2
Secularisms
Multiple and Global

In the previous chapter we outlined a series of challenges to secularism, or what has sometimes been referred to as crises of secularism that have provoked debates about political secularism itself, and specifically about the accommodation and inclusion of religious minorities as parts of religiously diverse populations. We saw how these challenges, despite parallels, are also importantly different across different global contexts and in different countries. We also sketched a series of broad responses that are evident both in the political sphere and in the work of theorists, when it comes to the governance of religious diversity.

What we noted in particular was the need for a contextual appreciation of multiple secularisms. The present chapter picks up this idea and challenges approaches that work with a limited set of secularisms (typically, US and European varieties, to which Indian secularism is added), arguing for a 'multiple secularisms' approach, construed as an extension of a non-Eurocentric, 'multiple modernities' approach. This means that we recognise that multiple secularisms are an aspect of the wider theoretical and sociological understanding of the very phenomenon of modernity in terms of 'multiple modernities' (Eisenstadt, 2000). Eisenstadt observes that western modes of modernity continue to 'enjoy historical precedence' and serve as 'a basic reference point for others', but the last half century has made it plain that western patterns of modernity are not the only 'authentic' ones available for concrete societal expression. Rather, different parts of the world are becoming modern in their own ways, and this refers not least to developments concerning religion, secularity, diversity and governance. This raises no small challenge when it comes to abstractly determining what some contexts and models may learn or adopt from other such models - a point we will pick up more directly in Part II. But this orientation informs the approach we begin developing in this chapter.

We start by outlining some of the development of the idea of political secularism, noting its limitations, and subsequently we offer a definition of political secularism that will serve as our foundation in this book. We then present an overview of the idea of multiple secularisms and its development in the literature. We observe, however, that despite the trend towards multiple and alternative secularisms that the literature displays, a comparative framework in which to understand these forms has not been developed. We then develop our multiple secularisms approach through an original typology of modes of the governance of religious diversity. This typology serves as an analytical framework that is sensitive to the historically shaped contemporary contexts in existence in different countries. Central to this approach is appreciating that different countries will legitimately interpret key principles and ideas differently, adding to them or subtracting from them, and will have different local priorities and challenges that are based on historical and contemporary conflicts and development; hence these phenomena should not be approached in terms of a single, privileged mode of secularism. We present our typology of modes in relation to a series of constitutive features or norms, and we discuss its conceptual and analytic advantages. Subsequent chapters go on to elaborate on these modes in relation to our evaluations of empirical cases - that is, the individual countries we studied.

Historical trends of political secularism

We began in the previous chapter to address the question of what political secularism is and is not, and how it differs from cognate phenomena. Before turning to our typology, we must address more directly the matter of what political secularism is and what it is not. Particularly if we are going to argue for multiple political secularisms, we need to ask what it is that makes them political secularisms in spite of their differences and divergences. This is important, as we also have something to say about what secularism is not, although this will still be within the scope of the governance of religious diversity. In other words, laying these things out in some detail will be an important starting point, because secularism does not necessarily entail religious diversity (secularism remains a question even in the absence of diversity), and the governance of religious diversity does not necessarily entail secularism (a state will have laws and policies that govern religion and religious diversity even if it is in no way a secular state, as we see in a theocracy).

Political secularism arises specifically in relation to religion - in relation to the power and authority of religion and to the challenge these may pose to political rule or, say, to equality among citizens. Secularism is therefore about the 'proper' relationship between political and religious authorities.

It emerges in Western Europe through long non-teleological historical processes, notably the Protestant Reformation, Enlightenment thought, and the scientific revolution. Religion and politics, church and state have enjoyed various linkages, and the emergence of a liberal, secular and democratic Europe was gradual and evolutionary (Berlinerblau, 2022). The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) is often cited as the moment when it was recognised that peace in Western Europe was possible only if each country was to be allowed to have an official state religion while at the same time desisting from persecuting dissenters and minorities.1 The formation of nation-states and the normalising of state religions were in some ways the opposite of secularism, but these two processes established that states had a right to regulate religion within their borders. This led to religious and cultural homogenisation, whose norms to a large extent prevail in the public domain today. From the Westphalian settlement of the principle cuius regio, eius religio (the ruler's religion is the state's religion), a trajectory that would pass through ideas of religious tolerance to state neutrality and privatised religion was set in motion. In combination with the growth of modern capitalism, the spirit of capitalism and the early modern scientific revolution, these developments resulted in the gradual and increasing circumscription of religion to areas outside politics and social life. Ideas of church-state separation, of religion as something private and voluntary, and of toleration (especially in the name of freedom of conscience) became defining features of liberalism and liberal secularism, and these principles gradually gained ground and found expression in legal and policy instruments, especially from the nineteenth century on.

Two of the best known political expressions of secularism reflect these concerns. One is the first amendment of the US constitution, adopted in 1791. It states: 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' The other is the French 1905 law on separation (with a legacy stretching back to the French Revolution of 1789), which guaranteed freedom of conscience but also that, with a few exceptions, '[t]he Republic does not recognize, pay, or subsidize any religious sect'. Both statements have traditionally been understood as establishing a strict separation between state and religion, but of different sorts. In the United States this separation has been seen to ensure freedom of religion and a vibrant public religious sphere; in France the ideal has emphasised a public sphere more free of religion than in other countries and with greater state control and interference, in the name of civic nationhood and republican egalitarianism.

Nevertheless, most of Western Europe followed a gentler path, which was neither the strict state-religion separation in the United States nor the denuding of the public sphere achieved by French laïcité. It would be wrong to think about secularism as something done to religions. The history of its development in Western Europe shows that arguments for political secularism are just as likely to come from leading religious figures as they are from those who wish to restrict the political power of religions. This is also reflected in current debates around the disestablishment of the Church of England, for instance (Buchanan, 1994; Chaplain, 2022).2 There are various reasons for separation, which can have to do with control or fear of control, but the emergence of what we now think of as secularism in Western Europe is to some extent one side of a bi-directional concern with separating political and religious authority in order to limit the interference of one into the other and allow each its proper sphere. What makes this separation secular, however, is a further aspect, whereby it is not just that the two spheres are separate; they also recognise each other's legitimacy, and the religious is subordinate to the political. In this sense, secularism is concerned with the governance of religion.

A further feature of this separation, both historically and today, is the concern with diversity. The gradual development of secularism in Western Europe ran alongside the gradual easing of restrictions placed on religious minorities (predominantly Christian dissenters and Jews), and the ideas of separation and state neutrality came to be seen by liberal theorists as key to ensuring religious freedom and equality. In...