
Project Recovery
Description
Alles über E-Books | Antworten auf Fragen rund um E-Books, Kopierschutz und Dateiformate finden Sie in unserem Info- & Hilfebereich.
More details
Other editions
Additional editions


Person
Content
1 Understanding Success and Failure 1
1.0 Introduction 1
1.1 Success: Historical Perspective 2
1.2 Early Modifications to Triple Constraints 3
1.3 Primary and Secondary CONSTRAINTS 4
1.4 Prioritization of Constraints 6
1.5 From Triple Constraints to Competing Constraints 6
1.6 Future Definitions of Project Success 8
1.7 Different Definitions of Project Success 11
1.8 Understanding Project Failure 12
1.9 Degrees of Project Failure 13
1.10 Other Categories of Project Failure 16
1.11 Summary of Lessons Learned 17
2 Causes of Project Failure 19
2.0 Introduction 19
2.1 Facts about Project Failure 19
2.2 Causes of Project Failure 20
2.3 Schedule Failure 22
2.4 Failures due to Unknown Technology 23
2.5 Project Size and Success/Failure Risk 24
2.6 Failure due to Improper Critical Failure Factors 25
2.7 Failure to Establish Tracking Metrics 26
2.8 Failing to Recognize Early Warning Signs 26
2.9 Improper Selection of Critical Team Members 27
2.10 Uncertain Rewards 29
2.11 Estimating Failures 31
2.12 Staffing Failures 32
2.13 Planning Failures 34
2.14 Risk Management Failures 36
2.15 Management Mistakes 37
2.16 Lacking Sufficient Tools 38
2.17 Failure of Success 39
2.18 Motivation to Fail 41
2.19 Tradeoff Failures 42
2.20 Summary of Lessons Learned 43
3 Business Case Failure 45
3.0 Introduction 45
3.1 Changing Stakeholders 45
3.2 Revalidation of Assumptions 46
3.3 Managing Innovation 47
3.4 Examples of Changing Business Cases 48
3.5 PROLOGUE TO THE Iridium Case Study 52
3.6 Rise, Fall and Resurrection of Iridium 52
Naming the Project "Iridium" 55
Obtaining Executive Support 55
Launching the Venture 56
Iridium System 58
Terrestial and Space-Based Network 58
Project Initiation: Developing Business Case 59
"Hidden" Business Case 61
Risk Management 61
Collective Belief 63
Iridium's Infancy Years 64
Debt Financing 67
M-Star Project 68
A New CEO 69
Project Management at Motorola (Iridium) 69
Satellite Launches 70
Initial Public Offering (IPO) 71
Signing Up Customers 71
Iridium's Rapid Ascent 72
Iridium's Rapid Descent 74
Iridium "Flu" 78
Definition of Failure (October 1999) 79
3.7 Summary of Lessons Learned 84
4 Sponsorship/Governance Failures 87
4.0 Introduction 87
4.1 Defining Project Governance 88
4.2 Project versus Corporate Governance 88
4.3 Roles, Responsibilities and Decision-Making Authority 90
4.4 Governance Frameworks 91
4.5 Governance Failures 93
4.6 Why Projects Are Hard to Kill 94
4.7 Collective Belief 96
4.8 Exit Champion 97
4.9 When to Give Up 98
4.10 Prologue to the Denver International Airport Case Study 101
4.11 Denver International Airport 101
Background 101
Airports and Airline Deregulation 102
Does Denver Need a New Airport? 103
Enplaned Passenger Market 108
Land Selection 109
Front Range Airport 109
Airport Design 110
Project Management 112
Baggage-Handling System 114
Early Risk Analysis 115
March 1991 115
April 1991 116
May 1991 116
August 1991 117
November 1991 117
December 1991 118
January 1992 118
June 1992 118
September 1992 119
October 1992 119
March 1993 119
August 1993 120
September 1993 120
October 1993 121
January 1994 121
February 1994 121
March 1994 121
April 1994 122
May 1994 122
June 1994 123
July 1994 124
August 1994 124
September 1994 127
October 1994 128
November 1994 128
December 1994 130
Airline Costs per Enplaned Passenger 131
February 28, 1995 132
Appendix A 133
Introduction 133
Agreement between United and the City 134
Appendix B Jokes about the Abbreviation DIA 138
4.12 Denver International Airport Baggage- Handling System: Illustration of Ineffective Decision Making 142
Synopsis 142
Background 142
System at a Glance 142
Chronology of Events 143
Basic Mode of Failure 145
Key Decisions That Led to Disaster 145
Other Failure Points 151
Conclusion 152
4.13 Summary of Lessons Learned 153
5 Project Politics and Failure 155
5.0 Introduction 155
5.1 Political Risks 156
5.2 R easons for Playing Politics 156
5.3 Situations Where Political Games Will Occur 157
5.4 Governance Committee 158
5.5 Friends and Foes 159
5.6 A ttack or Retreat 159
5.7 N eed for Effective Communications 161
5.8 Power and Influence 162
5.9 Managing Project Politics 163
5.10 Prologue to the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster Case Study 163
5.11 Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster 164
Background to Space Transportation System 166
NASA Succumbs to Politics and Pressure 167
Solid Rocket Boosters 169
Blowholes 171
O-Ring Erosion 173
Joint Rotation 173
O-Ring Resilience 174
External Tank 175
Spare Parts Problem 175
Risk Identification Procedures 175
Teleconferencing 176
Paperwork Constraints 176
Politics and O-Rings 178
Issuing Waivers 178
Launch Liftoff Sequence Profile: Possible Aborts 180
O-Ring Problem 184
Pressure, Paperwork and Waivers 189
Mission 51-L 191
Second Teleconference 194
Ice Problem 199
The Accident 202
NASA and Media 205
Findings of Commission 205
Chain-of-Command Communication Failure 209
Epilogue 210
Potential Cover-Up 211
Senate Hearing 213
5.12 Summary of Lessons Learned 214
6 Software Failures 217
6.0 Introduction 217
6.1 IT's Biggest Failures 217
IBM's Stretch Project 217
Knight-Ridder's Viewtron Service 218
DMV Projects-California and Washington 218
Apple's Copland Operating System 219
Sainsbury's Warehouse Automation 220
Canada's Gun Registration System 220
Three Current Projects in Danger 221
6.2 Software Bugs 222
6.3 Causes of Failure in Software Projects 224
6.4 Large-Scale IT Failure 225
Reader ROI 225
Out with the Old 227
Seeds of Failure 228
Early Warnings 230
Call for Help 232
6.5 W orst Possible Failure: FoxMeyer Drugs 234
Case Study: FoxMeyer Drugs' Bankruptcy: Was It a Failure of ERP? 235
6.6 L ondon Heathrow Terminal 239
History 240
Construction 240
Main Terminal Building 241
Satellite Terminal Buildings 241
New Heathrow Control Tower 242
Opening Day 242
6.7 Summary of Lessons Learned 243
7 Safety Considerations 245
7.0 Importance of Safety 245
7.1 Boeing 787 Dreamliner Battery Problems 245
7.2 Airbus A380 Problems 250
Configurations 251
Brief History 251
7.3 Summary of Lessons Learned 255
8 Scope Creep 257
8.0 Understanding Scope Creep 257
8.1 Creeping Failure 258
8.2 Defining Scope 259
8.3 Scope Creep Dependencies 261
8.4 C auses of Scope Creep 261
8.5 N eed for Business Knowledge 263
8.6 W ays to Minimize Scope Creep 263
8.7 Sydney Opera House 265
Performance Venues and Facilities 266
Construction History 267
8.8 Summary of Lessons Learned 273
9 Project Health Checks 275
9.0 Need for Project Health Checks 275
9.1 Understanding Project Health Checks 276
9.2 Who Performs Health Checks? 278
9.3 Health Check Life-Cycle Phases 278
9.4 Project Management Failure Warning Signs 279
"Instant Amnesia" and "Da Nial Ain't In Egypt" 280
Project Cost 280
The Lone Ranger Rides Again! 281
No Sale! 281
Arrogance Rules! 282
2 + 2 = 17! 282
Mao Didn't Have the Only "Long March" 283
What Risk? There's No Risk Here! 283
Where's Your Project Plan? 284
I'll Take a Booth without a Cell Phone! 284
Don't Bother Me with Details! 284
What Layoffs? 285
The Out-of-Towner Speaks: Distance Means Credibility 285
Disclaimer 286
9.5 Summary of Lessons Learned 286
10 Techniques for Recovering Failing Projects 289
10.0 Understanding Troubled Projects 289
10.1 Root Causes of Failure 290
10.2 Definition Phase 292
10.3 Early Warning Signs of Trouble 292
10.4 Selecting Recovery Project Manager (RPM) 294
10.5 Recovery Life-Cycle Phases 295
10.6 Understanding Phase 295
10.7 Audit Phase 296
10.8 Tradeoff Phase 298
10.9 Negotiation Phase 300
10.10 Restart Phase 300
10.11 E xecution Phase 301
10.12 Project Recovery versus Project Rescue 302
10.13 R ecovery Decision 302
10.14 Summary of Lessons Learned 304
Index 309
CHAPTER 1
UNDERSTANDING SUCCESS AND FAILURE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Most people have a relatively poor understanding of what is meant by project success and project failure. As an example, let’s assume you purchase a new car that contains a lot of electronic gadgetry. After a few days, some of the electronics fail to work correctly. Was the purchase of the new car a success or a failure? Most people would refer to this as a glitch or small problem that can be corrected. If the problem is corrected, then you would consider the purchase of the new car as a success.
But now let’s assume you purchase a $10 million software package for your company. The software fails to work correctly and your company loses $50 million in sales before the software bugs are removed and the system operates as expected. In this example, the literature would abound with stories about the failure of your software package and how much money your company lost in the process. But if the software package is now bug free and your company is generating revenue from use of the package, then why should the literature refer to this as a failure? Was the purchase and eventual use of the software package a success or a failure? Some people might consider this as a success with glitches along the way that had to be overcome. And we all know that software development rarely occurs without glitches.
Defining success and failure is not clear cut. We all seem to understand what is meant by total success or total failure. But the majority of projects fall into the grey area between success and failure where there may not be any clear definition of the meaning of partial success or partial failure.
Project success has traditionally been defined as completing the requirements within the triple constraints of time, cost and scope (or performance). This is the answer that had been expected of students on most exams. In the same breath, project failure had been defined as the inability to meet the requirements within time, cost and scope. Unfortunately, these definitions do not provide a clear picture or understanding of the health of the project and whether or not success has been achieved. And to make matters worse, the definition of success or failure is treated like the definition of beauty; it is in the eyes of the beholder. Today, we are finally beginning to scrutinize the definitions of project success and project failure.
1.1 SUCCESS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The complexities with defining project success and failure can be traced back to the early days of project management. The birth and initial growth of project management began with the Department of Defense (DOD) in the United States. With thousands of contractors, the DOD wanted some form of standardization with regard to project performance reporting. The earned value measurement system (EVMS) was created primarily for this purpose.
For the EVMS to be effective, metrics were needed to track performance and measure or predict project success. Everybody knew that measuring success was complicated and that predicting project success correctly required several metrics. Unfortunately, our understanding of metrics and metric measurement techniques was relatively poor at that time. The result was the implementation of the rule of inversion. The rule of inversion states that the metrics with the highest informational value, especially for decision making and measuring success, should be avoided or never measured because of the difficulty in data collection. Metrics like time and cost are the easiest to measure and should therefore be used. The result was that we then spent too much time on these variables that may have had the least impact on decision making and measuring and predicting project success or project failure. The EVMS, for all practical purposes, had two and only two metrics: time and cost. Several formulas were developed as part of the EVMS, and they were all manipulations of time and cost.
The definition of success was now predicated heavily upon the information that came out of the EVMS, namely time and cost. The triple constraints of time, cost and scope were established as the norm for measuring and predicting project success.
Unfortunately, good intentions often go astray. DOD contracts with the aerospace and defense industry were heavily based upon the performance of the engineering community. In the eyes of the typical engineer, each of the triple constraints did not carry equal importance. For many engineers, scope and especially technical achievement were significantly more important than time or cost. The DOD tried to reinforce the importance of time and cost, but as long as the DOD was willing to pay for the cost overruns and allow schedule slippages, project success was measured by how well performance was achieved regardless of the cost overruns, which could exceed several hundred percent. To make matters worse, many of the engineers viewed project success as the ability to exceed rather than just meet specifications, and to do it using DOD funding. Even though the triple constraints were being promoted as the definition of success, performance actually became the single success criterion.
1.2 EARLY MODIFICATIONS TO TRIPLE CONSTRAINTS
The DOD’s willingness to tolerate schedule slippages and cost overruns for the sake of performance gave the project management community the opportunity to consider another constraint, namely customer acceptance. Projects, by definition, are most often unique opportunities that you may never have attempted before and may never attempt again. As such, having accurate estimating databases that can be used to predict the time and cost to achieve success was wishful thinking. Projects that required a great deal of innovation were certainly susceptible to these issues as well as significant cost overruns. To make matters worse, the time and cost estimates were being established by people that knew very little about the complexities of project management and had never been involved in innovation activities.
People began to realize that meeting the time and cost constraints precisely would involve some degree of luck. Would the customer still be willing to accept the deliverables if the project was late by one week, two weeks or three weeks? Would the customer still be willing to accept the deliverables if the cost overrun was $10,000, $20,000, or $100,000?
Now it became apparent that success may not appear as just a single point as shown in Figure 1-1. The small circle within the cube in Figure 1-1 represents the budget, schedule and scope requirements defined by the customer. However, given the risks of the project, success may be identified as all points within the cube. In other words, if the schedule were to slip by up to two weeks, and the budget was exceeded by up to $50,000, and the client was able to receive up to 92% of the initial requirements, then the project might still be regarded as a success. Therefore, success is not just a single point. The hard part is identifying the size and boundaries of the success cube.
Figure 1-1 Project success boundary box.
Using Figure 1-1, the only definition of success was now customer satisfaction or customer acceptance. For some customers and contractors, time and cost were insignificant compared to customer satisfaction. Having the deliverables late or over budget was certainly better than having no deliverables at all. But customers were not willing to say that success was merely customer acceptance. Time and cost were still important to the customers. As such, the triple constraints were still used but surrounded by a circle of customer satisfaction, as shown in Figure 1-2.
Figure 1-2 Project success defined as customer satisfaction.
Figure 1-2 made it clear that there may be several definitions of project success because not all constraints carry equal importance. On some projects, customer acceptance may be heavily biased toward cost containment whereas on other projects the scheduled delivery date may be critical.
1.3 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONSTRAINTS
As projects became more complex, organizations soon found that the triple constraints were insufficient to clearly define project success even if the constraints were prioritized. There were other constraints that were often more important than time, cost and scope. These “other” constraints were referred to as secondary constraints with time, cost and scope being regarded as the primary constraints. Typical secondary constraints included:
- Using the customer’s name as reference at the completion of the project
- Probability of obtaining follow-on work
- Financial success (i.e., profit maximization)
- Achieving technical superiority (i.e., competitive advantage)
- Aesthetic value and usability
- Alignment with strategic planning objectives
- Maintaining regulatory agency requirements
- Abiding by health and safety laws
- Maintaining environmental protection standards
- Enhancing the corporate reputation and image
- Meeting the personal needs of the employees (opportunities for advancement)
- Supporting and maintaining ethical conduct (Sarbannes-Oxley law)
The secondary constraints created challenges for many companies. The EVMS was created to track and report only the primary constraints. To solve the tracking problem, companies created enterprise project management methodologies (EPMs) that incorporated the EVMS and also...
System requirements
File format: PDF
Copy-Protection: Adobe-DRM (Digital Rights Management)
System requirements:
- Computer (Windows; MacOS X; Linux): Install the free reader Adobe Digital Editions prior to download (see eBook Help).
- Tablet/smartphone (Android; iOS): Install the free app Adobe Digital Editions or the app PocketBook before downloading (see eBook Help).
- E-reader: Bookeen, Kobo, Pocketbook, Sony, Tolino and many more (only limited: Kindle).
The file format PDF always displays a book page identically on any hardware. This makes PDF suitable for complex layouts such as those used in textbooks and reference books (images, tables, columns, footnotes). Unfortunately, on the small screens of e-readers or smartphones, PDFs are rather annoying, requiring too much scrolling.
This eBook uses Adobe-DRM, a „hard” copy protection. If the necessary requirements are not met, unfortunately you will not be able to open the eBook. You will therefore need to prepare your reading hardware before downloading.
Please note: We strongly recommend that you authorise using your personal Adobe ID after installation of any reading software.
For more information, see our eBook Help page.