
Fast Software Encryption
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Content
- Title
- Preface
- Organization
- Table of Contents
- Differential Cryptanalysis
- Differential Cryptanalysis of Round-Reduced PRINTcipher: Computing Roots of Permutations
- Introduction
- A Short Description of PRINTcipher
- Using Differential Cryptanalysis to Recover the Permutation Key
- Optimal Differential Characteristic
- Targeting the xor Key
- Targeting the Linear Layer
- Finding (PRINTcipher)-Roots of a Permutation
- The General Case
- PRINTcipher-Roots
- Experimental Verifications
- Conclusions
- References
- Search for Related-Key Differential Characteristics in DES-Like Ciphers
- Introduction
- Description of DES-Like Block Ciphers
- Automatic Search for Related-Key Differential Characteristics in DES-Like Ciphers
- Matsui's Approach for Single-Key Characteristics
- Applying Matsui's Approach for Related-Key Characteristics
- The Split Approach
- The Case of DES
- The Case of DESL
- The Case of s2DES
- Conclusions
- References
- Multiple Differential Cryptanalysis: Theory and Practice
- Introduction
- Theoretical Framework
- Presentation and Notation
- Time and Memory Complexities
- Theoretical Framework
- Data Complexity and Success Probability
- Application to Known Differential Cryptanalyses
- Experimental Validation
- Description of PRESENT and SMALLPRESENT-[s]
- Experimental Validation of the Obtained Formulas
- On the Estimations of the Probabilities p and p*
- Application to PRESENT
- Conclusions
- References
- Invited Talk
- Fast Correlation Attacks: Methods and Countermeasures
- Introduction
- Correlation Attacks
- Fast Correlation Attacks
- Towards Correlation Immunity
- Combiners with Memory
- Linear Attacks
- Open Problems
- References
- Hash Functions I
- Analysis of Reduced-SHAvite-3-256 v2
- Introduction
- The SHAvite-3-256 Hash Function
- The Block Cipher E256
- The Message Expansion
- Rebound and Super-Sbox Analysis of SHAvite-3-256
- The Cryptanalyst Tool 1: The Truncated Differential Path
- The Cryptanalyst Tool 2: The Freedom Degrees
- Super-Sbox Attacks for Reduced SHAvite-3-256
- Chosen-Related-Salt Distinguishers
- 7-Round Distinguisher with 27 Computations
- 8-Round Distinguisher with 225 Computations
- Conclusion
- References
- An Improved Algebraic Attack on Hamsi-256
- Introduction
- Description of Hamsi-256
- A Direct Attack on Hamsi-256
- The Properties and Weaknesses of Hamsi-256 Which Are Exploited by the Attack
- Analysis of Polynomials of Degree 6 in 32 Variables
- Efficiently Eliminating Wrong Messages
- Improving the Direct Attack by Using Pseudo Preimages
- The Polynomial Analysis Algorithm
- The Query Algorithm
- Post Filtering the Solutions
- Finding a Good Sequence of Analyzed Bits
- Details of the Pseudo Preimage Attack on Hamsi-256
- Using Pseudo Preimages to Obtain Second Preimages for Hamsi-256
- Second Preimages for Longer Messages of Hamsi-256
- Conclusions
- References
- Practical Near-Collisions and Collisions on Round-Reduced ECHO-256 Compression Function
- Introduction
- Description of ECHO
- Differential Attack for Hash Functions
- Reordering of Transformations in the ECHO Permutation
- Truncated Differential Path
- Finding a Message Pair Conforming to the Differential Path
- Overview of the Attack
- Collision on the 4-Round Compression Function
- Partial Message Pair for the First Subpart
- Finding a Message Pair for the Second Subpart
- Completing the Partial Message Pair of the First Subpart
- Compression Phase in the Feed Forward
- Final Merging Phase
- Conclusion
- References
- Security and Models
- On Cipher-Dependent Related-Key Attacks in the Ideal-Cipher Model
- Introduction
- Notation and Related-Key Attacks
- A Generic Cipher-Dependent Attack
- RKD Functions with Access to E and E-1
- Interpretations in the Standard Model
- References
- On the Security of Hash Functions Employing Blockcipher Postprocessing
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Hash Function with Output Transformation E(x)x
- Computability
- PRO Analysis of a Hash Function with OT E(x)x
- Application of Theorem 1: PRO Analysis of a Variant of Grøstl
- PRO Analysis of Hash Functions with PGV Output Transformations
- PRO Attacks on Hash Functions with Some DBL Output Transformations
- The Case of OT(x)=f(x)||f(xp)
- PRO Attack with OT(x)=Fi(x) for i=8, 12, (Fig. 3)
- Conclusion
- References
- Stream Ciphers
- Breaking Grain-128 with Dynamic Cube Attacks
- Introduction
- Cube Attacks and Cube Testers
- Cube Attacks
- Cube Testers
- A Simple Example of Dynamic Cube Attacks
- Dynamic Cube Attacks on Grain-128
- Description on Grain-128
- Previous Attacks
- Outline of the New Attacks on Grain-128
- Details of the First Attack
- A Partial Simulation Phase
- A Generic Key Recovery Method
- Details of the Second Attack
- Details of the Third Attack
- Discussion
- Generalizing the Attack
- Conclusions and Open Issues
- References
- Cryptanalysis of the Knapsack Generator
- Introduction
- Previous Cryptanalytic Results
- Contribution of This Paper
- Road Map
- Problem Formalization
- A System of Modular Equations
- Weight Approximation Matrices
- Prediction with Approximate Weights
- Finding Good Approximation Matrices
- Description of the Attack and Empirical Results
- Description of the Attack
- Practical Attack for n=32
- Empirical Results for Larger n
- Analysis of the Fast Knapsack Generator
- The Fast Generator over Prime Fields
- The Fast Generator Modulo 2n
- Discussion
- References
- Attack on Broadcast RC4 Revisited
- Introduction
- Bytes 3 to 255 of PRGA are Biased to Zero
- A Class of New Distinguishers
- A Critical Analysis of the Event (zr = 0) Given jr = or =0
- Guessing State Information Using the Bias in zr
- Attacking the RC4 Broadcast Scheme
- Non-randomness of j in PRGA
- Non-randomness of j1
- Non-randomness of j2
- Randomness of jr for r 3
- Conclusion
- References
- Hash Functions II
- Boomerang Attacks on BLAKE-32
- Introduction
- Description of BLAKE32
- Boomerang Attacks on Block Ciphers and Compression Functions
- Round-Reduced Differential Trails in BLAKE-32
- Boomerang Attacks on the Compression Function of BLAKE-32
- Boomerang Attacks on the Keyed Permutation of BLAKE-32
- Conclusions
- References
- Practical Near-Collisions on the Compression Function of BMW
- Introduction
- Compression Function Attacks
- Description of BMW
- Previous Results
- Our Results
- Solving a System of Additions and Xor
- Using Collisions in f0
- Collisions in f0 with Some Words of H Inactive
- Using Partial-Collisions in f0
- Using Near Collisions in AddElement
- Conclusion
- References
- Higher-Order Differential Properties of Keccak and Luffa
- Introduction
- A New Bound on the Degree of Some Iterated Permutations
- Distinguishing Properties Related to the Algebraic Degree
- Higher-Order Derivatives
- Zero-Sum Structures
- Application to the Keccak-f Permutation
- The Keccak-f Permutation
- Zero-Sum Partitions for the Full Keccak-f Permutation
- Application to the Hash Function Luffa
- The Luffa Hash Function
- Algebraic Degree of the Qj Permutation and Its Inverse
- Higher-Order Differentials for the Compression Function of Luffa v2
- Zero-Sum Partitions for the Qj Permutations
- Higher-Order Differentials for the Full Luffa v1 Hash Function
- Degree of the Full Luffa v2 Hash Function with Chosen IVs
- Conclusions
- References
- Block Ciphers and Modes
- Cryptanalysis of PRESENT-Like Ciphers with Secret S-Boxes
- Introduction
- The Cipher
- Principle of the Attack
- Relaxed Truncated Differentials
- The Attack in Practice
- Data Collection Phase
- S-Box Recovery Phase
- Case Study: The Block Cipher Maya
- Model for the Complexity of Recovering Sets De
- Extensions
- Linear Cryptanalysis
- Fully Random PRESENT-Like Ciphers
- Conclusion
- References
- A Single-Key Attack on the Full GOST Block Cipher
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Description of GOST
- 3-Subset MITM Attack
- Reflection Attack
- Reflection-Meet-in-the-Middle Attack
- Details of the R-MITM Attack
- Evaluation of the R-MITM Attack
- R-MITM Attack on the Full GOST Block Cipher
- Reflection Property of GOST
- Effective MITM Technique Using Equivalent Keys on Short Rounds
- Evaluation
- Conclusion
- References
- The Software Performance of Authenticated-Encryption Modes
- Introduction
- The Mode OCB3
- Experimental Results
- Proof of Security for OCB3
- Stretch-then-Shift Universal Hash
- The TBC-Based Generalization of OCB3
- Instantiating the TBC
- References
- Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis
- Cryptanalysis of Hummingbird-1
- Introduction
- Description of Hummingbird-1
- Notation and Parameters
- The 16-Bit Permutation E
- Initialization
- The Encryption Function
- Building an Attack
- An Iterative Differential
- Attacking K(1)
- Attacking K(4)
- Attacking K(3)
- Attacking K(2)
- Discussion
- Implementing the Attack
- Lessons Learned
- Conclusions
- References
- The Additive Differential Probability of ARX
- Introduction
- Definition of adp$\ll$
- Computation of adp$\bigoplus$ Using S-Functions
- Definition of adp$ARX$
- Computation of adp$ARX$
- The Initial State
- The Final State
- A Special Intermediate State
- Computing adp$ARX$
- Proof of Correctness
- Experiments
- Conclusions
- References
- Linear Approximations of Addition Modulo 2n-1
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Linear Approximation and Its Correlation
- Linear Approximations of the Addition Modulo 2n
- Some Properties on Linear Approximations of the Addition Modulo 2n-1
- Addition of Two Inputs in F2n-1
- Addition of More than Two Inputs in F2n-1
- More Properties of Linear Approximations of the Addition Modulo 2n-1 with Two Inputs
- The Limit of cor(1
- 1k) for the Addition in F2n-1 when n
- Conclusion
- References
- Hash Functions III
- Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks on AES Hashing Modes and an Application to Whirlpool
- Introduction
- Specifications
- Previous Work
- Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks
- Previous Analysis on AES
- Basic Idea of Our Attack and Techniques for Extension
- Basic Attack for 4-Round AES
- Techniques for Attacking More Rounds
- Preimage Attack against 7-Round AES
- Discussion
- Concluding Remarks
- References
- Known-Key Distinguishers on 11-Round Feistel and Collision Attacks on Its Hashing Modes
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Previous and Related Work
- Basic Notions
- Rebound-Attack Technique
- New Known-Key Attacks on Feistel Ciphers
- Basic 9R Attack on the Feistel Ciphers
- Extended 11R Attack on the Feistel Ciphers
- ``Shrunken'' 9R Attack: Case (N,c)=(64,8)
- Application to MMO and Miyaguchi-Preneel Modes
- Eleven-Round Half-Collision Attack
- Nine-Round Full-Collision Attack
- Nine-Round Near-Collision Attack: Case (N,c)=(64,8)
- Seven-Round Full-Collision Attack: Case (N,c)=(64,8)
- Generality of Our Known-Key Distinguishers
- When S-Boxes Are Biased
- When P Is Not an MDS Matrix
- When 2c&r
- Conclusion
- References
- Author Index
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