Motivation and Agency
1st Edition
Published on 2. January 2003
279 pages
978-0-19-803549-7 (ISBN)
Description
What place does motivation have in the lives of intelligent agents? Mele's answer is sensitive to the concerns of philosophers of mind and moral philosophers and informed by empirical work. He offers a distinctive, comprehensive, attractive view of human agency. This book stands boldly at the intersection of philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.
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Alfred R. Mele
Motivation and Agency
Book
04/2005
Oxford University Press Inc
€52.10
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Alfred R. Mele
Motivation and Agency
Book
02/2003
Oxford University Press Inc
€225.80
Shipment within 15-20 days
Content
- Intro
- Contents
- Introduction
- 1. Preview
- 2. A Perspective on Action
- 3. Flexibility: A Mark of Motivation
- I: Motivation and Action
- 1. Motivation and Desire
- 1. What Is Motivation? What Is the Question?
- 2. Motivation, Desire, and Action-Desire
- 3. Providing Motivation and Motivational Bases
- 4. Desire and Direction of Fit
- 5. Intention and Desire
- 6. Desire's Breadth
- 7. Occurrent versus Standing Desires
- 8. Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Desires
- 9. Summary of Some Technical Terms
- 2. Goal-Directed Action
- 1. Davidson's Challenge and Two Unsuccessful Replies
- 2. Two More Unsuccessful Replies
- 3. Causalism and Primary Deviance
- 4. A Myth About Simple Agents
- 5. Handling Primary Deviance
- II: Motivation and Normativity
- 3. Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons
- 1. Davidsonian Reasons for Action
- 2. Arational Actions
- 3. Scanlon on Reasons and the "Standard Desire Model"
- 4. Motivational and Normative Reasons for Action
- 5. External and Broadly Davidsonian Reasons for Action
- 4. The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning
- 1. Another Promethean Tale
- 2. The Antecedent Motivation Theory
- 3. Some Unsuccessful Arguments for the Antecedent Motivation Theory
- 4. Antecedent Motivation versus the Cognitive Engine
- 5. Implications of the Antecedent Motivation Theory?
- 5. Moral Motivation and Moral Ought-Beliefs: Internalism versus Externalism
- 1. Internalism
- 2. Present Concerns
- 3. Introducing Listlessness
- 4. Testing
- 5. Belief, Belief*, and SP-Belief
- 6. Listlessness Again
- 7. An Alleged Problem with Generic Moral Desires
- 8. Modest Cognitivist Internalism: Problems
- 6. Attitudes That Essentially Encompass Motivation to Act
- 1. A Preliminary Thesis
- 2. Action-Desires and a Hypothesis
- 3. The Hypothesis Tested
- 4. Further Testing: Negative Actions
- 5. A Refinement and a Worry About Circularity
- III: Strength and Control
- 7. Motivational Strength
- 1. Some Background
- 2. MSI and Vacuity
- 3. MSI and Associated Principles
- 4. Action-Desires and Ordinary Dispositions
- 5. MSI and Agency
- 8. Control and Self-Control
- 1. Background
- 2. Libet's Studies
- 3. Urges, Intentions, and Actions
- 4. Branching Out
- IV: Decision, Agency, and Belief
- 9. Deciding
- 1. Background: Four Views of Practical Decision
- 2. Intentions in Practical Deciding
- 3. Are Practical Decisions Inexplicable?
- 4. Practical Deciding
- 10. Human Agency par Excellence
- 1. Human Agents
- 2. Velleman's Objection to the "Standard Story"
- 3. Human Action par Excellence and a Special Desire
- 4. Deciding and Reduction
- 5. Alienation and the Elusive Location of Human Agency par Excellence
- 6. Causalism, Real Selves, and Human Agents
- 11. Motivated Belief and Motivational Explanations
- 1. Motivationally Biased Belief and a Theory
- 2. Motivated Belief and Motivational Explanations
- 3. Reasons-Explanations and Motivational Explanations
- 4. Conclusion
- References
- Index
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- R
- S
- T
- V
- W
