Probability and Evidence
Published on 27. July 2016
978-1-316-56044-0 (ISBN)
Description
In this influential study of central issues in the philosophy of science, Paul Horwich elaborates on an important conception of probability, diagnosing the failure of previous attempts to resolve these issues as stemming from a too-rigid conception of belief. Adopting a Bayesian strategy, he argues for a probabilistic approach, yielding a more complete understanding of the characteristics of scientific reasoning and methodology. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Colin Howson, illuminating its enduring importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this engaging work has been revived for a new generation of readers.
Reviews / Votes
'... the strongest and most influential parts of Probability and Evidence are Horwich's solutions to various puzzles about scientific reasoning ... the book might very well still be of considerable interest to those who are looking for an engaging and readable introduction to the topic of scientific reasoning from a Bayesian perspective.' Finnur Dellsen, MetascienceMore details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Publishing group
Cambridge University Press
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
5 Tables, black and white; 10 Line drawings, unspecified
File size
2,07 MB
ISBN-13
978-1-316-56044-0 (9781316560440)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Paul Horwich
Probability and Evidence
Book
08/2016
Cambridge University Press
€73.80
Shipment within 15-20 days
Person
Paul Horwich is Professor of Philosophy at New York University. He is best known for his contributions to the philosophy of science, including a probabilistic account of scientific methodology. His most recent publications include Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy (2012) and Truth - Meaning - Reality (2010).
Content
Preface to this edition Colin Howson; Part I. Methodology: 1. Introduction; 2. Aspects of the scientific method; 3. A taste of Bayesianism; Part II. Probability: 4. The primitive theory; 5. Subjectivism; 6. The rationalist interpretation; 7. The logical interpretation; 8. The evidential state; 9. The empirical interpretation; Part III. Confirmation: 10. Explications; 11. The paradox; 12. A Bayesian pseudo-solution to the problem of induction; 13. Projection; Part IV. Induction: Section 1. The Nature of Inductive Inference; Section 2. Conditions of Rationality: 14. Demonstrable reliability; 15. The demonstrable reliability of c+; 16. Immodesty; 17. Audacity; Section 3. The Justification of Induction: 18. The impossibility of a noncircular rationale; 19. Inductive demonstration of reliability; 20. Semantic justification; Part V. Prediction: 21. Surprise; 22. Severe tests; 23. Ad hoc hypothesis; 24. Prediction versus accommodation; Part VI. Evidence: 25. The evidential value of varied data; 26. The value of further data; Part VII. Realism: 27. Popper; 28. Realism versus instrumentalism; 29. Putnam; 30. Glymour; 31. Conclusion; Bibliography; Index.
