
Repeated Games and Reputations
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Content
- Intro
- Contents
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Intertemporal Incentives
- 1.2 The Prisoners' Dilemma
- 1.3 Oligopoly
- 1.4 The Prisoner's Dilemma under Imperfect Monitoring
- 1.5 The Product-Choice Game
- 1.6 Discussion
- 1.7 A Reader's Guide
- 1.8 The Scope of the Book
- Part I: Games with Perfect Monitoring
- 2 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring
- 2.1 The Canonical Repeated Game
- 2.2 The One-Shot Deviation Principle
- 2.3 Automaton Representations of Strategy Profiles
- 2.4 Credible Continuation Promises
- 2.5 Generating Equilibria
- 2.6 Constructing Equilibria: Simple Strategies and Penal Codes
- 2.7 Long-Lived and Short-Lived Players
- 3 The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring
- 3.1 Examples
- 3.2 Interpreting the Folk Theorem
- 3.3 The Pure-Action Folk Theorem for Two Players
- 3.4 The Folk Theorem with More than Two Players
- 3.5 Non-Equivalent Utilities
- 3.6 Long-Lived and Short-Lived Players
- 3.7 Convexifying the Equilibrium Payoff Set Without Public Correlation
- 3.8 Mixed-Action Individual Rationality
- 4 How Long Is Forever?
- 4.1 Is the Horizon Ever Infinite?
- 4.2 Uncertain Horizons
- 4.3 Declining Discount Factors
- 4.4 Finitely Repeated Games
- 4.5 Approximate Equilibria
- 4.6 Renegotiation
- 5 Variations on the Game
- 5.1 Random Matching
- 5.2 Relationships in Context
- 5.3 Multimarket Interactions
- 5.4 Repeated Extensive Forms
- 5.5 Dynamic Games: Introduction
- 5.6 Dynamic Games: Foundations
- 5.7 Dynamic Games: Equilibrium
- 6 Applications
- 6.1 Price Wars
- 6.2 Time Consistency
- 6.3 Risk Sharing
- Part II: Games with (Imperfect) Public Monitoring
- 7 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 7.1 The Canonical Repeated Game
- 7.2 A Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Example
- 7.3 Decomposability and Self-Generation
- 7.4 The Impact of Increased Precision
- 7.5 The Bang-Bang Result
- 7.6 An Example with Short-Lived Players
- 7.7 The Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Redux
- 7.8 Anonymous Players
- 8 Bounding Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs
- 8.1 Decomposing on Half-Spaces
- 8.2 The Inefficiency of Strongly Symmetric Equilibria
- 8.3 Short-Lived Players
- 8.4 The Prisoners' Dilemma
- 9 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 9.1 Characterizing the Limit Set of PPE Payoffs
- 9.2 The Rank Conditions and a Public Monitoring Folk Theorem
- 9.3 Perfect Monitoring Characterizations
- 9.4 Enforceability and Identifiability
- 9.5 Games with a Product Structure
- 9.6 Repeated Extensive-Form Games
- 9.7 Games of Symmetric Incomplete Information
- 9.8 Short Period Length
- 10 Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 10.1 Sequential Equilibrium
- 10.2 A Reduced-Form Example
- 10.3 Two-Period Examples
- 10.4 An Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
- 11 Applications
- 11.1 Oligopoly with Imperfect Monitoring
- 11.2 Repeated Adverse Selection
- 11.3 Risk Sharing
- 11.4 Principal-Agent Problems
- Part III: Games with Private Monitoring
- 12 Private Monitoring
- 12.1 A Two-Period Example
- 12.2 Private Monitoring Games: Basic Structure
- 12.3 Almost Public Monitoring: Robustness in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
- 12.4 Independent Monitoring: A Belief-Based Equilibrium for the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
- 12.5 A Belief-Free Example
- 13 Almost Public Monitoring Games
- 13.1 When Is Monitoring Almost Public?
- 13.2 Nearby Games with Almost Public Monitoring
- 13.3 Public Profiles with Bounded Recall
- 13.4 Failure of Coordination under Unbounded Recall
- 13.5 Patient Players
- 13.6 A Folk Theorem
- 14 Belief-Free Equilibria in Private Monitoring Games
- 14.1 Definition and Examples
- 14.2 Strong Self-Generation
- Part IV: Reputations
- 15 Reputations with Short-Lived Players
- 15.1 The Adverse Selection Approach to Reputations
- 15.2 Commitment Types
- 15.3 Perfect Monitoring Games
- 15.4 Imperfect Monitoring Games
- 15.5 Temporary Reputations
- 15.6 Temporary Reputations: The Proof of Proposition 15.5.1
- 16 Reputations with Long-Lived Players
- 16.1 The Basic Issue
- 16.2 Perfect Monitoring and Minmax-Action Reputations
- 16.3 Weaker Reputations for Any Action
- 16.4 Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 16.5 Commitment Types Who Punish
- 16.6 Equal Discount Factors
- 16.7 Temporary Reputations
- 17 Finitely Repeated Games
- 17.1 The Chain Store Game
- 17.2 The Prisoners' Dilemma
- 17.3 The Product-Choice Game
- 18 Modeling Reputations
- 18.1 An Alternative Model of Reputations
- 18.2 The Role of Replacements
- 18.3 Good Types and Bad Types
- 18.4 Reputations with Common Consumers
- 18.5 Discrete Choices
- 18.6 Lost Consumers
- 18.7 Markets for Reputations
- Bibliography
- Symbols
- Index
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Y
- Z
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