority dealt with in the area of abuse of dominant position and with what result?"
- 7.1. Napp Pharmaceuticals
- 7.2. Aberdeen Journals
- Question 8. "Has an appeal ever been lodged against the respective decisions of the national competition authority? If so, in what cases and with what result?"
- 8.1. R v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex parte Thomson Holidays
- 8.2. R v. Monopolies and Mergers Commission ex parte National House Building Council
- 8.3. R v. Monopolies and Mergers Commission ex parte South Yorkshire Transport
- 8.4. R v. Monopolies and Mergers Commission ex parte Visa International Services Association
- Question 9. "What role is played by objective justifications for abusive behaviour?"
- Question 10. "Is the so-called essential facility doctrine applied in national competition law?"
- Question 11. "Is the concept of a collective dominant position known in national competition law?"
- Question 12. "If so, is it known both in relation to merger control and to abuse of dominant position or in relation to only one of these areas?"
- Question 13. "If so, is the concept applied in a similar way as under EC-law (to the extent that that can be defined)?"
- Question 14. "If the concept of a collective dominant position is known in national competition law, is collective abuse also possible?"
- Question 15. "Can you mention any examples or particularities with respect to the application of the general concept of abuse of a dominant position in relation to liberalised sectors (i.e. not in the form of specific legislation)?"
- Question 16. "Do regulatory authorities in liberalised sectors apply the concept of abuse of dominant position other than on the basis of the sector-specific legislation?"
- The Premier League Case
- Hendry v. World Professional Billiards & Snooker Association Limited
- Controversial Cases Under the FTA
- 1. Highland Scottish Omnibuses
- 2. Scottish milk
- 3. Domestic electrical goods
- 4. Films
- 5. Supermarkets
- 6. New cars
- 7. Banking services to SMEs
- ANNEX 1 Sec. 18 - Abuse of dominant position
- ANNEX 2 Fair Trading Act 1973, Schedule 8
- ANNEX 3 Enterprise Act 2002, Schedule 8
- 10. Australia and New Zealand
- 1. INTRODUCTION
- 2. COMPETENCE IN COMPETITION MATTERS
- A. Australia
- B. New Zealand
- 3. MARKET DEFINITION
- A. Australia
- The four dimensions
- Product market
- Functional market
- Geographic market
- Temporal market
- B. New Zealand
- A purposive approach
- The SSNIP test
- The four dimensions
- Sub-markets
- 4. STANDARD OF DOMINANCE
- A. Australia
- "Substantial market power"
- "Take advantage"
- "Purpose"
- Indicative market share thresholds
- General competition rules
- Merger rules
- Proposed amendments to Article 46
- B. New Zealand
- Interpretation of the previous test
- First phase: economic approach
- Second phase: literal approach
- Indicative market share thresholds
- General competition rules
- Merger rules
- 5. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
- Refusal to deal
- Predatory pricing
- Bundling and exclusive dealing
- Capacity dumping
- Price discrimination and price squeezing
- Monopoly pricing
- 6. OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ABUSIVE BEHAVIOUR
- A. Australia
- Section 46
- Authorisation powers
- B. New Zealand
- 7. THE "ESSENTIAL FACILITIES" TEST
- A. Australia
- Case-law
- Part IIIA access regime
- Access declarations
- "Effective access" regime
- Access undertakings
- Access regulation under part XIC
- Conclusions
- B. New Zealand
- 8. COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE
- 9. ABUSIVE PRACTICES AND LIBERALISED ECONOMIC SECTORS
- A. Australia
- Telecommunications
- Access regulation
- Regulation of anti-competitive conduct
- Electricity and Gas
- B. New Zealand
- Telecommunications Act 2001
- Price and non-price (standard access) principles
- Industry-based consensus
- 11. United States of America
- 1. OVERVIEW OF US ANTITRUST LAWS AND AUTHORITIES
- A. US antitrust law generally
- B. Relevant antitrust statutes
- 1. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
- 2. Federal Trade Commission Act
- 3. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
- 4. Section 3 of the Clayton Act
- 5. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
- 6. Robinson-Patman Act
- C. Competition authorities
- 1. Federal authorities
- (a) Federal Trade Commission
- (b) Department of Justice Antitrust Division
- (c) Abuse of dominance cases
- 2. Shared authority - sectoral regulators
- 3. State authorities
- 4. Private parties
- 2. ANTITRUST LAW AND DOMINANT FIRMS
- A. Standard of dominance
- B. Market definition
- 1. Sherman act cases
- 2. Merger review
- (a) Product market
- (b) Geographic market
- C. Indicative market share thresholds
- 1. Sherman Act cases
- 2. Merger review
- D. Categories of abusive practices
- E. Abuse of dominance
- Significant cases
- (a) Microsoft
- (b) Intel Corporation
- (c) American Airlines
- F. Objective justifications for abusive behaviour
- G. The "essential facilities" test
- H. Collective dominance
- 1. Merger review
- 2. Abusive conduct
- I. Abusive practices - liberalised economic sectors
- J. Liberalized economic sectors - interplay with sector-specific legislation
- Index
- Back Cover
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