Introduction

There is another world and it is this world.

Franz Wright

Has theology lost its place? Does it belong to this world, or to another? And if another, is this other world superimposed irreducibly upon this one, or merely a projection, reflection, or reification of this world? Two fundamental orientations of thought propose themselves: either truly affirm or critically accept this other world. For those truly affirming it, it is this world below that is changed in reference to the one beyond. But for those critically accepting another world, it is the other world that is changed into a persistent illusion or illusive projection. And when it comes to theology, and especially political theology, there is a world of difference between these two orientations.

Transcendence, Immanence, Subjectivity, Freedom

Speaking of this world and a world beyond summons the themes of transcendence and immanence. What is transcendent to what? From what perspective is something immanent to something else? Transcendence is always transcendence of. But which world, and whose? From a more classical perspective transcendence refers to a transcendent world above (invisible, immutable, eternal) that sustains and makes intelligible the immanent world below (visible, changeable, temporal) of which we are a part, subjects caught within and between the two (spirited bodies or embodied spirits). Transcendence, in this perspective, "is that which is beyond the visible and temporal world of humans, but as such, it is reached by humans in the movement beyond themselves."1 The transcendence of the immanent world is a movement beyond, a movement that subjects accomplish or participate in. Transcendence, therefore, is doubled: first as that which is beyond the world, and second, as the act by which subjects reach this transcendence as a form of self-transcendence.

But in the modern turn toward the subject the doubling of transcendence (transcendence of the world and the transcending of subjects) turns to a doubling of immanence. From Descartes to Kant, the world below is not grounded in a transcendent world above, but is grounded in the subject itself. The metaphysics of transcendence is replaced with the metaphysics of subjectivity such that the world beyond the subject is now the non-subjective world of immanent objects. This rebounds into the shrinking of immanence from encompassing the entire world of material objects to encompassing the world of thought representing these objects. In modernity, "immanence is no longer the world within our reach . but is our own subjectivity."2 This creates a doubling of immanence: first as the world in opposition to otherworldly transcendence, and second as the immanence of thought for the subject. Modern subjectivity, then, frames the problem of transcendence as the world of immanent objects that the subject seeks to grasp, rather than as a transcendence beyond the world of such objects.

Being intimately woven together, transcendence, immanence, and subjectivity reveal one's fundamental "matter of orientation in philosophy"3 and of theology. When oriented around the subject, to speak of the transcendence of the world is to ask if and how there is a world other than subjectivity and how subjectivity deals with or accounts for this world. But when oriented around the world itself, to speak of the transcendence of the world is to ask about the being and the beyond of this world. Each orientation entails shifting the primary definition of transcendence and immanence, and each includes a particular account of the subject. The first orientation construes immanence as that which is thinkable for subjectivity. The second construes immanence as the totality of beings, or being itself, which may or may not be thinkable for the subject.

The complex weaving together of these elements reveals the basis for the title of this work: transcending subjects. On the one hand, "transcending" can be an adjective describing "subjects." This places the emphasis on the subject and its act of transcending, referring specifically to the self-transcending process by which subjectivity moves beyond its own immanent world of thought. On the other hand, "transcending" could also be a participle acting upon "subjects." This would place the emphasis not on the subject that transcends, but on the transcending of subjectivity itself, i.e. the subject is being transcended by and to something else. These two ways of reading the title, that subjects actively self-transcend and that subjects are transcended, is the central concern of this study.

Rather than endlessly qualify transcendence, subjectivity, and immanence in advance of the planned discussion of Hegel and Augustine, we will modify William Desmond's classification regarding transcendence as a baseline.4 What Desmond calls first transcendence (T1) regards the transcendence of external objects in the world, related but not reducible to conscious thought. Second transcendence (T2) is the self-transcendence of subjectivity as it relates to, yet exceeds and is not reducible to, the first transcendence of external objects. This is the self-transcending power of thought about external objects and its freedom within this world of objects. Third transcendence (T3) refers to a beyond in relation to both external objects (T1) and the self-transcendence of subjectivity (T2). This third type of transcendence is typical of religious or metaphysical thought and has recently received a severe onto-theological critique. Because this investigation is not concerned directly with a philosophy or theology of nature, we will combine the first two into a single category in what will be called "self-transcending immanence." Self-transcending immanence affirms the non-reducible interrelation between the transcendence of objects and the self-transcendence of subjects. The second category affirms an actual transcendence in the ontological sense, and I will just use the word "transcendence" to signify this ontological meaning in regard to what I will call "self-immanenting transcendence."

Hegel will guide our understanding of self-transcending immanence and its critical affirmation of another world. As we will see, Hegel critically affirms transcendence as the necessary passage of thought's own self-determining freedom. For Hegel, to truly affirm another world is to hinder freedom in this world. In this sense, actual transcendence always competes with the freedom of self-transcendence. On the other hand, Augustine's orientation towards transcendence offers an alternative vision freedom. Augustine sees God's transcendence not merely as an opposed "other" but gives an account of God's "self-immanenting transcendence" in which God comes into this world in order to re-establish freedom. Of course, the cogency and plausibility of these distinctions between Hegel's "self-transcending immanence" and Augustine's "self-immanenting transcendence" will only be seen at the end of this investigation. As of yet they only exercise heuristic value in positing different fundamental orientations in philosophy and theology between a critical and actual affirmation of transcendence.

A Political Subjectivity?

This study, however, will not focus solely on these philosophical and theological problems, but will instead ask about political possibilities. Within the broader orientations between transcendence and immanence, Hegel and Augustine represent two forms of understanding freedom and social change. The general questions of transcendence, immanence, and subjectivity will therefore run through the specific questions of political subjectivity and the possibility of engaging in social criticism and offering substantial change.

To understand the issues surrounding the possibility of a political subjectivity within Hegel and Augustine let us first observe a recent interaction between Romand Coles and Stanley Hauerwas. Coles seeks to express the possibilities of a radical democracy understood as a receptive generosity. Hauerwas points to a radical ecclesiology expressing itself as repentant orthodoxy. Their dialogue, captured in Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary: Conversations between a Radical Democrat and a Christian, will clarify the terms of this inquiry regarding a political subjectivity capable of social criticism and change, and how transcendence and immanence play within each account.5

Romand Coles: Radical democracy as receptive generosity

Away from the corporate mega-state, containing a rhetoric of democracy even while eroding its possibility, Romand Coles seeks a radical democracy, a democracy never fully in possession of itself, a democracy that is fugitive in nature.6 Unlike the attempts to gain a share of State power, radical democracy attempts to share power through a persistent tending to others as a process of mutual benefit.7 The characteristics of such a radical democracy consist in tension-dwelling practices between (1) the past and future, (2) receptive listening and prophetic voicing, (3) immediate goals and deep transformation,...