Auctioning Public Assets
Analysis and Alternatives
1st Edition
Published on 30. April 2006
978-0-511-16278-7 (ISBN)
Description
In many countries all over the world, governments are privatising firms that were previously under public control. This is happening, for example, in public utility sectors such as gas, water and electricity, in transport sectors (such as rail and metro) and in radio and telephony. This book provides an overview of the economic issues that are involved in this transfer of ownership of public assets. Combining a theoretical framework with a set of case studies of recent sales of state-owned assets from Europe and the USA, it asks which sort of allocation mechanism can a government adopt? Which is most suited to a particular sale? And how will the choice of allocation mechanism affect future market outcomes? With contributions from international experts, this book offers an accessible introduction to auction theory and an invaluable, non-technical analysis of existing knowledge. It will be of interest to students, non-specialists and policy-makers alike.
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Publishing group
Cambridge University Press
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
20 Tables, unspecified; 15 Line drawings, unspecified
File size
1,95 MB
ISBN-13
978-0-511-16278-7 (9780511162787)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Book
01/2004
Cambridge University Press
€120.08
No shipping information available
Book
01/2004
Cambridge University Press
€57.00
Article not available at the moment
Person
Maarten Janssen is a Professor of Microeconomics at Erasmus University Rotterdam. His main research interests are in game theory and the economics of information. His research has focused on coordination games, consumer search and adverse selection. He has been advising firms and government bodies on issues related to market structure.
Content
Introduction Maarten Janssen; Part I. Theory: 1. Auction theory for auction design Tilman Boergers and Eric van Damme; 2. Beauty contest design Maurice Dykstra and Nico van der Windt; 3. Preventing collusion between firms in auctions Tim Salmon; 4. Levelling the playing field in auctions and the prohibition of state aid Emiel Maasland, Yves Montangie and Roger van der Bergh; 5. Allocation mechanisms and post-allocation interaction Maarten Janssen and Benny Moldovanu; Part II. Case Studies: 6. Spectrum auctions by the United States Federal Communications Commission Tim Salmon; 7. An analysis of the European 3G licensing process Emiel Maasland and Benny Moldovanu; 8. Auctions to gas transmission access; the British experience Karsten Neuhoff and Tanga McDaniel; 9. The design of treasury bond auctions - some case studies Tilman Boergers and Joseph Swierzbinski; 10. Matching markets Benny Moldovanu; 11. Competitive procurement of reintegration services in the Netherlands Maurice Dykstra and Jaap de Koning; 12. Case study: the provision of rail services Luisa Affuso and David Newbery.
