Performance-Based Contracts (PBC) for Improving Utilities Efficiency

Name: Performance-Based Contracts (PBC) for Improving Utilities Efficiency
Brand: IWA Publishing
Price: 117.99 EUR
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Jan Janssens Didier Carron Philippe Marin Philip Giantris Tom Williams(Author)

IWA Publishing

Published on 15. August 2018

200 pages

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978-1-78040-596-4 (ISBN)

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Content

Cover
Copyright
Contents
Principal Authors
Contributing Authors
Preface
Chapter 1: Performance-based contracts - setting the scene
1.1 Introduction - PBCs and PPPs
1.1.1 Specificity of PBCs
1.1.2 Legal framework
1.1.3 Designing a PBC
1.2 References
Chapter 2: PBC and results-based financing: The inverse approach
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The Direct Problem
2.3 The Inverse Problem
2.4 Case Study
2.5 Conclusion
2.6 References
Chapter 3: PBC and energy efficiency
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Energy Savings from Pumping
3.3 Other Energy Efficiency (EE) Possibilities
3.4 Performance-Based Contracts For Energy Efficiency
3.5 Designing and Implementing an EE Performance-Based Contract
3.6 Case Studies
3.6.1 Yerevan (Armenia)
3.6.2 Emfuleni (South Africa)
3.6.3 Larger contracts including an EE performance based component
3.6.4 Milwaukee
3.6.5 Lynn
3.7 References
Chapter 4: Internal performance contracts: A case of the National Water and Sewerage Corporation in Uganda
4.1 Introduction: Why this Chapter?
4.2 IPCs at NWSC: Identity Card
4.3 Prerequisites for IPC Successful Implementation: Strong Foundations and Competition with the Private Sector
4.4 IPCs: An Integral Part of an Organisational Structure, A Management Style and an Organisational Culture
4.4.1 Key 1: Making managers accountable
4.4.2 Key 2: Motivate the staff
4.4.3 Key 3: Monitor and evaluate performance
4.4.4 Key 4: Manage resistance to change
4.5 IPCs: Only Constant is Change
4.5.1 Find the right balance between individual and collective incentive mechanism
4.5.2 Adjust the definition of performance over time
4.5.3 Find the right balance between control and confidence
4.5.4 Keep motivation high
4.6 Conclusion
4.7 Note
4.8 References
Chapter 5: Performance-based service contracts in Navi Mumbai
5.1 Overview
5.1.1 Context
5.1.2 Current service delivery
5.1.3 Water supply management
5.2 The Performance-Based Contract Design
5.2.1 Overall nature of the PBC
5.2.2 Analysis of the contract structure
5.2.3 The procurement process
5.2.4 Performance monitoring
5.3 Implementation and Results Achieved
5.3.1 Results achieved
5.3.2 Sustainability
5.4 Lessons Drawn
5.5 References
Chapter 6: Financial comparison of NRW PBCs and conventional NRW projects
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Methodology
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Project effectiveness
6.3.2 Project cost efficiency
6.3.3 Financial comparison
6.4 Conclusions
Chapter 7: Tegucigalpa PBC case study
7.1 Context: How The PBC Came About
7.2 The Design of The PBC
7.2.1 Overall nature of the PBC
7.2.2 Analysis of the contract structure
7.2.3 The procurement/tender process
7.3 Implementation and Results Achieved
7.4 Lessons Drawn
7.5 References
Chapter 8: Performance-based contracts - key design Issues
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Activities where PBCs are Typically Used
8.3 External Factors that can Influence Design of the Contract
8.4 Parties to the Contract
8.5 Scope of the Contract and PBC Contractor Obligations
8.6 Obligations of the Contracting Authority
8.6.1 Monitoring and supervision
8.6.2 Duration and sustainability of contract
8.6.3 Fees and incentives
8.6.4 Dispute resolution
8.6.5 Early termination
8.6.6 Procurement
8.7 Acknowledgements
8.8 Other Resources
Chapter 9: NRW reduction optimization framework
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Optimizing Physical Losses
9.2.1 The point at which physical losses are optimized
9.2.2 Deriving the supply curve for physical loss reduction
9.2.3 The various benefits of physical loss reduction
9.2.4 Estimating the value of deferred capital costs
9.3 Optimizing for Service
9.3.1 The interaction between physical losses and hours of supply
9.3.2 Valuing benefits from increased duration of supply and increased access
9.4 Optimizing Commercial Losses
9.5 A General Optimization Framework
9.6 Conclusions
9.7 Note
9.8 References
Chapter 10: How to improve water services performance
10.1 Introduction
10.2 A Strong Water and Sanitation Governance
10.3 A Smart PBC Design
10.3.1 Baselines, targets and incentives
10.3.2 Ensure mitigation of risks and leave room for flexibility
10.3.3 Develop an integrated approach
10.4 A Resilient Economic Model
10.4.1 Enhanced financial sustainability
10.4.2 A sustainable territorial anchorage
10.5 Conclusion
10.6 References
Chapter 11: Performance-based contracts (PBC) and regulatory issues
11.1 Background
11.2 Monitoring and Evaluating Utilities
11.2.1 Building information systems with key performance indicators (KPIs) that enable regulators to monitor, and evaluate operators
11.2.2 Setting performance targets and monitoring performance with limited data
11.2.3 Developing incentives for quality improvements, cost containment and network/service expansion
Chapter 12: Peer-to-peer partnerships operational for sustainable water services
12.1 Introduction
12.2 The Water Operator Partnership
12.3 Components of an Operational Partnership
12.3.1 Preparing a WOP
12.3.2 Incentives: yes or no?
12.3.3 Priority setting in performance improvement
12.3.4 Conditional factors for WOP success
12.4 Summary and Recommendations
12.5 References
Chapter 13: Performance-based contracts in Malawi: Teamwork works
13.1 The Context: How the PBC Came About
13.2 The Design of the PBC
13.2.1 Overall nature of the PBC
13.2.2 What is the PBC about?
13.3 Performance Contract Design
13.3.1 Services to be provided
13.3.2 The remuneration structure
13.3.3 Performance regime: a "stick and carrot" approach
13.4 The Procurement/Tender Process
13.4.1 The pre-qualification stage
13.4.2 The proposal stage
13.5 Implementation and Results Achieved
13.5.1 The "office" phase
13.5.2 The "operations" phase
13.5.3 The extension phase
13.5.4 Remuneration
13.6 Did the Contract Achieve and Sustain Results?
13.6.1 Internalities
13.6.2 Externalities
13.7 Reflections on Performance-Based Service Contracting
13.8 Acknowledgements
13.9 References
Chapter 14: Performance-based affermage contracts
14.1 The Basics of the Affermage Contract
14.2 Differences and Similarities Between the Affermage and Other Operations Contracts
14.3 Affermage Contracts from the 19th Century Until Today In France
14.4 The Way to a Second Generation of Affermage Contracts
14.5 The Performance-Based Affermage (PBA) Model
14.6 The Earning Logic
14.7 Technical Performance Indicators
14.8 Financial Performance Indicators
14.9 Case Study: The Sedif
14.10 Sedif: Return of Experience 2011-2013
14.11 Conclusion
14.12 References
Chapter 15: Performance-based contracts, the Aroona Integrated Alliance experience
15.1 Case Study Detail
15.1.1 The Aroona Integrated Alliance to deliver improvements in water and wastewater services
15.1.2 A commercial framework set up to generate the right behaviour
15.1.3 Alliance governance
15.1.4 The "good to great" strategy to deliver a step change
15.1.5 A governance model is in place to ensure business improvements are sustainable
15.1.6 A Business improvement program designed to deliver sustainable cost efficiencies
15.1.7 The cultural and the change management challenge
15.1.8 Main achievements two years after the Good to Great strategy inception
15.2 Conclusion
Chapter 16: Experience from Eastern Europe
Chapter 17: Performance-based contracts (PBCs) for improving utilities efficiency: Experiences and perspectives: The way forward and perspectives/trends
17.1 Summary of Discussions of 31 October 2016
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Performance-Based Contracts (PBC) for Improving Utilities Efficiency

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