CHAPTER 2
A Brief History of Gerrymandering

If we were to establish a representative assembly today, for our state or for the country as a whole, how might we do it? Specifically, how would representation work? Where would representatives come from and whom (or what) would they represent? To the modern citizen, it might seem obvious that people are represented and, on top of that, they are to be represented equally. That has not always been the case in representative assemblies in the United States.

This chapter traces the development and evolution of American electoral districts over time. It begins by examining "corporate" representation in colonial assemblies and the boundary manipulation of towns and counties that sometimes occurred during the colonial period. Following independence from Great Britain, states began to base representation on population and many opted to elect representatives from single-member districts. As a result, the drawing of district boundaries became an increasingly vital political activity in the early American republic, as did gerrymandering.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, fierce party competition and a requirement that states hold congressional elections in single-member districts (with some exceptions) meant that the ability to draw district boundaries had become extremely valuable. It was also a frequent activity, as many states redrew district lines multiple times per decade. Interestingly, the opposite occurred in the early twentieth century as states often refused to redistrict in response to population growth in urban areas.

The history of drawing district boundaries in the United States is, in many ways, a history of gerrymandering. The manipulation of districts has taken a number of forms, but the purpose has always been the same, namely, to gain political advantage in elections. That gerrymandering has such a long history in the United States suggests that, without legal limitations, it is virtually inevitable.

Districts in Early American History

There were representative assemblies in America long before Congress and, indeed, well before there were state legislatures. Colonial assemblies contained councilors appointed by the Crown or by the colony's proprietors but they quickly incorporated elected members as well. As Peverill Squire notes in his study of the evolution of American legislatures, colonial assemblies "emerged at different times and for different reasons" but they all "rapidly evolved into representative bodies as it became geographically impracticable for all freemen to participate in their regular (and often frequent) sessions."1 Interestingly, the divergent viewpoints of appointed magistrates and elected delegates eventually led to the earliest bicameral assemblies in America (i.e., one chamber for the magistrates and one for the delegates).2

Elected representation in colonial assemblies, and the state legislatures that emerged from them, was based on geography. That is, towns and counties, not people, were represented in assemblies. The theory underlying this system of territorial, or "corporate," representation was that the members of a local community would naturally share attitudes and interest. As Rosemarie Zagarri put it in her study of representation in early American history, "Each geographic unit was thought to be an organic, cohesive community, whose residents knew one another, held common values, and shared compatible economic interests."3 Thus, the interests of communities, and not of individuals, were paramount and deserved representation in the assembly.

Initially, geographical units were given equal representation. For instance, the Virginia General Assembly, established in 1619, consisted of "two Burgesses from each Plantation [or settlement] freely . elected by the inhabitants thereof."4 Fairly early in the colonial experience, however, some allowance was made for greater representation for towns with significantly larger populations. Thus, while the Plymouth Colony allowed each town to elect two freemen, it granted the town of Plymouth four representatives.5 Georgia's original assembly allowed every "village, town, or district having ten families settled within its limits" to elect one representative; "those having thirty families" could "depute two persons;" and Savannah was given four representatives.6 And in Virginia, representation for each settlement would vary from one to six delegates within ten years of the first meeting of the House of Burgesses.7

Since towns or counties were the basis for representation, one would assume that boundary lines were essentially permanent, having been established when a given town or county was created. However, as Elmer Griffith explains in his classic study of gerrymandering,

At the present time the boundaries of counties are rarely modified. But in the colonial period necessity required that they be frequently adjusted. This custom of changing county lines was frequently abused and was made a means of securing political advantage, precisely as in after years district boundaries were changed and altered for the same reason.8

To be sure, the political advantage sought by manipulating town and county boundaries was not partisan as we would use the term today. Instead, the division was between "the prerogative and measures of the governor and those of the people; in other words, between the representative of the crown and the democratic branch of the government."9 Nevertheless, this political manipulation of boundaries indicates just how early the urge to gerrymander appeared in American politics.

Griffith claims that the earliest case of gerrymandering occurred in the colony of Pennsylvania in the first few years of the eighteenth century.10 However, close examination of the political struggles between the counties surrounding Philadelphia and the city itself reveals that the power-enhancing method used by the counties was, first, apportionment and, later, suffrage restrictions. While the counties Bucks, Chester, and Philadelphia (excluding the city) were originally given four representatives in the assembly, the city was given just two. Later, when county representation was increased to eight, representation for the city remained unchanged. As the population in the city grew, suffrage requirements were set at "possession of fifty pounds in personal property or a free holding, neither of which was easy to secure."11 As the population in the western part of the colony grew, the representatives from the three eastern counties made sure to "erect new counties slowly, if at all, and to restrict their representation in the Assembly."12 None of this is gerrymandering, per se, unless you consider the separation of the city from any nearby county, or the unwillingness to establish new counties, as a decision about where to draw lines. Still, Griffith maintains that Pennsylvania had "dissimilar election districts which were continued for partisan political purposes," and that these "artificial and heterogeneous" districts were established "to the interest of one class of citizens and against a rival portion."13

Another of Griffith's early examples of gerrymandering, the colony of North Carolina, is far more compelling as a case of boundary manipulation. "As early as the year 1732," writes Griffith, "the governor was engaged in dividing precincts for his own political ends."14 To achieve those ends, the governor and his councilors might turn a single existing precinct into as many as ten new precincts; some of the altered precincts contained as few as thirty families. The goal of all such activity, which garnered "serious objection" at the time, was to produce a lower house (ostensibly of the people) that was in agreement with the magistrates' upper house.15

Once the American colonies declared independence from Great Britain, state legislatures were formed to replace colonial assemblies (with provincial congresses operating in the interim16). "In a very concrete way," writes Squire, "the colonial assemblies morphed into the first state legislatures."17 This was particularly true for lower chambers in bicameral legislatures, which existed in all but two states, since those chambers were already built upon republican principles of representation.18 Thus, the common practice of allocating representation according to existing political units, like towns and counties, continued in most states.

Nevertheless, some states took the opportunity independence afforded, with its attendant spirit of equality, to experiment with representation based on population. This alternative to corporate (i.e., territorial) representation was referred to as "proportional representation."19 According to this system, a ratio of representatives to people would be established (e.g., one representative per 100 citizens) and applied to districts throughout the state. Interestingly, Zagarri found that the size of the state influenced a state's decision about the basis of representation. "[T]he legislators in smaller states," she notes, "concluded that the traditional system, based on territory, was adequate for their needs, whereas the legislators in larger states believed that a newer...