Free Will and Luck
Published on 29. July 2008
234 pages
978-0-19-970567-2 (ISBN)
Description
Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issue in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will - one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will.
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Alfred R. Mele
Free Will and Luck
Book
08/2008
Oxford University Press Inc
€38.30
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Content
- Intro
- Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 1. A Problem about Luck for Libertarians
- 2. A Modest Libertarian Proposal
- 3. Deciding, the Time of Action, and Free Will
- 4. Agents' Abilities
- 2. Free Will and Neuroscience
- 1. Conceptual Matters
- 2. Libet's Work
- 3. Free Will
- 4. Further Testing
- 5. Conclusion
- 3. Libertarianism, Luck, and Control
- 1. A Task for Libertarians
- 2. Kane on Luck and Control
- 3. O'Connor on Active Power
- 4. Clarke on Agent Causation
- 5. Persisting Intentions and Control
- 6. Luck Remains a Problem
- 7. Some Recent History
- 8. Conclusion
- 4. Frankfurt-style Cases, Luck, and Soft Libertarianism
- 1. Introducing Frankfurt-style Cases and Clarifying PAP
- 2. A Frankfurt-style Story and Alternative Possibilities
- 3. Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Cases
- 5. A Daring Soft Libertarian Response to Present Luck
- 1. Leeway
- 2. Luck and Modest Libertarianism
- 3. Daring Soft Libertarianism
- 4. Daring Soft Libertarianism and the Problem of Present Luck
- 5. Objections and Replies
- 6. Little Agents
- 7. Conclusion
- 6. Compatibilism: Objections and Replies
- 1. The Consequence Argument
- 2. The Manipulation Argument
- 3. The No-Chance Idea Introduced
- 4. Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility
- 5. Application to the No-Chance Idea, Proposition 2
- 6. Semicompatibilism and Traditional Compatibilism
- 7. My Compatibilist Proposal: Objections and Replies
- 1. A History-Sensitive Compatibilism
- 2. Dennett's Critique
- 3. Arpaly's Critique
- 4. Kapitan's Critique and the Zygote Argument
- 5. Conclusion
- 8. Conclusion
- 1. Compatibilist and Libertarian Sufficient Conditions for Free Action
- 2. Two Thought Experiments
- 3. Conclusion
- References
- Index
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Z
