
Post-Quantum Cryptography
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The 23 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 67 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on code-based cryptography, isogeny-based cryptography, lattice-based cryptography, multivariate cryptography, quantum algorithms, and security models.
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Content
- Intro
- Preface
- PQCrypto 2017 The 8th International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography
- Contents
- Code-Based Cryptography
- A New Rank Metric Codes Based Encryption Scheme
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Rank Metric Decoding Problems
- 2.1 Rank Metric
- 2.2 Decoding Problems
- 2.3 Hamming Metric vs Rank Metric
- 2.4 Post-quantum Security
- 3 Rank Metric Based Cryptography
- 3.1 Algebraic Decoding Based Cryptosystems
- 3.2 Probabilistic Decoding Based Cryptosystems
- 4 The New Cryptosystem
- 4.1 Design of the Encryption Scheme
- 4.2 Security Arguments
- 4.3 Choice of Parameters
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- Ouroboros: A Simple, Secure and Efficient Key Exchange Protocol Based on Coding Theory
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 2.1 Coding Theory and Syndrome Decoding Problems
- 2.2 HQC Scheme
- 3 The Ouroboros Protocol
- 3.1 Decoding Cyclic Errors
- 3.2 Description of the Ouroboros Protocol
- 3.3 Comparison with HQC and Alekhnovich
- 4 Security of the Protocol
- 5 Parameter Sets
- 5.1 Parameters
- 5.2 Optimized Parameters
- 6 Conclusion
- References
- CCA2 Key-Privacy for Code-Based Encryption in the Standard Model
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 k-Repetition Paradigm
- 4 Key-Privacy of the k-Repetition Paradigm
- 5 IK-CPA/CCA2 Code-Based Encryption
- 6 Another Instantiation: McEliece
- References
- A Reaction Attack on the QC-LDPC McEliece Cryptosystem
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 The QC-LDPC McEliece Cryptosystem
- 2.2 The QC-MDPC McEliece Cryptosystem
- 2.3 Previous Attack on the QC-MDPC McEliece Cryptosystem
- 3 The Attack
- 3.1 Learning Distances in the Matrix H - Intuition
- 3.2 Learning Distances in the Matrix Q - Intuition
- 3.3 Learning Distances - Experiments
- 3.4 Distance Spectrum Reconstruction Problem
- 3.5 Reconstructing the Matrix H
- 3.6 Reconstructing the Matrix Q
- 3.7 Learning to Decrypt
- 4 Conclusion
- References
- Quantum Information Set Decoding Algorithms
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Quantum Search Algorithms
- 2.1 Grover Search
- 2.2 Quantum Walk
- 3 Generalities on Classical and Quantum Decoding
- 3.1 Prange's Algorithm and Bernstein's Algorithm
- 3.2 Generalised ISD Algorithms
- 4 Solving the Generalised 4-Sum Problem with Quantum Walks and Grover Search
- 4.1 The Shamir-Schroeppel Idea
- 4.2 A Quantum Version of the Shamir-Schroeppel Algorithm
- 4.3 Application to the Decoding Problem
- 5 Improvements Obtained by the Representation Technique and ``1+1=0''
- 6 Computing the Complexity Exponents
- 7 Concluding Remarks
- References
- Isogeny-Based Cryptography
- Loop-Abort Faults on Supersingular Isogeny Cryptosystems
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Cryptosystems from Supersingular Isogenies
- 2.1 Elliptic Curves and Isogenies
- 2.2 Elliptic Curves for Supersingular Isogeny Schemes
- 2.3 Computing Smooth Degree Isogenies
- 2.4 Jao--De Feo Protocols
- 2.5 Validation Methods Against Active Attacks
- 3 Fault Injection Attacks
- 3.1 Tampering with Bits and Bytes
- 3.2 Implementing Loop-Aborts
- 4 The Loop-Abort Fault Attack
- 4.1 Attack Framework
- 4.2 The Attack
- 4.3 Analysis of the Attack
- 4.4 Alternative with Less Faults but Stronger Oracle
- 5 Countermeasures and Conclusion
- References
- A When P and Q Are Not a Basis of the Torsion
- Fault Attack on Supersingular Isogeny Cryptosystems
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Mathematical Background
- 2.2 Supersingular Isogeny Cryptosystem
- 2.3 The Kirkwood et al. Validation Method
- 3 Fault Attack
- 3.1 Recovery of Isogeny from Image of Random Point
- 3.2 Fault Models
- 3.3 Countermeasures
- 4 Analysis of Attack
- 4.1 Feasibility of Attack Models
- References
- A Signature Schemes in Detail
- A.1 Digital Signature Scheme
- A.2 Undeniable Signature Scheme
- Lattice-Based Cryptography
- Fast Lattice-Based Encryption: Stretching SPRING ????? ? ?????? ??
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Related Work
- 1.2 Our Contributions
- 2 The SPRING Family of PRFs and PRGs
- 2.1 SPRING-RS: Rounding with Rejection-Sampling
- 3 Security Analysis
- 3.1 Birthday-Type Attack on SPRING
- 3.2 Lattice Attack
- 3.3 Partially Known Secret Key
- 3.4 Side-Channel Leaks
- 4 Implementation Details
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- Revisiting TESLA in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Background
- 1.2 Our Contribution
- 1.3 Related Work
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Notation
- 2.2 The Learning with Errors Problem
- 3 The Signature Scheme TESLA
- 4 Security Reduction for TESLA
- 4.1 Yes-Instances of LWE
- 4.2 No-Instances of LWE
- 5 Selecting Parameters for TESLA
- 5.1 Derivation of System Parameters
- 5.2 Concrete Bit Security of TESLA
- 5.3 Convenient Parameters
- 6 Results and Comparison
- References
- Cryptanalysis of RLWE-Based One-Pass Authenticated Key Exchange
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 The CRT Basis in the Ring-LWE Setting
- 3.1 The Ring-LWE Problem
- 3.2 The CRT Basis for and Its Properties
- 4 How to Attack 1: A Warm-Up
- 4.1 The One-Pass AKE Scheme 1
- 4.2 Definition of the Oracle M0
- 4.3 The Oracle M1 and Its Associated Attacker A1
- 5 Making Small Field Attack ``Undetectable''
- 5.1 The Improved Attacker A1' Against M1
- 5.2 The ``Undetectable'' Attacker ( V/A1' ) Against M1
- 6 The Small Field Attack Against 1
- References
- A Lemma8 and Its Proof
- B Construction of V
- A Hybrid Lattice Basis Reduction and Quantum Search Attack on LWE
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Structure of the Paper
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 The Classical Hybrid Attack
- 4 The Quantum Hybrid Attack
- 4.1 Amplitude Amplification
- 4.2 The Attack
- 5 Analysis
- 5.1 Success Probability and Number of Function Applications
- 5.2 Total Runtime of the Quantum Hybrid Attack
- 6 Results
- 6.1 New Hope and Frodo
- 6.2 Lindner-Peikert
- 6.3 R-BinLWEenc
- References
- A About the constant in Theorem1
- B Hardness Tables for Lindner/Peikert LWE
- Multivariate Cryptography
- HMFEv - An Efficient Multivariate Signature Scheme
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Multivariate Cryptography
- 3 The MultiHFE Scheme
- 3.1 Efficiency
- 3.2 The Rank Attack Against HFE and MultiHFE
- 4 The New Signature Scheme HMFEv
- 5 Security
- 5.1 Direct and Rank Attacks
- 5.2 Quantum Attacks
- 5.3 Other Attacks and a Remark on the Minus Method
- 6 Parameter Choice
- 6.1 How to Choose the Parameter k?
- 6.2 Experiments with Direct Attacks Against HMFEv Schemes over GF(31) and GF(256)
- 6.3 Parameters
- 7 Comparison
- 8 Implementation
- 8.1 Inversion of the Central Map F
- 8.2 Arithmetic over Finite Fields
- 9 Conclusion
- References
- A Results of Our Computer Experiments with the Direct Attack Against HMFEv Systems over Small Fields
- MQ Signatures for PKI
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 Multivariate Quadratic Signature Schemes
- 3.1 Approximate MQ
- 4 Construction
- 4.1 Summary
- 5 Security
- 6 Discussion
- References
- A Proofs
- A.1 Proof of Theorem1
- A.2 Proof of Theorem2
- An Updated Security Analysis of PFLASH
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Prior Work
- 1.2 Our Contribution
- 1.3 Organization
- 2 Big Field Schemes
- 2.1 C*
- 2.2 PFLASH
- 2.3 HFE
- 3 Cryptanalyses of Big Field Schemes
- 3.1 Differential Techniques
- 3.2 Rank Techniques
- 4 Updated Differential Analysis of Projected Primitive
- 5 Extension to PFLASH
- 5.1 Differential Analysis
- 5.2 Rank Analysis
- 5.3 Security Estimates
- 6 Conclusion
- References
- Improved Attacks for Characteristic-2 Parameters of the Cubic ABC Simple Matrix Encryption Scheme
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Cubic ABC Matrix Encryption Scheme
- 3 The Structure of the Cubic ABC Scheme
- 3.1 Column Band Spaces
- 4 A Variant of MinRank Exploiting the Column Band Space Structure
- 5 Application to the Quadratic ABC Scheme
- 6 Completing the Key Recovery
- 7 Comparison with Minors Methods
- 8 Experiments
- 9 Conclusion
- References
- Key Recovery Attack for All Parameters of HFE-
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Recent History
- 1.2 Previous Analysis
- 1.3 Our Contribution
- 1.4 Organization
- 2 HFE Variants
- 3 Q-Rank
- 4 Previous Cryptanalysis of HFE
- 5 Key Recovery for HFE-
- 5.1 Reduction of HFE- to HFE
- 5.2 Key Recovery
- 6 Complexity of Attack
- 7 Experimental Results
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- A Toy Example
- A.1 Recovering a Related HFE Key
- A.2 Recovery of Equivalent HFE- Key
- Key Recovery Attack for ZHFE
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The ZHFE Encryption Scheme
- 3 Key Recovery Attack for ZHFE
- 3.1 Existence of a Low Rank Equivalent Key
- 3.2 Finding a Low Rank Core Polynomial
- 3.3 Finding Solution from a MinRank Problem
- 4 Experimental Results and Complexity
- 4.1 Comparison to Previous MinRank Analysis
- 5 Conclusion
- References
- A Appendix
- A.1 Toy Example
- A.2 Low Rank Matrix Forms
- Quantum Algorithms
- Post-quantum RSA
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Post-quantum Factorization
- 3 RSA Scalability
- 4 Concrete Parameters and Initial Implementation
- References
- A Appendix: Implementation Barriers and Details
- B Credits for Multi-prime RSA
- A Low-Resource Quantum Factoring Algorithm
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Factoring Integers with NFS
- 3 Accelerating NFS Using Quantum Search
- 4 A Quantum Relation Search
- 5 Shor's Factorization Method in Superposition
- 6 Recognizing Smooth Integers
- References
- A Number of Iterations for the Serial Construction
- Quantum Algorithms for Computing Short Discrete Logarithms and Factoring RSA Integers
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Recent Work
- 1.2 Our Contributions
- 1.3 Related Work
- 1.4 Overview
- 2 Notation
- 3 Computing Short Discrete Logarithms
- 3.1 The Discrete Logarithm Problem
- 3.2 Algorithm Overview
- 3.3 The Quantum Algorithm
- 3.4 Analysis of the Probability Distribution
- 3.5 The Notion of Constructive Interference
- 3.6 The Notion of a Good Pair (j, k)
- 3.7 Lower-Bounding the Number of Good Pairs (j, k)
- 3.8 Lower-Bounding the Probability of a Good Pair (j, k)
- 3.9 Computing d from a Set of s Good Pairs
- 3.10 Rationale and Analysis
- 3.11 Building a Set of s Good Pairs
- 3.12 Main Result
- 3.13 The Advantage of Our Algorithm
- 3.14 Implementation Remarks
- 3.15 Applications
- 4 Factoring RSA Integers
- 4.1 The RSA Integer Factoring Problem
- 4.2 The Factoring Algorithm
- 4.3 Generalizations
- 4.4 The Advantage of Our Algorithm
- 5 Order Finding Under Side Information
- 6 Summary and Conclusion
- A Appendix
- References
- Security Models
- XOR of PRPs in a Quantum World
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Security Notions
- 2.2 XOR of PRPs
- 2.3 Idealized XOR of PRPs
- 2.4 Quantum Claw-Finding
- 3 Modeling Quantum Distinguishers
- 4 Quantum Key-Recovery Attack
- 4.1 Colliding Key Sets
- 4.2 Generic Attack
- 5 Quantum Security Analysis
- 6 Discussion
- References
- Transitioning to a Quantum-Resistant Public Key Infrastructure
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Signature Schemes and Unforgeability
- 2.1 Unforgeability Security Definitions
- 2.2 Separations and Implications
- 3 Separability of Hybrid Signatures
- 4 Combiners
- 4.1 C"026B30D : Concatenation
- 4.2 Cstr-nest: Strong Nesting
- 4.3 Dnest: Dual Message Combiner Using Nesting
- 5 Hybrid Signatures in Standards
- 5.1 X.509v3 Certificates
- 5.2 TLS
- 5.3 CMS and S/MIME
- 5.4 Discussion
- References
- A A Brief Review of Quantum Computation
- B Unforgeability Separations and Implications
- C Proofs for Combiners
- C.1 C"026B30D : Concatenation
- C.2 Cstr-nest: Strong Nesting
- C.3 Dnest: Dual Message Combiner Using Nesting
- ORAMs in a Quantum World
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 The New ORAM Model
- 3.1 Classical and Post-quantum Security
- 3.2 Comparison with
- 3.3 PathORAM
- 3.4 Post-quantum Security of PathORAM
- 4 Quantum ORAM
- 4.1 QORAM Security
- 4.2 PathQORAM
- References
- Author Index
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