Surrounding Free Will
Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience
1st Edition
Published on 8. October 2014
304 pages
978-0-19-933396-7 (ISBN)
Description
This volume showcases cutting-edge scholarship from The Big Questions in Free Will project, funded by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation and directed by Alfred R. Mele. It explores the subject of free will from the perspectives of neuroscience; social, cognitive, and developmental psychology; and philosophy (both traditional and experimental).
The volume consists of fourteen new articles and an introduction from top-ranked contributors, all of whom bring fresh perspectives to the question of free will. They investigate questions such as: How do children conceive of free will and how does their concept of free will develop? How does lowered or raised confidence in the existence of free will affect our behavior? What modifies our power to resist temptation? What do lay folk mean by free will? What brain processes underlie decisions? How does the conscious experience of voluntary action contribute to the neural control of behavior? What are the neural differences between deliberate choosing and arbitrary picking? How do neuroscientific studies of decision making in monkeys bear on human free will? Is determinism compatible with free will? What can a proper understanding of causation tell us about free will? What is moral responsibility?
Readers interested in the current and future direction of scholarship on free will find this volume essential reading.
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12/2014
Oxford University Press Inc
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Person
Alfred R. Mele is the William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. He is the author of eight books from Oxford University press: Irrationality (1987), Springs of Action (1992), Autonomous Agents (1995), Motivation and Agency (2003), Free Will and Luck (2006), Effective Intentions (2009), Backsliding (2012), and A Dialogue on Free Will and Science (2014). He also is the editor of The Philosophy of Action (OUP 1997) and a coeditor of four other OUP volumes: Mental Causation (1993), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (2004), Rationality and the Good (2007), and Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? (2010).
Content
1. Introduction
Alfred Mele
2. The Origins and Development of Our Conception of Free Will
Alison Gopnik and Tamar Kushnir
3. Free Will without Metaphysics
Andrew E. Monroe and Bertram F. Malle
4. Free Will: Belief and Reality
Roy Baumeister, Cory Clark, and Jamie Luguri
5. Measuring and Manipulating Beliefs and Behaviors Associated with Free Will: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
Jonathan Schooler, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, and Kathleen Vohs
6. Incompatibilism and Bypassed Agency
Gunnar Björnsson
7. Naturalizing Free Will: Paths and Pitfalls
Hakwan Lau and Myrto Mylopoulos
8. "Free will": Components and Processes
Patrick Haggard
9. Change of Intention in "Picking" Situations
Ariel Furstenberg, Leon Y. Deouell, and Haim Sompolinsky
10. On Reporting the Onset of the Intention to Move
Uri Maoz, Liad Mudrik, Ram Rivlin, Ian Ross, Adam Mamelak, and Gideon Yaffe
11. Dissecting Readiness Potential: an Investigation of the Relationship Between Readiness Potentials, Conscious willing, and Action
Prescott Alexander, Alexander Schlegel, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies, Peter Ulric Tse, and Thalia Wheatley
12. Monkey Decision-Making as a Model System for Human Decision-Making
Adina Roskies
13. The Problem of Determinism and Free Will Is Not the Problem of Determinism and Free Will
Carolina Sartorio
14. On Being Some-One
J. T. Ismael
15. Negligent Action and Unwitting Omission
Randolph Clarke
Appendix: Free Will Lexicon
Patrick Haggard, Alfred Mele, Timothy O'Connor, and Kathleen Vohs
Contributors
Index
