
Cryptology and Network Security
Description
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Content
- Intro
- Title
- Preface
- Table of Contents
- Invited Talks
- Expressive Encryption Systems from Lattices
- Introduction
- Background
- Lattice Notions
- Discrete Gaussians
- Sampling and Preimage Sampling
- Hardness Assumption
- Classic Constructions
- Regev Public-Key Encryption
- GPV Identity-Based Encryption
- Techniques and Refinements
- Bit-by-Bit Standard-Model IBE
- All-at-Once Standard-Model IBE
- Adaptive or ``Full'' Security
- Delegation and Hierarchies
- Concatenation-Based Delegation
- Multiplicative In-Place Delegation
- Attributes and Predicates
- Conclusion
- References
- Breaking Fully-Homomorphic-Encryption Challenges
- References
- Symmetric Cryptanalysis
- Cube Cryptanalysis of Hitag2 Stream Cipher
- Introduction
- Hitag2 Stream Cipher
- Cube Attack
- Cube Attack on Hitag2
- First Phase: Black-Box Attack
- Second Phase: White-Box Attack
- Third Phase: Exhaustive Search Attack
- Experimental Results
- Conclusion
- References
- New Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round Camellia
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Notations
- A Brief Description of Camellia
- 7-Round Impossible Differential of Camellia
- Impossible Differential Attack on 10-Round Camellia-128
- Attack on 10-Round Camellia-192 and 11-Round Camellia-256
- Attack on 10-Round Camellia-192
- Attack on 11-Round Camellia-256
- Conclusion
- References
- The Initialization Stage Analysis of ZUC v1.5
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- ZUC v1.5
- S-Functions
- The Chosen-IV Attack of ZUC v1.5
- The Definition of Differences
- An Chosen-IV Differential Path of ZUC v1.5
- The Differential Properties of Operations in ZUC v1.5
- The Probability of the Differential
- Conclusion
- References
- Algebraic Cryptanalysis of the Round-Reduced and Side Channel Analysis of the Full PRINTCipher-48
- Introduction
- PRINTCipher
- Algebraic Description
- SAT Techniques for Algebraic System Solving
- Conversion Techniques
- Optimal Tools and Strategies for the Attacks
- Algebraic Analysis of PRINTCipher-48
- Attack on Round-Reduced PRINTCipher-48
- Additional Bits at Round Four
- Side Channel Analysis of the Full PRINTCipher-48
- Conclusion and Future Work
- References
- Symmetric Ciphers
- EPCBC - A Block Cipher Suitable for Electronic Product Code Encryption
- Introduction
- The Electronic Product Code - EPC
- A New Block Cipher Suitable for EPC Encryption: EPCBC
- EPCBC(48,96) - EPCBC with 48-Bit Block Size and 96-Bit Key Size
- EPCBC(96,96) - EPCBC with 96-Bit Block Size and 96-Bit Key Size
- Improved Differential and Linear Cryptanalyis of PR-n
- Brief Description of PR-n
- Improved Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis
- Security Analysis of EPCBC
- Differential, Linear and Related-Key Differential Cryptanalysis
- Other Attacks on EPCBC
- Implementation of EPCBC
- Conclusion
- References
- On Permutation Layer of Type 1, Source-Heavy, and Target-Heavy Generalized Feistel Structures
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Generalized Feistel Structure (GFS)
- Diffusion of GFS
- Equivalence of GFSs
- Analysis on DRmax()
- Type 1 GFS
- Source-Heavy GFS
- Target-Heavy GFS
- Experimental Results
- Conclusions
- References
- Public Key Cryptography
- Security Analysis of an Improved MFE Public Key Cryptosystem
- Introduction
- MFE and Its Improvement
- MFE Cryptosystem
- Improvement of MFE
- Linearization Equation Attack
- First Order Linearnation Equation
- Second Order Linearization Equation
- Conclusion
- References
- A New Lattice-Based Public-Key Cryptosystem Mixed with a Knapsack
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Knapsack Problem
- Lattice
- Description of Our Cryptosystem
- The Basic Cryptosystem
- Implementations of Our Cryptosystem
- Choosing the Superincreasing Sequence and
- Finding Integer Linear Combination with Small Coefficients
- Some Experimental Results
- Security Analysis
- Knapsack Structure
- Message Security
- Key Security
- Remarks
- Conclusion
- References
- Achieving Short Ciphertexts or Short Secret-Keys for Adaptively Secure General Inner-Product Encryption
- Introduction
- Background
- Our Results
- Related Works
- Key Techniques
- Notations
- Dual Pairing Vector Spaces by Direct Product of Symmetric Pairing Groups
- Definitions of Zero and Non-zero Inner-Product Encryption (ZIPE / NIPE)
- Decisional Linear (DLIN) Assumption
- Proposed NIPE Scheme with Constant-SizeCiphertexts
- Key Ideas in Constructing the Proposed NIPE Scheme
- Dual Orthonormal Basis Generator
- Construction
- Security
- Proposed NIPE Scheme withConstant-SizeSecret-Keys
- Dual Orthonormal Basis Generator
- Construction and Security
- Proposed ZIPE Scheme with Constant-Size Ciphertexts
- Dual Orthonormal Basis Generator
- Construction and Security
- Performance
- Concluding Remarks
- References
- Protocol Attacks
- Comments on the SM2 Key Exchange Protocol
- Introduction
- Security Attributes
- Related Works and Our Contribution
- Organization
- Review of SM2 Key Exchange Protocol
- Formal Model for Key Exchange Protocols
- Weaknesses of SM2 Key Exchange Protocol
- UKS Attack I
- UKS Attack II
- Formal Attack Description
- Countermeasure
- Conclusion
- References
- Cryptanalysis of a Provably Secure Cross-Realm Client-to-Client Password-Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol of CANS '09
- Introduction
- Related Work and Motivation
- The C2C-PAKA-SC Protocol
- Adversarial Capability in the C2C-PAKA-SC Security Model
- Cryptanalysis of the C2C-PAKA-SC
- By any Outsider C Impersonating A to B
- By Any Outsider C Impersonating B to A
- By Any Insider Client B=A Impersonating A to KDCA
- Concluding Remarks
- References
- Passive Attack on RFID LMAP++ Authentication Protocol
- Introduction
- LMAP++ Authentication Protocol
- Passive Attack on LMAP++
- The Least Significant Bit of Identifier 0 [ID]
- The Least Significant Bit of Random Number [r]0
- Algorithm to Obtain the Identifier and Secrets
- Conclusions
- References
- Privacy Techniques
- Multi-show Anonymous Credentials with Encrypted Attributes in the Standard Model
- Introduction
- A Model for Anonymous Credential Systems with Encrypted Attributes
- Protocols
- Security Properties
- Cryptographic Tools
- Randomizable and Extractable Commitment Schemes
- (SXDH) Groth-Sahai Proofs
- GS Proof of Equality under Different Commitment Keys
- Automorphic Signatures
- Commuting Signatures and Some New Extensions
- Additional Commitments
- Simple Commuting Signature: One Committed Message and One Commitment Key
- Vector of Committed Messages and One Commitment Key
- Vector of Committed Messages and Several Commitment Keys
- Commuting Signatures in Privacy Enhancing Cryptography
- A Multi-show Anonymous Credential Scheme with Encrypted Attributes
- Overview of Our Solution
- Algorithms and Protocols
- References
- Group Signature with Constant Revocation Costs for Signers and Verifiers
- Introduction
- PriorWork on Revocable Group Signatures
- Our Results and Organization
- Preliminaries
- Bilinear Groups
- Hardness Assumptions
- Security Model and Definitions for Revocable Group Signatures
- Our RGS Scheme with Constant Costs for Signers and Verifiers
- High-Level Intuition
- Specification of RGS Algorithms
- Security Analysis
- Conclusion
- References
- Fast Computation on Encrypted Polynomials and Applications
- Introduction
- Our Contribution
- Homomorphic Encryption and Hardness Assumptions
- Additive Variant of El Gamal
- Paillier's Encryption Scheme
- Non-interactive Computation on Encrypted Polynomials
- Applications
- Batch Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation
- Private Set Intersection via OPE
- Private Set Intersection via Polynomial Multiplication
- References
- Varia
- AniCAP: An Animated 3D CAPTCHA Scheme Based on Motion Parallax
- Introduction
- Background
- Security and Usability
- Animated CAPTCHAs
- CAPTCHA: Formal Definition and Notation
- AniCAP
- Design and Implementation
- New AI Problem Family
- Security Considerations for AniCAP
- Image Processing and Computer Vision Attacks
- Brute Force Attacks
- Machine Learning Attacks
- Conclusion
- References
- Towards Attribute Revocation in Key-Policy Attribute Based Encryption
- Introduction
- Background
- Bilinear Groups
- Access Structure and Access Tree
- Lagrange Coefficient
- Decision q-BDHE Assumption
- Definition
- Construction
- Small Universe Construction
- Large Universe Construction
- Efficiency
- Security
- Discussion
- Conclusion and Future Work
- References
- A Note on (Im)Possibilities of Obfuscating Programs of Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
- Introduction
- Our Results
- Organizations
- Preliminaries
- Point Functions and Their Obfuscation
- Zero-Knowledge
- Witness Indistinguishability
- Proofs of Knowledge
- Definitions of Obfuscation for Interactive Probabilistic Programs
- Considerations
- Definitions
- Impossibilities of Obfuscating Provers
- Impossibilities for Zero Knowledge and Witness Indistinguishability
- Extending the Impossibilities to t-Composition Setting
- Possibilities of Obfuscating Verifiers
- Motivation for Obfuscating Verifiers
- Obfuscation for Verifiers
- Conclusions
- References
- Author Index
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