Monitoring Democracy
When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails
1st Edition
Published on 25. March 2012
336 pages
978-1-4008-4252-0 (ISBN)
Description
In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? Monitoring Democracy argues that the practice of international election monitoring is broken, but still worth fixing. By analyzing the evolving interaction between domestic and international politics, Judith Kelley refutes prevailing arguments that international efforts cannot curb government behavior and that democratization is entirely a domestic process. Yet, she also shows that democracy promotion efforts are deficient and that outside actors often have no power and sometimes even do harm.
Analyzing original data on over 600 monitoring missions and 1,300 elections, Kelley grounds her investigation in solid historical context as well as studies of long-term developments over several elections in fifteen countries. She pinpoints the weaknesses of international election monitoring and looks at how practitioners and policymakers might help to improve them.
Analyzing original data on over 600 monitoring missions and 1,300 elections, Kelley grounds her investigation in solid historical context as well as studies of long-term developments over several elections in fifteen countries. She pinpoints the weaknesses of international election monitoring and looks at how practitioners and policymakers might help to improve them.
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Judith G. Kelley
Monitoring Democracy
When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails
Book
03/2012
Princeton University Press
€116.50
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Judith G. Kelley
Monitoring Democracy
When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails
Book
03/2012
Princeton University Press
€51.00
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Judith G. Kelley is associate professor of public policy and political science at Duke University. She is the author of Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives (Princeton).
Content
Illustrations xi
Tables xiii
Preface xv
Abbreviations xix
PART I
Chapter 1: Introduction 3
Two Questions 6
Methods of Analysis 12
Chapter 2: Th e Rise of a New Norm 16
The Changing Normative Environment 21
Contestation 23
Increased Supply and Demand 26
The Popularization of Monitoring 28
Monitoring Today: Organizational Variation 34
Summary 41
Chapter 3: Th e Shadow Market 43
Disagreements about Contested Elections 47
Who Invites Whom? 54
Discussion 56
Chapter 4: What Infl uences Monitors' Assessments? 59
Analyzing Summary Monitor Assessments 60
Five Types of Bias 63
Discussion 75
Chapter 5: Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism? 77
What Constitutes Evidence of a Monitor- Induced Shift ? 78
What Are the Safer Forms of Cheating? 80
Data: Th e Varieties of Irregularities 82
The Record 84
Discussion 92
PART II
Chapter 6: International Monitors as Reinforcement 97
Altering Incentives to Cheat 99
Altering Domestic Conditions 104
If It Works, When Should It Work? 107
Summary 109
Chapter 7: Are Monitored Elections Better? 112
Measures of Election Quality 112
An Overview of the Record 115
Statistical Analysis 121
Discussion 129
Chapter 8: Long- Term Eff ects 131
Selection of Countries and Method of Analysis 133
Do International Monitors Improve Elections Over Time? 136
When Do Countries Follow the Recommendations of International Monitors? 141
Discussion 151
Conclusion: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 155
Do Monitors Assess Elections Accurately and Objectively? 156
Do Monitors Improve the Quality of Elections? 166
Closing Th oughts 176
Appendix A: Data Description 181
Two Datasets 181
Variables 184
Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3 195
Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4 197
Dependent Variable 197
Analysis 197
Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7 199
with Mark Buntaine
Additional Description of Matching Process 199
Appendix E: Case Summaries 211
with Kiril Kolev
Albania: Th e Importance of Leverage 211
Armenia: Paper Compliance 214
Bangladesh: Slowly but Surely? 218
Bulgaria: Motivated but Slow 221
El Salvador: International Meddling for Both Good and Bad 223
Georgia: Not So Rosy 228
Guyana: Uphill Battle 232
Indonesia: A Sluggish Behemoth 237
Kenya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back 242
Lesotho: Deadlock 245
Mexico: Constructive Engagement 247
Nicaragua: Excessive Meddling and Deal Making 252
Panama: Both a Will and a Way 256
Russia: Goliath Beats David 258
South Africa: Remarkably Unremarkable 261
Notes 265
References 293
Index 321
Tables xiii
Preface xv
Abbreviations xix
PART I
Chapter 1: Introduction 3
Two Questions 6
Methods of Analysis 12
Chapter 2: Th e Rise of a New Norm 16
The Changing Normative Environment 21
Contestation 23
Increased Supply and Demand 26
The Popularization of Monitoring 28
Monitoring Today: Organizational Variation 34
Summary 41
Chapter 3: Th e Shadow Market 43
Disagreements about Contested Elections 47
Who Invites Whom? 54
Discussion 56
Chapter 4: What Infl uences Monitors' Assessments? 59
Analyzing Summary Monitor Assessments 60
Five Types of Bias 63
Discussion 75
Chapter 5: Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism? 77
What Constitutes Evidence of a Monitor- Induced Shift ? 78
What Are the Safer Forms of Cheating? 80
Data: Th e Varieties of Irregularities 82
The Record 84
Discussion 92
PART II
Chapter 6: International Monitors as Reinforcement 97
Altering Incentives to Cheat 99
Altering Domestic Conditions 104
If It Works, When Should It Work? 107
Summary 109
Chapter 7: Are Monitored Elections Better? 112
Measures of Election Quality 112
An Overview of the Record 115
Statistical Analysis 121
Discussion 129
Chapter 8: Long- Term Eff ects 131
Selection of Countries and Method of Analysis 133
Do International Monitors Improve Elections Over Time? 136
When Do Countries Follow the Recommendations of International Monitors? 141
Discussion 151
Conclusion: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 155
Do Monitors Assess Elections Accurately and Objectively? 156
Do Monitors Improve the Quality of Elections? 166
Closing Th oughts 176
Appendix A: Data Description 181
Two Datasets 181
Variables 184
Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3 195
Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4 197
Dependent Variable 197
Analysis 197
Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7 199
with Mark Buntaine
Additional Description of Matching Process 199
Appendix E: Case Summaries 211
with Kiril Kolev
Albania: Th e Importance of Leverage 211
Armenia: Paper Compliance 214
Bangladesh: Slowly but Surely? 218
Bulgaria: Motivated but Slow 221
El Salvador: International Meddling for Both Good and Bad 223
Georgia: Not So Rosy 228
Guyana: Uphill Battle 232
Indonesia: A Sluggish Behemoth 237
Kenya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back 242
Lesotho: Deadlock 245
Mexico: Constructive Engagement 247
Nicaragua: Excessive Meddling and Deal Making 252
Panama: Both a Will and a Way 256
Russia: Goliath Beats David 258
South Africa: Remarkably Unremarkable 261
Notes 265
References 293
Index 321
