System Assurance

Contents 1. Why Hackers know more about our systems 1.1 Operating in cyberspace involves risks 1.2 Why Hackers are repeatadly successful 1.2.1 What are the challenges in defending cybersystems? 1.2.1.1 Difficulties in understanding and assessing risks 1.2.1.2 Understanding Development Trends 1.2.1.3 Comprehending Systems' Complexity 1.2.1.4 Understanding Assessment Practices and their Limitations 1.2.1.5 Vulnerability Scanning Technologies and their Issues 1.3 Where do We Go from Here 1.3.1 Systematic and repeatable defense at affordable cost 1.3.2 The OMG Software Assurance Ecosystem 1.3.3 Linguistic Modeling to manage the common vocabulary 1.4 Who should read this book 2 Chapter: Confidence as a Product 2.1 Are you confident that there is no black cat in the dark room? 2.2 The Nature of Assurance 2.2.1 Engineering, Risk and Assurance 2.2.2 Assurance Case (AC) 2.2.2.1 Contents of an Assurance Case 2.2.2.2 Structure of the Assurance Argument 2.3 Overview of the Assurance Process 2.3.1 Producing Confidence 2.3.1.1 Economics of Confidence 3 Chapter: How to Build Confidence 3.1 Assurance in the System Lifecycle 3.2 Activities of System Assurance Process 3.2.1 Project Definition 3.2.2 Project Preparation 3.2.3 Assurance argument development 3.2.4 Architecture Security Analysis 3.2.4.1 Discover System Facts 3.2.4.2 Threat identification 3.2.4.3 Safeguard Identification 3.2.4.4 Vulnerability detection 3.2.4.5 Security Posture Analysis 3.2.5 Evidence analysis 3.2.6 Assurance Case Delivery 4 Chapter: Knowledge of System as of Element in Cybersecurity argument 4.1 What is system 4.2 Boundaries of the system 4.3 Resolution of the system description 4.4 Conceptual commitment for system descriptions 4.5 System architecture 4.6 Example of an architecture framework 4.7 Elements of System 4.8 System Knowledge Involves Multiple Viewpoints 4.9 Concept of operations (CONOP) 4.10 Network Configuration 4.11 System life cycle and assurance 4.11.1 System life cycle stages 4.11.2 Enabling Systems 4.11.3 Supply Chain 4.11.4 System life cycle processes 4.11.5 The implications to the common vocabulary and the integrated system model 5 Chapter: Knowledge of Risk as an Element of Cybersecurity argument 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Basic cybersecurity elements 5.3 Common vocabulary for risk analysis 5.3.1 Defining diScernable vocabulary for Assets 5.3.2 Threats and hazards 5.3.3 Defining dicernable vocabulary for Injury and Impact 5.3.4 Defining dicernable vocabulary for threats 5.3.5 Threat scenarios and attacks 5.3.6 Defining dicernable vocabulary for vulnerabilities 5.3.7 Defining dicernable vocabulary for safeguards 5.3.8 Risk 5.4 Systematic Threat Identification 5.5 Assurance Strategies 5.5.1 Injury Argument 5.5.2 Entry point argument 5.5.3 Threat argument 5.5.4 Vulnerability argument 5.5.5 Security requirement argument 5.5.6 Assurance of the threat identification 6 Chapter: Knowledge of Vulnerabilities as an Element of Cybersecurity Argument 6.1 Vulnerability as part of system knowledege 6.1.1 What is Vulnerability 6.1.2 Vulnerability as Unit of Knowledge: The History of Vulnerability 6.1.3 Vulnerabilities and the Phases of the System Life Cycle 6.1.4 Enumeration of Vulnerabilities as a Knowledge Product 6.1.5 Vulnerability Databases 6.1.5.1 US-CERT 6.1.5.2 Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) 6.1.6 Vulnerability Life Cycle 6.2 NIST Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) Ecosystem 6.2.1 Overview of SCAP Ecosystem 6.2.2 Information Exchanges under SCAP 7 Chapter: Vulnerability Patterns as a New Assurance Content 7.1 Beyond Current SCAP Ecosystem 7.2 Vulnerability Patterns 7.3 Software Fault Patterns 7.3.1 Safeguard category of clusters and corresponding Software fault Patterns (SFPs) 7.3.1.1 Authentication 7.3.1.2 Access Control 7.3.1.3 Privilege 7.3.2 Direct Impact category of clusters and corresponding Software fault Patterns (SFPs) 7.3.2.1 Information Leak 7.3.2.2 Memory Management 7.3.2.3 Memory Access 7.3.2.4 Path Resolution 7.3.2.