Principles of Group Solidarity
1st Edition
Published on 24. August 1988
288 pages
978-0-520-90897-0 (ISBN)
Description
Social scientists have long recognized that solidarity is essential for such phenomena as social order, class, and ethnic consciousness, and the provision of collective goods. In presenting a new general theory of group solidarity, Michael Hechter here contends that it is indeed possible to build a theory of solidarity based on the action of rational individuals and in doing so he goes beyond the timeworn disciplinary boundaries separating the various social sciences.
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Michael Hechter
Principles of Group Solidarity
Book
08/1988
1st Edition
University of California Press
€33.43
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Person
Michael Hechter is Professor of Sociology at the University of Arizona.
Content
Tables and Figures
Preface
I. Introduction
II. The Problem
Sociological Approaches to Group Solidarity
Rational Choice Approaches to Group Solidarity
III. A Theory of Group Solidarity
The Extensiveness of Corporate Obligations
The Probability of Compliance
IV. The Necessity of Formal Controls
Prosocial Motivations
Gaming Strategies Among Rational Egoists
V. Dependence and Party Solidarity
Legislators' Dependence on the Party for Re-Election
Legislators' Dependence on the Party for Patronage
VI. The Production of Formal Controls
Rotating Credit Associations
Insurance Groups
By-Products of Insurance Groups
VII. The Limits of Compensation in Capitalist Firms
Costs of Input Assessment
Costs of Output Assessment
The Internal Labor Market as a Quasi-Obligatory Group
VIII. Economizing on Control Costs in Intentional Communities
Monitoring Economies
Sanctioning Economies
IX. Conclusion
Markets and Groups
The Family
Class and Status Solidarity
Solidarity in the National Society
Bibliography
Index
Preface
I. Introduction
II. The Problem
Sociological Approaches to Group Solidarity
Rational Choice Approaches to Group Solidarity
III. A Theory of Group Solidarity
The Extensiveness of Corporate Obligations
The Probability of Compliance
IV. The Necessity of Formal Controls
Prosocial Motivations
Gaming Strategies Among Rational Egoists
V. Dependence and Party Solidarity
Legislators' Dependence on the Party for Re-Election
Legislators' Dependence on the Party for Patronage
VI. The Production of Formal Controls
Rotating Credit Associations
Insurance Groups
By-Products of Insurance Groups
VII. The Limits of Compensation in Capitalist Firms
Costs of Input Assessment
Costs of Output Assessment
The Internal Labor Market as a Quasi-Obligatory Group
VIII. Economizing on Control Costs in Intentional Communities
Monitoring Economies
Sanctioning Economies
IX. Conclusion
Markets and Groups
The Family
Class and Status Solidarity
Solidarity in the National Society
Bibliography
Index
