Luck Egalitarianism
1st Edition
Published on 8. October 2015
280 pages
978-1-4725-7044-4 (ISBN)
Description
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen tackles all the major questions concerning luck egalitarianism, providing deep, penetrating and original discussion of recent academic discourses on distributive justice as well as responses to some of the main objections in the literature. It offers a new answer to the "Why equality?" and "Equality of what?" questions, and provides a robust luck egalitarian response to the recent criticisms of luck egalitarianism by social relations egalitarians.
This systematic, theoretical introduction illustrates the broader picture of distributive justice and enables the reader to understand the core intuitions underlying, or conflicting with, luck egalitarianism.
This systematic, theoretical introduction illustrates the broader picture of distributive justice and enables the reader to understand the core intuitions underlying, or conflicting with, luck egalitarianism.
More details
Series
Edition
1. Auflage
Language
English
Place of publication
London
United Kingdom
Publishing group
Bloomsbury Publishing PLC
Target group
Professional and scholarly
College/higher education
ISBN-13
978-1-4725-7044-4 (9781472570444)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Luck Egalitarianism
Book
10/2015
Bloomsbury Academic
€53.41
Shipment within 15-20 days
Person
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen is Professor of Political Theory at the University of Aarhus, Denmark and Professor II in Philosophy at the University of Tromsø, Norway. His most recent book is Born Free and Equal? A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination (2013).
Content
Chapter 1. Luck egalitarianism and some close and distant relatives
1.1 Introduction
1.2 What is luck egalitarianism?
1.3 What is attractive about luck egalitarianism?
1.4 Three important luck egalitarians: Dworkin
1.5 Three important luck egalitarians: Arneson
1.6 Three important luck egalitarians: Cohen
1.7 Luck egalitarianism and other views
1.8 Summary
Chapter 2. Why equality?
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Formal equality
2.3 Equality of human beings
2.4 Williams on the idea of equality
2.5 Rawls on range properties
2.6 Respect and opaqueness
2.7 A different proposal
2.8 Summary
Chapter 3. Luck
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Different kinds of luck
3.3 Thin luck
3.4 Thick luck
3.5 Independent notions of luck
3.6 How much luck is there?
3.7 Constitutive luck
3.8 Option luck versus brute luck
3.9 Neutralizing luck and equality
3.10 Bad luck versus good luck
3.11 Summary
Chapter 4. Equality of what?
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Welfare
4.3 The specification objection
4.4 The disability objection
4.5 The offensive preference objection
4.6 The experience and snobbish tastes objection
4.7 The non-instrumental concern objection
4.8 Dworkin's resourcist view
4.9 Sen's capability metric
4.10 Summary
Chapter 5. Telic and deontic luck egalitarianism
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Some distinctions
5.3 Telic versus deontic and the scope of equality
5.4 The levelling down objection
5.5 Telic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection
5.6 Deontic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection
5.7 Egalitarian responses
5.8 Summary
Chapter 6. The scope of luck egalitarianism
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Whole lives
6.3 Generations
6.4 Groups
6.5 States
6.6 Individuals who are neither persons nor human beings
6.7 Summary
Chapter 7. Social relations egalitarianism versus luck egalitarianism
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Social relations egalitarianism
7.3 Anderson's democratic equality
7.4 Humiliation and harshness
7.5 What is at stake?
7.6 The source of the disagreement between social relations and luck egalitarians?
7.7 Summary
Chapter 8. Other values
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Freedom
8.3 Demandingness
8.4 Community
8.5 Publicity and stability
8.6 Reflections
8.7 Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
1.1 Introduction
1.2 What is luck egalitarianism?
1.3 What is attractive about luck egalitarianism?
1.4 Three important luck egalitarians: Dworkin
1.5 Three important luck egalitarians: Arneson
1.6 Three important luck egalitarians: Cohen
1.7 Luck egalitarianism and other views
1.8 Summary
Chapter 2. Why equality?
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Formal equality
2.3 Equality of human beings
2.4 Williams on the idea of equality
2.5 Rawls on range properties
2.6 Respect and opaqueness
2.7 A different proposal
2.8 Summary
Chapter 3. Luck
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Different kinds of luck
3.3 Thin luck
3.4 Thick luck
3.5 Independent notions of luck
3.6 How much luck is there?
3.7 Constitutive luck
3.8 Option luck versus brute luck
3.9 Neutralizing luck and equality
3.10 Bad luck versus good luck
3.11 Summary
Chapter 4. Equality of what?
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Welfare
4.3 The specification objection
4.4 The disability objection
4.5 The offensive preference objection
4.6 The experience and snobbish tastes objection
4.7 The non-instrumental concern objection
4.8 Dworkin's resourcist view
4.9 Sen's capability metric
4.10 Summary
Chapter 5. Telic and deontic luck egalitarianism
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Some distinctions
5.3 Telic versus deontic and the scope of equality
5.4 The levelling down objection
5.5 Telic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection
5.6 Deontic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection
5.7 Egalitarian responses
5.8 Summary
Chapter 6. The scope of luck egalitarianism
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Whole lives
6.3 Generations
6.4 Groups
6.5 States
6.6 Individuals who are neither persons nor human beings
6.7 Summary
Chapter 7. Social relations egalitarianism versus luck egalitarianism
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Social relations egalitarianism
7.3 Anderson's democratic equality
7.4 Humiliation and harshness
7.5 What is at stake?
7.6 The source of the disagreement between social relations and luck egalitarians?
7.7 Summary
Chapter 8. Other values
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Freedom
8.3 Demandingness
8.4 Community
8.5 Publicity and stability
8.6 Reflections
8.7 Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
