Game Theory and Applications

Name: Game Theory and Applications | 3rd Joint China-Dutch Workshop and 7th China Meeting, GTA 2016, Fuzhou, China, November 20-23, 2016, Revised Selected Papers
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3rd Joint China-Dutch Workshop and 7th China Meeting, GTA 2016, Fuzhou, China, November 20-23, 2016, Revised Selected Papers

Deng-Feng Li Xiao-Guang Yang Marc Uetz Gen-Jiu Xu(Editor)

Springer (Publisher)

Published on 13. October 2017

XV, 369 pages

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978-981-10-6753-2 (ISBN)

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Content

Intro
Preface
Organization
Contents
Non-cooperative Games
Repeated Games and Price Wars
1 Introduction
2 Basic Model
2.1 The One-Shot Game
2.2 The Repeated Game
3 Collusive Equilibria Under Private Information
4 Collusive Equilibria Under Public Information
5 Collusive Equilibria When Market Shares Form a Martingale
6 Conclusion
References
A Game Theory Approach for Deploying Medical Resources in Emergency Department
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Literature Review
3 The Proposed Model
3.1 Model Assumptions
3.2 TVC Game
3.3 The Deployment Game
4 Simulation Experiments
5 Conclusions
References
Non-cooperative Monomino Games
1 Introduction
2 Monomino Games
3 Game Play and Payoffs in Equilibrium
4 Conclusions
References
Bargaining Model of Mutual Deterrence Among Three Players with Incomplete Information
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Incomplete Information Mutual Deterrence Bargaining Model
2.1 Indefinitely Rubinstein Bargaining Model
2.2 Complete Information Indefinitely Tripartite Bargaining Model of Mutual Deterrence
2.3 Discount Factor of Deterrence
3 Unilateral Incomplete Information Mutual Deterrence Bargaining Method
4 The Tripartite Mutual Deterrence Bargaining Method of Bilateral Incomplete Information
4.1 Strategy Analysis of Player 2 Is 2H Type
4.2 Strategy Analysis of Player 2 Is 2L Type
5 Numerical Calculation Case
6 Conclusion
Acknowledgement
References
Stakeholders' Behavior Analysis and Enterprise Management Strategy Selection in Chinese Ancient Village Tourism Development
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Connotation of the Ancient Village Protection
2.1 Interpretations from the International Cultural Heritage Protection Documents
2.2 Significance of Ancient Village Heritage Landscape Protection
2.3 Dominant Position of Aboriginal People in Ancient Villages
2.4 Duties of Local Governments in Ancient Villages
2.5 Authoritative Supervisory Roles of Protection Experts
2.6 International Principles of Heritage Tourism Management
3 General Situations of Chinese Ancient Village Protection
4 Chinese Ancient Villages and Tourism Development
5 Tourism Resources and Tourism Enterprise Positioning
5.1 Localization of Tourism Resources
5.2 Tourism Enterprise Positioning
6 Behavior Analysis of Stakeholders in Ancient Village Development
6.1 Game Model Between Tourism Enterprise and the Local Government and Behavior Analysis
6.2 Game Model Between Tourism Enterprise and the Local People and Behavior Analysis
7 The Decision Making Analysis on the Stakeholders of Ancient Village Tourism Companies
8 Conclusions
References
Two Bargain Game Models of the Second-Hand Housing Commence
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Literature Review
3 Indefinite Period Bargaining Model
3.1 Problem Assumption
3.2 Perfect Equilibrium Solution of Subgame
4 Finite Period Bargaining Model
4.1 Game Process Description
4.2 Equilibrium Solution of Game in the Second Round
4.3 Repeated Game Model Establishment
4.4 The Discussion of the Game Process in the Time of k\Delta
5 A Real Example of the Bargaining Game Model
6 Concluding Remarks
Acknowledgment
References
Some Relaxed Solutions of Minimax Inequality for Discontinuous Game
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
3 Some Relaxed Solutions of Minimax Inequality
4 The Other Cases with Pseudocontinuity
5 Some Relaxed Nash Equilibrium
References
Dynamic Games of Firm Social Media Disclosure
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Related Research
3 The First Stage Game Model of Social Media Disclosure
4 The Second Stage Game Model of Social Media Disclosure
4.1 The Second Stage Static Game
4.2 The Second Stage Complete Information Game
4.3 The Second Stage Incomplete Information Repeated Game
5 The Third Stage Game Model of Social Media Disclosure
5.1 Add Regulators in the Game
5.2 Game Analysis of Regulators and Firm Social Media Disclosure
6 Conclusions and Implications
6.1 Research Conclusion
6.2 Inspirations and Suggestions
References
Non-cooperative Games Under Uncertainty
On Stochastic Fishery Games with Endogenous Stage-Payoffs and Transition Probabilities
1 Introduction
2 Endogenizing Payoffs and Transitions
3 Strategies and Restrictions
4 On Rewards and Equilibrium Rewards
4.1 Jointly Convergent Pure Strategy Rewards
4.2 Equilibrium Rewards
4.3 On Computing Threat Points
5 Conclusions
A Appendix
References
n-Person Credibilistic Non-cooperative Game with Fuzzy Payoffs
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Classical n-Person Non-cooperative Games
2.2 Credibility Theory
3 n-Person Credibilistic Non-cooperative Game
3.1 Three Credibilistic Equilibrium Strategies
3.2 Existence Theorem of Three Credibilistic Equilibria
4 Sufficient and Necessary Condition of Three Nash Equilibria
5 Numerical Example
6 Conclusion
Acknowledgements
References
Pareto Optimal Strategies for Matrix Games with Payoffs of Intuitionistic Fuzzy Sets
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Definitions and Notations
2.1 IFSs and Operations
3 The Models and Method for Matrix Games with IFS Payoffs
4 A Numerical Example and Comparative Analysis
4.1 A Numerical Example
4.2 Comparative Analysis of the Results Obtained by Li and Nan's Method and the Proposed Method
5 Conclusion
Acknowledgments
References
Cooperative Games
Marginal Games and Characterizations of the Shapley Value in TU Games
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
3 Marginal Games and Extended Marginal Games
4 Marginal Games and Axiomatic Characterizations of the Shapley Value
5 Marginal Games and Recursive Formulas of the Shapley Value
6 Final Remark
References
Computing the Shapley Value of Threshold Cardinality Matching Games
1 Introduction
2 Preliminary and Definition
2.1 Cooperative Game and Shapley Value
2.2 Threshold Cardinality Matching Game (TCMG)
2.3 Observations on the Shapley Value of TCMG
3 Efficient Algorithms in Special Cases
3.1 Linear Graphs
3.2 Graphs with a Constant Number of Clique or Coclique Modules
4 Computational Complexity in General Case
5 Conclusion and Further Discussion
References
Matrix Analysis for the Shapley Value and Its Inverse Problem
1 Introduction
2 Matrix Approach to Linear Values
3 The Shapley Standard Matrix
4 The Inverse Problem
5 Conclusion
References
The General Nucleolus of n-Person Cooperative Games
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
3 The Calculation of the General Nucleolus
4 The Properties of the General Nucleolus of N-Person Cooperative Games
4.1 The Least Square General Nucleolus Is the General Nucleolus
4.2 The General Nucleolus Is the Unique Point of p-kernel
5 The Kohlberg Criterion
6 Conclusions
References
A Cooperative Game Approach to Author Ranking in Coauthorship Networks
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Coauthorship Network
2.2 Cooperative Game
3 The Weighted Coauthorship Networks and Related Cooperative Games
3.1 The Number of the Papers
3.2 The Citation of the Papers
3.3 The Ranking Factor of the Papers
4 Author Ranking with the Induced Cooperative Games
4.1 The Core and the Shapley Value for the Games
4.2 Contribution Level Based Allocation Rules
5 Conclusion
References
A Reduced Harsanyi Power Solution for Cooperative Games with a Weight Vector
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cooperative Games
2.2 Fuzzy Cooperative Games
3 Reduced Harsanyi Power Solution
4 Three Particular Loss Functions
5 Conclusion
References
An Allocation Method of Provincial College Enrollment Plan Based on Bankruptcy Model
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Comprehensive Evaluation of the University Educational Indexes of Enrollment Plan
2.1 Description of the University Educational Indexes
2.2 Comprehensive Evaluation Based on the Minimum Membership Degree Deviation Method
3 Bankruptcy Model of Provincial College Enrollment Plan Allocation
4 Analysis of the Example
5 Conclusion
Acknowledgements
References
Cooperative Games Under Uncertainty
Edgeworth Equilibria of Economies and Cores in Multi-choice NTU Games
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
3 Connection Between Edgeworth Equilibria of Economies and Cores of Multi-choice NTU Games
4 Existence of Cores in Multi-choice NTU Games
References
Two-Phase Nonlinear Programming Models and Method for Interval-Valued Multiobjective Cooperative Games
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Arithmetic Operations over Intervals and Concept of Satisfactory Degrees of Comparing Intervals
2.1 Arithmetic Operations over Intervals
2.2 Concept of Satisfactory Degrees of Comparing Intervals and Properties
3 Interval-Valued Cores and Solution Method for Interval-Valued Multiobjective n-Person Cooperative Games
3.1 The Concept of Interval-Valued Multiobjective n-Person Cooperative Games
3.2 Interval-Valued Cores for Interval-Valued Multiobjective n-Person Cooperative Games
3.3 Solution Method for Interval-Valued Multiobjective n-Person Cooperative Games with Satisfactory Degrees of Comparing Intervals
3.4 Algorithms for Solving Interval-Valued n-Person Cooperative Games with Satisfactory Degrees
4 A Numerical Example
4.1 Computational Results Obtained by the Proposed Method
4.2 Computational Results with the LR Method
5 Conclusion
Acknowledgments
References
Models and Algorithms for Least Square Interval-Valued Nucleoli of Cooperative Games with Interval-Valued Payoffs
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Notations of Intervals and Interval-Valued Cooperative Games
2.1 Interval Notations and Arithmetic Operations
2.2 Interval-Valued Cooperative Games and Notations
3 Quadratic Programming Model for Least Square Interval-Valued Prenucleoli of Interval-Valued Cooperative Games
4 A Fast Method for Computing Least Square Interval-Valued Prenucleoli of Interval-Valued Cooperative Games
5 Algorithms for Least Square Interval-Valued Nucleoli of Interval-Valued Cooperative Games
6 A Numerical Example of Joint Production Problems
7 Conclusions
References
Interval-Valued Least Square Prenucleolus of Interval-Valued Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions
1 Introduction
2 Some Basic Concepts and Notations
2.1 Interval Arithmetic Operations and Interval-Valued Cooperative Games
2.2 Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions
2.3 Interval-Valued Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions in Choquet Integral Form
3 Interval-Valued Least Square Prenucleolus
4 Some Properties of the Interval-Valued Least Square Prenucleolus
5 Two Numerical Examples
6 Conclusions
References
Quadratic Programming Models and Method for Interval-Valued Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Distances Between Intervals and the Choquet Integral
3 Interval-Valued Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions
3.1 Transformation of Interval-Valued Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions
3.2 The Construction of Dissatisfaction Functions of Interval-Valued Cooperative Games
3.3 A Quadratic Programming Model and Its Optimal Solution
3.4 An Extension of the Quadratic Programming Model
3.5 A Process of Interval-Valued Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions
4 A Numerical Example
4.1 Computational Results Obtained by Different Methods and Analysis
4.2 The Comparative Analysis and Conclusions
5 Conclusions
Acknowledgement
References
Cooperative Games with the Intuitionistic Fuzzy Coalitions and Intuitionistic Fuzzy Characteristic Functions
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
3 Cooperative Games with the Intuitionistic Fuzzy Coalitions and Intuitionistic Fuzzy Characteristic Functions
3.1 Intuitionistic Fuzzy Coalitions and Intuitionistic Fuzzy Characteristic Functions
3.2 Intuitionistic Fuzzy Cooperative Games with Multilinear Extension Form
3.3 The Shapley Function for Intuitionistic Fuzzy Cooperative Games
4 Analysis of Example and Computational Result Comparison
5 The Comparison Analysis and Conclusion
Acknowledgments
References
A Profit Allocation Model of Employee Coalitions Based on Triangular Fuzzy Numbers in Tacit Knowledge Sharing
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Triangular Fuzzy Number
2.2 Triangular Fuzzy Numbers' Distance
3 The Profit Allocation Model Based on Triangular Fuzzy Numbers
3.1 Quadratic Programming Model with Coalitions' Weights and Solutions
3.2 The Pre-allocation with Coalitions' Weights and Efficiency
4 A Numerical Example
5 Conclusion
References
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Game Theory and Applications

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