The Strategy of Social Choice

Introduction to the SeriesPreface1. Introduction 1 Prescriptive Judgements or Descriptive Analysis 2. Normative versus Positive Approach to Voting 3. The Implementation Problem 4. Classifying Voting Methods 5. Voting and the Non-Strategic Theory of Social Choice 6. Development of the Strategic Theory of Voting 7. Relation to the Economics of Incentives References2. Social Choice Functions and Correspondences 1. Summary of the Results 2. Basic Definitions and Notation 3. Efficiency 4. Anonymity and Neutrality 5. The Condorcet Winner and Related s.c.c. References3. Monotonicity and the Arrow Theorem 1. Summary of the Results 2. Monotonic s.c.c. 3. Strongly Monotonic s.c.c. 4. Examples of a Strongly Monotonic s.c.c. 5. Strongly Monotonic s.c.f.: Impossibility Result 6. Social Welfare Functions: Arrow's Theorem References4. Strategy-Proofness and Monotonicity 1. Summary of the Results 2. Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions and Game Forms 3. The Case of a Binary Choice 4. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem 5. Restricted Domains References5. Sophisticated Voting 1. Summary of the Results 2. Sophisticated Implementation 3. Voting by Binary Choices 4. A Necessary Condition References6. Voting by Veto 1. Summary of the Results 2. The Minority Principle 3. The Proportional Veto Core 4. Proof of Theorem 1 5. Voting by Integer Veto 6. General Voting by Veto References7. Cooperative Voting 1. Summary of the Results 2. Effectivity Functions 3. Maximal Effectivity Functions 4. Stable Effectivity Functions 5. Implementation by Strong Equilibrium 6. Implementation by Nash Equilibrium ReferencesIndex