We All Lost the Cold War
1st Edition
Published on 3. July 1995
566 pages
978-1-4008-2108-2 (ISBN)
Description
Drawing on recently declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American policy-makers, among them several important figures speaking for public record for the first time, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein cast new light on the effect of nuclear threats in two of the tensest moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the confrontations arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. They conclude that the strategy of deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers.
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Richard Ned Lebow | Janice Gross Stein
We All Lost the Cold War
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07/1995
Princeton University Press
€68.30
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Richard Ned Lebow | Janice Gross Stein
We All Lost the Cold War
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02/1994
Princeton University Press
€80.47
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Persons
Richard Ned Lebow is Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. Janice Gross Stein is Harrison Professor of Conflict Management and Negotiation at the University of Toronto.
Content
Preface
Abbreviations
Ch. 1 Introduction 3
Pt. 1 The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
Ch. 2 Missiles to Cuba: Foreign-Policy Motives 19
Ch. 3 Missiles to Cuba: Domestic Politics 51
Ch. 4 Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate? 67
Ch. 5 Why Did the Missiles Provoke a Crisis? 94
Ch. 6 The Crisis and Its Resolution 110
Pt. 2 The Crisis in the Middle East, October 1973
Ch. 7 The Failure to Prevent War, October 1973 149
Ch. 8 The Failure to Limit the War: The Soviet and American Airlifts 182
Ch. 9 The Failure to Stop the Fighting 198
Ch. 10 The Failure to Avoid Confrontation 226
Ch. 11 The Crisis and Its Resolution 261
Pt. 3 Deterrence, Compellence, and the Cold War
Ch. 12 How Crises Are Resolved 291
Ch. 13 Deterrence and Crisis Management 324
Ch. 14 Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Weapons 348
Postscript. Deterrence and the End of the Cold War 369
Notes 377
Appendix 523
Name Index 527
General Index 535
Abbreviations
Ch. 1 Introduction 3
Pt. 1 The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
Ch. 2 Missiles to Cuba: Foreign-Policy Motives 19
Ch. 3 Missiles to Cuba: Domestic Politics 51
Ch. 4 Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate? 67
Ch. 5 Why Did the Missiles Provoke a Crisis? 94
Ch. 6 The Crisis and Its Resolution 110
Pt. 2 The Crisis in the Middle East, October 1973
Ch. 7 The Failure to Prevent War, October 1973 149
Ch. 8 The Failure to Limit the War: The Soviet and American Airlifts 182
Ch. 9 The Failure to Stop the Fighting 198
Ch. 10 The Failure to Avoid Confrontation 226
Ch. 11 The Crisis and Its Resolution 261
Pt. 3 Deterrence, Compellence, and the Cold War
Ch. 12 How Crises Are Resolved 291
Ch. 13 Deterrence and Crisis Management 324
Ch. 14 Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Weapons 348
Postscript. Deterrence and the End of the Cold War 369
Notes 377
Appendix 523
Name Index 527
General Index 535
