
Game Theory for Networks
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Content
- Title
- Preface
- Organization
- Table of Contents
- Session A1: Mechanism Design
- Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing
- Introduction
- Model
- Welfare Maximization
- Revenue Maximization
- Conclusion
- References
- Hierarchical Auctions for Network Resource Allocation
- Introduction
- Model and Problem Statement
- The Hierarchical Model
- The Mechanism Design Framework
- Hierarchical Auctions for Indivisible Resources
- Hierarchical Auctions for Divisible Resources
- Conclusion
- References
- Local Public Good Provision in Networks: A Nash Implementation Mechanism
- Introduction
- Literature Survey
- Contribution of the Paper
- The Local Public Good Provision Problem
- The Network Model (M)
- The Decentralized Local Public Good Provision Problem (PD)
- A Decentralized Local Public Good Provision Mechanism
- The Game Form
- Properties of the Game Form
- Future Directions
- References
- Session A2: Physical Layer Games
- Channel Assignment on Wireless Mesh Network Backbone with Potential Game Approach
- Introduction
- Related Works
- Interference Model
- Interference Factor
- Modeling Channel Assignment Game
- Performance Evaluation
- NE and Better Response
- Random Topology
- NPOCA and HMCP
- Conclusion
- References
- Game Based Self-Organizing Scheme for Femtocell Networks
- Introduction
- Self-Organizing Femtocell Network
- Modeling of Femtocell Network
- Potential Game for SON Operation
- Operation of the Proposed SON Scheme
- Tabu Search Extended Game Algorithm
- Performance Evaluation
- Conclusion
- References
- Additively Coupled Sum Constrained Games
- Introduction
- GameModel
- Strategic Games, Nash Equilibrium, and Pareto Optimality
- Additively Coupled Sum Constrained Games
- Issues Related to ACSCG
- Scenario I: No Message Exchange among Users
- Properties of Best Response Dynamics in ACSCG
- Extensions to General fkn(·)
- Scenario II: Message Exchange among Users
- Gradient Play
- Jacobi Update
- Conclusion
- References
- Session B1: Network Neutrality and Regulation
- Technology Choices and Pricing Policies in Wireless Networks
- Introduction
- Related Work
- SystemModel
- The Service Provider
- Users
- Problem Formulation
- Two Simple Scenarios
- CSMA with Subscription Fee Only
- TDMA with Subscription Fee and Per-bit Surcharge
- Numerical Simulation
- Conclusion
- References
- Network Regulations and Market Entry
- Introduction
- Model
- Analysis
- Analysis of the Subgame G(M,N)
- The Entry Game G
- User Welfare and Social Welfare
- Numerical Analysis
- Conclusions
- References
- Bandwidth Exchange for Fair Secondary Coexistence in TV White Space
- Introduction
- System Model and Bandwidth Exchange
- System Model
- Bandwidth Exchange
- Database Assisted Nash Bargaining for Bandwidth Exchange
- Using Database to Obtain Bargaining Parameters
- Effect of Existence of Other Users
- Pairwise Nash Bargaining Solution
- Performance Improvement
- Numerical Results
- Simulation Model
- Simulation Results
- Conclusion and Discussions
- References
- Net Neutrality and Quality of Service
- Introduction
- Overview
- New Indicators of Quality of Service Needed
- The Involvement of End-Users in Determining Policies in France
- Duration and Timing
- The Impact of the Government Position
- Taxation Issues
- Incentives for Investments
- Mathematical Modeling of Network Neutrality Issues
- Conclusions of the Models at a Glance
- Literature Survey
- Conclusion
- References
- Session B2: Network Mechanisms
- The Sharing-Mart System: Digital Content Sharing, Online Auctions, and Incentives
- Introduction
- Sharing-Mart System
- Experimental Designs
- Subject Recruitment
- Game Description
- Experimental Results
- Incentivizing User Cooperation
- Application Settings
- Computing CTV
- Computing SIPT
- Future Experiments
- Conclusion
- References
- Selfish Random Access: Equilibrium Conditions and Best-Response Learning
- Introduction
- Background and Contributions
- Related Work
- SystemModel
- Equilibrium Contention Resolution Strategies: General Wireless Channels
- Applications and Discussion
- Selfish Random Access over Imperfect Collision Channels
- Selfish Random Access for T-Out-of-N Channels
- Imperfect Information Random Access Games
- Conclusions
- References
- Multi-portfolio Optimization: A Potential Game Approach
- Introduction
- Problem Formulation
- Potential Game and Its Characterizations
- Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem
- Discussions and Conclusions
- References
- Session C1: Stochastic and Dynamic Games
- Analyzing the Dynamics of Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on Structured Networks
- Introduction
- Game Model and Evolutionary Dynamics
- Micro Level Analysis
- Expected Value of Payoff Difference
- Evolutionary Advantage of Nodes
- Simulation Results
- Conclusion and Future Directions
- References
- Spatio-temporal Control for Dynamic Routing Games
- Introduction
- Dynamic Game with Fixed Demand
- Non-atomic Routing Games
- Atomic Routing Games
- Global Optimum
- Stochastic Congestion Game
- Motivating Examples
- Model
- Equilibrium and Properties
- Linear Programming
- Symmetric Users
- Stochastic Congestion Game with Fixed Demand
- Equilibrium Strategies
- Conclusion
- References
- Designing Incentive Schemes Based on Intervention: The Case of Imperfect Monitoring
- Introduction
- Framework for the Design of Intervention Schemes
- Intervention Schemes in a Slotted Multiaccess Communication Network
- Model
- Formulation of the Design Problem
- Analysis of the Design Problem
- Conclusion
- References
- Session C2: Security Games I
- How to Choose Communication Links in an Adversarial Environment?
- Introduction
- Model
- Critical Subsets
- Critical Subset Attack Theorem
- Analyzing the NE Theorem
- Proof of the Critical Subset Attack Theorem
- Best Responses
- Existence of the Equilibrium Distribution a
- Enumerating All Nash Equilibria
- Conclusion and Future Work
- References
- Adversary Games in Secure/Reliable Network Routing
- Introduction
- Motivation
- Notations
- The (One Commodity, One Edge)-Problem
- Reduction to the Max-flow Min-cut Problem
- Algorithm
- The(k Commodities, One Edge)-Problem
- The (2 Commodities, c Edges)-Problem
- Budgeted Attacks: Costs on Edges
- Conclusions
- References
- A Network Security Classification Game
- Introduction
- Basic Model
- Summary of Analysis and Results
- Related Work
- Detailed Model
- Cost Functions of Defender and Spy
- Assumed Behavior of Spammer and Spy
- Commit to N Game
- Defender's Best Response
- Spy's Best Response
- Numerical Experiments
- Dynamic N Game
- Defender's Best Response
- Spy's Best Response
- Numerical Experiments
- Conclusion
- References
- Session D1: Algorithmic Game Theory and Learning
- Convergence Dynamics of Resource-Homogeneous Congestion Games
- Introduction
- The Model
- Convergence Time to a Nash Equilibrium
- The Fastest Convergence
- Average Fastest Convergence from Random Initial Conditions
- The Slowest Convergence
- Average Convergence, with Random Better Response Switches
- Spatial Variations on Our Models
- Application: Cognitive Radio Networking
- The Significance of Previous Results
- Modeling the Dynamic Radio Environment
- Conclusion
- References
- Bottleneck Routing Games on Grids
- Introduction
- Contributions
- Impact of Games with Small Number of Bends
- Related Work
- Definitions
- BasicGame
- Channel Game
- Price of Anarchy Analysis for Channel Game
- Split Game
- Price of Anarchy Analysis for Split Game
- Split Game in the d-Dimensional Grid
- Lower Bounds
- Conclusions
- References
- Optimal Price of Anarchy of Polynomial and Super-Polynomial Bottleneck Congestion Games
- Introduction
- Contributions
- Related Work
- Definitions
- Type-B to Type-A Game Transformation
- PriceofAnarchy
- Price of Anarchy for Type-A Player Games
- Lower Bounds on Price of Anarchy
- Conclusions
- References
- Performance and Convergence of Multi-user Online Learning
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Allocations Achievable with Exp3 Algorithm (Case 1)
- An Algorithm for Socially Optimal Allocation with Sub-linear Regret (Case 2)
- An Algorithm for Socially Optimal Allocation (Case 3)
- Conclusion
- References
- Session D2: Game-Theoretic Network Models
- Incentivizing Upload Capacity in P2P-VoDSystems: A Game Theoretic Analysis
- Introduction
- System Model and Reward-Based Scheme
- Peers' Viewing Behavior
- Reward-Based Incentive Scheme
- Peers' Contribution and Content Provider's Cost
- Distribution of Peers in Different Video Segments
- Content Provider's Upload Cost
- Game Theoretic Analysis on Incentive Scheme
- Stackelberg Game Model
- Existence and Uniqueness of Stackelberg Equilibrium
- Efficiency of Stackelberg Equilibrium
- General Reward Scheme
- Performance Evaluation
- Related Work
- Conclusion
- References
- Service Routing in Multi-ISP Peer-to-Peer Content Distribution: Local or Remote?
- Introduction
- Related Work
- Contribution and Content
- Single Transient Swarm
- Stochastic System Model
- Delay Calculation Using the Fluid Model
- Single Swarm Optimization
- Stochastic Simulations of the Single Swarm
- Multiple Swarms: Collaboration or Competition?
- Proportional-Fairness Mechanism
- Definition of the Game
- Collaborative Scenario
- Multiplayer Game
- The Price of Anarchy
- Numerical Studies of the Game
- Conclusion
- References
- Bargaining and Peering between Network Content/Coverage Providers
- Introduction
- A Static Baseline Model
- Content Qualities and Subscribing Fees
- Users' Utilities
- Providers' Coverages and Revenues
- Content Procurement Strategies
- The Peering and Bargaining of Providers
- Peering Agreement
- Change of Coverage
- Providers' Revenues
- Nash Bargaining Problem
- Impact of Dynamic Content
- Conclusion and Future Work
- References
- Session E1: Cooperative Games in Networks
- Coalition Stability under QoS Based-Market Segmentation
- Introduction
- Game Description
- Relationship between Two Providers
- Case of Two Providers
- Case of Three Providers
- Can Cooperation Emerge in Case of n Providers?
- Generalization of the Game Resolution to n Providers
- Stability of the Shapley Value as a Revenue Sharing Mechanism
- Conclusion
- References
- On the Shapley-Like Payoff Mechanisms in Peer-Assisted Services with Multiple Content Providers
- Introduction
- Preliminaries
- Game with Coalition Structure
- Shapley Value and Aumann-Dr`eze Value
- Axiomatic Characterizations of Values
- Coalition Game in Peer-Assisted Services
- Worth Function in Peer-Assisted Services
- Fluid Aumann-Dr`eze Value for Multiple-Provider Coalitions
- Instability of the Grand Coalition
- Stability of the Grand Coalition
- Convergence to the Grand Coalition
- A Critique of the A-D Payoff for Separate Providers
- Concluding Remarks
- References
- Economic Viability of Femtocell Service Provision
- Introduction
- Benchmark Scenario: Macrocell Service Only
- Users' Requests in Service and Bandwidth in Stage II
- Operator's Pricing in Stage I
- Provision of Femtocell Service
- Users' Requests in Service and Bandwidth in Stage II
- Operator's Spectrum Allocations and Pricing in Stage I
- Impact of Users' Reservation Payoffs
- Impact of Femtocell Operational Cost
- Conclusion
- References
- Session E2: Security Games II
- Jamming Game in a Dynamic Slotted ALOHA Network
- Introduction
- Organization of the Paper
- Model
- Numerical Illustrations
- MarkovALOHAGame
- Solution of Markov ALOHA Game
- A Particular Case: The Asymmetric Case
- Discussion and Extensions
- Appendix
- References
- Nash Equilibria for Weakest Target Security Games with Heterogeneous Agents
- Introduction
- Related Work
- Model
- Analysis
- No Pure Strategies
- Mixed Strategies
- Social Optimum: The Sacrificial Lamb
- Discussion
- Conclusion
- References
- Noisy Mean Field Game Model for Malware Propagation in Opportunistic Networks
- Introduction
- Controlled Mean Field Interaction Model
- Noisy Mean Field Approach
- Application to Malware Propagation
- Homogeneous System
- Heterogeneous System
- Optimal Strategy for the Homogeneous System
- Noisy Mean Field
- Effect of the System Size
- Concluding Remarks
- References
- Session F1: Incentives for Relaying
- The Impact of Incomplete Information on Games in Parallel Relay Networks
- Introduction
- Network Model and Problem Formulation
- Cost Function and Utility Function
- Socially Optimal Allocation
- Game Structure
- Games with Complete Information
- Games with Incomplete Information
- Efficiency Analysis
- Conclusion
- References
- Hierarchical Coalition Formation Game of Relay Transmission in IEEE 802.16m
- Introduction
- Related Works
- IEEE 802.16 Relay Networks
- Game Theory and Cooperative Communications
- System Model and Assumptions
- Network Model and Coalition Formation
- Relay Transmission
- Hierarchical Coalition Formation Game
- Hierarchical Coalition Formation Game
- Game Definition
- Stable Coalitional Structure
- Performance Evaluation
- Parameter Setting
- Numerical Results
- Summary
- References
- A Game-Theoretic Framework for Resource Allocation in IEEE 802.16j Transparent Relay Networks
- Introduction
- Dynamic Zone Partitioning Game
- Two-Stage Bargaining Game
- Utility Formulation for Two-Stage Bargaining
- Zone Partition
- Simulation Results and Analysis
- Conclusion
- References
- Session F2: Spectrum Sharing Games
- Dynamic Spectrum Negotiationwith Asymmetric Information
- Introduction
- PU-SU Negotiation and Cooperation Model
- One-Stage Bargaining Game
- Two-Stage Bargaining Game
- Type I PBE
- Type II PBE
- Numerical Results
- Conclusion
- References
- Evolution of Cooperation: A Case with Interference-Aware Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Networks
- Introduction
- SystemModel
- Spectrum Sensing Model
- Spectrum Sharing Model
- Interference-Aware Sensing Game
- Game Formulation
- Best Response
- Nash Equilibrium
- Social Optimum
- Evolution of Cooperation
- Strategies in the Repeated Game
- Evolution of Strategies
- Evaluation Results
- Evolution of Strategies
- Gain of Evolution
- Conclusions
- References
- A Game Theoretic Approach for Multi-hop Power Line Communications
- Introduction
- System Model
- A Game Theoretic Approach for Multi-hop PLC Transmission
- Distributed Network Formation Algorithm
- Simulation Results and Analysis
- Conclusions
- References
- "To Sense" or "Not to Sense" in Energy-Efficient Power Control Games
- Introduction
- Review of Known Results
- Review of the One-Shot Energy-Efficient Power Control Game (Without Sensing)
- Review of the Stackelberg Energy-Efficient Power ControlGame (With Sensing)
- ANewGame:TheK-Player Sensing Game
- Sensing Game Description
- The Sensing Game Is a Weighted Potential Game
- Equilibrium Analysis
- Detailed Analysis for the 2-Player Case
- The 2-Player Hybrid Power Control Game
- The 2-Player Sensing Game
- Conclusion
- References
- Session G1: P2P and Social Networks
- Designing Social Norm Based Incentive Schemes to Sustain Cooperation in a Large Community
- Introduction
- Model
- Analysis of Optimal Social Norms
- Conclusions
- References
- Minimizing the Social Cost of an Epidemic
- Introduction
- ModelDescription
- CostofDisease
- Exact Disease Cost for Large n
- Bounds for General n
- Minimizing Social Cost with Immunization
- Social Cost Calculation
- Optimal Immunization
- Conclusion and Future Work
- References
- "Two Is a Crowd" - Optimal Trend Adoption in Social Networks
- Introduction
- Related Work
- Model and Problem Statement
- Social Network Graph
- Asymptotic Behavior
- Trendsetters
- Trend Adoption
- Adoption Process
- Problem Statement
- Main Result
- Numerical Results
- Equivalent Model
- Analysis
- Decision Policy in Subcritical Phase
- Conclusions
- References
- Session G2: Economics of Network QoS
- Paris Metro Pricing for Internet Service Differentiation
- Introduction
- SystemModel
- Single Pricing
- Differentiated Pricing
- Impact of PMP on Revenue and User Subscription
- Uniform Distribution
- Competition: Duopoly
- Three Prices
- Four Prices
- Discussion
- Conclusion
- References
- Joint Price and QoS Market Share Game with Adversarial Service Providers and Migrating Customers
- Introduction
- Related Works and Their Drawbacks
- Organization of the Paper
- Problem Formulation : Customers Steady Behaviour
- Service Providers Strategic Decision
- Discussion : Special But Realistic Cases
- Numerical Investigation
- Migration Rate Model
- Price Game with Fixed QoS
- QoS Game with Fixed Price
- Convergence to Nash Equilibrium
- Concluding Remarks
- References
- Capacity Allocation Games for Network-Coded Multicast Streaming
- Introduction
- Related Work
- System Model and Formulation
- Capacity Allocation Games on the 2-Tier Network Model
- Generalizations for Arbitrary Network Models
- Experimental Results
- References
- Author Index
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