A Two-Dimensionalist Guide to Conceptual Analysis

1 - Preface [Seite 7]
2 - Contents [Seite 9]
3 - Introduction [Seite 13]
4 - 1 What is conceptual analysis and what is the problem? [Seite 21]
4.1 - 1.1 What is conceptual analysis? [Seite 21]
4.2 - 1.2 From Frege to Kripke and Putnam [Seite 25]
5 - 2 Two-dimensionalism and the necessary a posteriori [Seite 33]
5.1 - 2.1 Two-dimensionalism [Seite 33]
5.1.1 - 2.1.1 Primary and secondary intensions [Seite 33]
5.1.2 - 2.1.2 Metaphysical plenitude and two-fold world dependence [Seite 37]
5.1.3 - 2.1.3 Scrutability and canonical descriptions [Seite 42]
5.1.4 - 2.1.4 Two-dimensionalism and Jackson's descriptivism [Seite 46]
5.1.5 - 2.1.5 Two notions of apriority [Seite 50]
5.2 - 2.2 Modal illusions according to Kripke and according to twodimensionalism [Seite 54]
5.2.1 - 2.2.1 Kripke's two models of modal error [Seite 56]
5.2.2 - 2.2.2 Doubts about the accounts of modal error [Seite 58]
5.2.2.1 - 2.2.2.1 Doubts about the epistemic counterpart model [Seite 58]
5.2.2.2 - 2.2.2.2 Doubts about the reference fixer model [Seite 65]
5.3 - 2.3 Summary and outlook: What has been shown and what is yet to be shown [Seite 70]
6 - 3 The challenge from the epistemic arguments [Seite 77]
6.1 - 3.1 Primary intensions and the epistemic arguments [Seite 80]
6.1.1 - 3.1.1 The primary intensions of natural kind terms [Seite 84]
6.1.1.1 - 3.1.1.1 Vagueness [Seite 92]
6.1.1.2 - 3.1.1.2 Intersubjective variation and the individuation of concepts . [Seite 94]
6.1.2 - 3.1.2 Semantic deference and the primary intensions of names [Seite 96]
6.1.2.1 - 3.1.2.1 The argument from Ignorance and Error [Seite 98]
6.1.2.2 - 3.1.2.2 Deferential concepts and the alleged problem of circularity [Seite 99]
6.1.2.3 - 3.1.2.3 Deferential concepts and apriority [Seite 104]
6.1.2.4 - 3.1.2.4 Two methods for detecting deferential concepts and two problems for two-dimensionalism [Seite 106]
6.2 - 3.2 Linguistic meaning, mental content, and two-dimensionalism [Seite 110]
7 - 4 Primary intensions, defining the subject, and communication [Seite 121]
7.1 - 4.1 Defining the subject [Seite 122]
7.1.1 - 4.1.1 A case for the epistemic thesis [Seite 127]
7.1.1.1 - 4.1.1.1 From (CJ) to (CJ+) - Schroeter's improv model [Seite 129]
7.1.1.2 - 4.1.1.2 From (CJ+) to (CJ++) [Seite 145]
7.1.2 - 4.1.2 The failure of the semantic thesis [Seite 149]
7.2 - 4.2 Two-dimensional communication [Seite 153]
7.2.1 - 4.2.1 The semantic thesis [Seite 156]
7.2.1.1 - 4.2.1.1 Communication involving indexical expressions [Seite 158]
7.2.1.2 - 4.2.1.2 Communication involving proper names [Seite 163]
7.2.1.3 - 4.2.1.3 Communication involving natural kind terms [Seite 167]
7.2.2 - 4.2.2 The epistemic thesis [Seite 169]
7.2.2.1 - 4.2.2.1 The importance of shared primary intensions [Seite 170]
7.2.2.2 - 4.2.2.2 How primary intensions help to promote co-reference even when they are not shared [Seite 175]
7.2.2.2.1 - 4.2.2.2.1 Proper names [Seite 176]
7.2.2.2.2 - 4.2.2.2.2 Natural kind terms [Seite 178]
8 - 5 Epistemic transparency and epistemic opacity [Seite 181]
8.1 - 5.1 Arguments for ubiquitous opacity [Seite 182]
8.1.1 - 5.1.1 Millikan [Seite 183]
8.1.2 - 5.1.2 Putnam [Seite 185]
8.1.3 - 5.1.3 Kornblith [Seite 187]
8.2 - 5.2 Revealing opacity [Seite 194]
8.2.1 - 5.2.1 Revealing opacity via the function of a term [Seite 195]
8.2.2 - 5.2.2 Revealing opacity via considerations about hypothetical cases [Seite 197]
8.2.3 - 5.2.3 Can opacity be determined a priori? [Seite 199]
8.3 - 5.3 The value of opaque terms in conceptual analysis [Seite 206]
8.3.1 - 5.3.1 Discovering essences [Seite 207]
8.3.2 - 5.3.2 Variation in primary intensions [Seite 208]
9 - 6 Scrutability, primary intensions, and conceptual analysis [Seite 213]
9.1 - 6.1 Scrutability and primary intensions [Seite 214]
9.1.1 - 6.1.1 From descriptivism to the scrutability thesis [Seite 217]
9.1.2 - 6.1.2 A case for (CJ) [Seite 223]
9.1.2.1 - 6.1.2.1 Argument from metaphysical plenitude [Seite 224]
9.1.2.2 - 6.1.2.2 Arguments from the scrutability of specific kinds of facts . [Seite 225]
9.1.2.3 - 6.1.2.3 Arguments from the absence of clear counterexamples [Seite 227]
9.1.2.4 - 6.1.2.4 Arguments from the epistemic indispensability of scrutability [Seite 230]
9.2 - 6.2 Semantic idealizations and epistemic reality [Seite 234]
9.2.1 - 6.2.1 Are primary intensions too coarse-grained? [Seite 235]
9.2.2 - 6.2.2 Scrutability for real subjects [Seite 239]
9.2.2.1 - 6.2.2.1 The two-level model [Seite 245]
9.2.2.2 - 6.2.2.2 Approaching ideal judgments [Seite 254]
10 - 7 The trouble with definitions and the aims of conceptual analysis [Seite 261]
10.1 - 7.1 The aims of conceptual analysis [Seite 263]
10.1.1 - 7.1.1 Definitions - complete, partial, and absent [Seite 263]
10.1.2 - 7.1.2 Reductive explanations [Seite 267]
10.1.3 - 7.1.3 The Canberra Plan [Seite 274]
10.1.3.1 - 7.1.3.1 Ramsey sentences, primary intensions and unique reference [Seite 278]
10.1.3.2 - 7.1.3.2 The scope of the Canberra Plan [Seite 280]
10.1.3.3 - 7.1.3.3 The practicability of the Canberra Plan [Seite 283]
10.2 - 7.2 The trouble with definitions [Seite 286]
10.2.1 - 7.2.1 Adequacy conditions for definitions [Seite 286]
10.2.2 - 7.2.2 Objections to the eligibility of definitions [Seite 290]
10.2.2.1 - 7.2.2.1 Objections from the relation between definiendum and everything else [Seite 290]
10.2.2.2 - 7.2.2.2 Objections from the format of concepts [Seite 294]
10.2.3 - 7.2.3 The absence of successful definitions and some reasons for optimism [Seite 297]
11 - 8 Concluding remarks [Seite 303]
12 - References [Seite 309]