Forgetting How to Win
The U.S. Army, State Department, and Usaid in Modern Post-Combat Operations
1st Edition
Published on 16. October 2025
224 pages
979-8-7651-4230-1 (ISBN)
Description
By examining how three American national security institutions (the U.S. Army, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development) adapted to address unexpected and unfamiliar post-combat crises, this book reveals the four shared techniques which led to their success.
Focusing on topics such as crisis response, adaptation, pragmatic policy solutions, and personal relationships, Jeremy Kasper introduces four pivotal case studies which examine how national security institutions responded to post-combat operations in Grenada, Panama, Kosovo, and Afghanistan between 1983-2008.
This book gives a key account of the soldiers, diplomats, and foreign aid practitioners who responded to unexpected crises during post-conflict reconstruction - a dynamic, unfamiliar, and complex mission far outside their respective organization's core mission. Focusing on how bureaucracies struggled to apply the diplomatic, military, and economic dimensions of national power in pursuit of U.S. policy goals, this book ultimately exposes institutional forgetfulness, such that hard-won lessons did little to shape subsequent crises.
Focusing on topics such as crisis response, adaptation, pragmatic policy solutions, and personal relationships, Jeremy Kasper introduces four pivotal case studies which examine how national security institutions responded to post-combat operations in Grenada, Panama, Kosovo, and Afghanistan between 1983-2008.
This book gives a key account of the soldiers, diplomats, and foreign aid practitioners who responded to unexpected crises during post-conflict reconstruction - a dynamic, unfamiliar, and complex mission far outside their respective organization's core mission. Focusing on how bureaucracies struggled to apply the diplomatic, military, and economic dimensions of national power in pursuit of U.S. policy goals, this book ultimately exposes institutional forgetfulness, such that hard-won lessons did little to shape subsequent crises.
More details
Series
Edition
1. Auflage
Language
English
Place of publication
United States
Publishing group
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
Target group
College/higher education
ISBN-13
979-8-7651-4230-1 (9798765142301)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Jeremy Kasper
Forgetting How to Win
The U.S. Army, State Department, and USAID in Modern Post-Combat Operations
Book
11/2025
Bloomsbury Academic USA
€113.80
Shipment within 10-20 days
Person
Jeremy Kasper is an active-duty Lieutenant Colonel and Deputy Director of Strategy and Plans, Joint Special Operations Command, U.S. Army, USA. He received his PhD from the LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas-Austin, USA.
Content
Introduction
1. Grenada (1983-1985)
2. Panama (1989-1994)
3. Kosovo (1999-2008)
4. Afghanistan (2001-2008)
5. Conclusion and Afterword
Bibliography
Index
1. Grenada (1983-1985)
2. Panama (1989-1994)
3. Kosovo (1999-2008)
4. Afghanistan (2001-2008)
5. Conclusion and Afterword
Bibliography
Index
